ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Monograph available for loan
    Monograph available for loan
    New York : Anchor Press
    Call number: PIK B 160-00-0435
    Type of Medium: Monograph available for loan
    Pages: 465 p.
    ISBN: 0385183461
    Location: A 18 - must be ordered
    Branch Library: PIK Library
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Publication Date: 2011-09-21
    Description: Physiological sensing of O2 tension (partial O2 pressure, pO2) plays an important role in some mammalian cellular systems, but striated muscle generally is not considered to be among them. Here we describe a molecular mechanism in skeletal muscle that acutely couples changes in pO2 to altered calcium release through the ryanodine receptor–Ca2+-release channel (RyR1). Reactive oxygen species are generated in proportion to pO2 by NADPH oxidase 4 (Nox4) in the sarcoplasmic reticulum, and the consequent oxidation of a small set of RyR1 cysteine thiols results in increased RyR1 activity and Ca2+ release in isolated sarcoplasmic reticulum and in cultured myofibers and enhanced contractility of intact muscle. Thus, Nox4 is an O2 sensor in skeletal muscle, and O2-coupled hydrogen peroxide production by Nox4 governs the redox state of regulatory RyR1 thiols and thereby governs muscle performance. These findings reveal a molecular mechanism for O2-based signaling by an NADPH oxidase and demonstrate a physiological role for oxidative modification of RyR1.
    Print ISSN: 0027-8424
    Electronic ISSN: 1091-6490
    Topics: Biology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Publication Date: 2014-08-13
    Description: The mammalian sex-determining factor SRY comprises a conserved high-mobility group (HMG) box DNA-binding domain and poorly conserved regions outside the HMG box. Mouse Sry is unusual in that it includes a C-terminal polyglutamine (polyQ) tract that is absent in nonrodent SRY proteins, and yet, paradoxically, is essential for male sex...
    Print ISSN: 0027-8424
    Electronic ISSN: 1091-6490
    Topics: Biology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
    Publication Date: 2008-11-21
    Description: 〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- England -- Nature. 2008 Nov 20;456(7220):326-7. doi: 10.1038/456326a.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, USA. bowles@santafe.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19020603" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Animals ; Biological Evolution ; *Conflict (Psychology) ; *Cooperative Behavior ; *Human Characteristics ; Humans ; Models, Biological ; Violence/psychology/statistics & numerical data ; Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2006-12-13
    Description: Humans behave altruistically in natural settings and experiments. A possible explanation-that groups with more altruists survive when groups compete-has long been judged untenable on empirical grounds for most species. But there have been no empirical tests of this explanation for humans. My empirical estimates show that genetic differences between early human groups are likely to have been great enough so that lethal intergroup competition could account for the evolution of altruism. Crucial to this process were distinctive human practices such as sharing food beyond the immediate family, monogamy, and other forms of reproductive leveling. These culturally transmitted practices presuppose advanced cognitive and linguistic capacities, possibly accounting for the distinctive forms of altruism found in our species.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2006 Dec 8;314(5805):1569-72.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA, and Universita di Siena, 17 Piazza San Francesco, Siena, Italy. bowles@santafe.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17158320" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Archaeology ; *Biological Evolution ; Climate ; *Competitive Behavior ; Cultural Evolution ; Genetic Variation ; Genetics, Population ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; Mathematics ; Models, Theoretical ; Population Dynamics ; *Reproduction ; Selection, Genetic ; Violence ; Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2007-10-27
    Description: Altruism-benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself-and parochialism-hostility toward individuals not of one's own ethnic, racial, or other group-are common human behaviors. The intersection of the two-which we term "parochial altruism"-is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one's payoffs by comparison to what one would gain by eschewing these behaviors. But parochial altruism could have evolved if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in these conflicts. Our game-theoretic analysis and agent-based simulations show that under conditions likely to have been experienced by late Pleistocene and early Holocene humans, neither parochialism nor altruism would have been viable singly, but by promoting group conflict, they could have evolved jointly.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Choi, Jung-Kyoo -- Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2007 Oct 26;318(5850):636-40.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉School of Economics and Trade, Kyungpook National University, 1370 Sankyuk-dong, Buk-gu, Daegu 702-701, Korea.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17962562" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Algorithms ; *Altruism ; *Biological Evolution ; Computer Simulation ; Cooperative Behavior ; Female ; Game Theory ; *Hostility ; Humans ; Male ; Models, Psychological ; Reproduction ; *Social Behavior ; *Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    Publication Date: 2009-11-11
    Description: Small-scale human societies range from foraging bands with a strong egalitarian ethos to more economically stratified agrarian and pastoral societies. We explain this variation in inequality using a dynamic model in which a population's long-run steady-state level of inequality depends on the extent to which its most important forms of wealth are transmitted within families across generations. We estimate the degree of intergenerational transmission of three different types of wealth (material, embodied, and relational), as well as the extent of wealth inequality in 21 historical and contemporary populations. We show that intergenerational transmission of wealth and wealth inequality are substantial among pastoral and small-scale agricultural societies (on a par with or even exceeding the most unequal modern industrial economies) but are limited among horticultural and foraging peoples (equivalent to the most egalitarian of modern industrial populations). Differences in the technology by which a people derive their livelihood and in the institutions and norms making up the economic system jointly contribute to this pattern.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2792081/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2792081/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Borgerhoff Mulder, Monique -- Bowles, Samuel -- Hertz, Tom -- Bell, Adrian -- Beise, Jan -- Clark, Greg -- Fazzio, Ila -- Gurven, Michael -- Hill, Kim -- Hooper, Paul L -- Irons, William -- Kaplan, Hillard -- Leonetti, Donna -- Low, Bobbi -- Marlowe, Frank -- McElreath, Richard -- Naidu, Suresh -- Nolin, David -- Piraino, Patrizio -- Quinlan, Rob -- Schniter, Eric -- Sear, Rebecca -- Shenk, Mary -- Smith, Eric Alden -- von Rueden, Christopher -- Wiessner, Polly -- R01 AG024119-01/AG/NIA NIH HHS/ -- R24 HD042828/HD/NICHD NIH HHS/ -- R24 HD042828-10/HD/NICHD NIH HHS/ -- T32 HD007168-31/HD/NICHD NIH HHS/ -- T32 HD007543/HD/NICHD NIH HHS/ -- T32 HD007543-10/HD/NICHD NIH HHS/ -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2009 Oct 30;326(5953):682-8. doi: 10.1126/science.1178336.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Anthropology and Center for Population Biology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, USA. mborgerhoffmulder@ucdavis.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19900925" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Anthropology, Cultural ; Humans ; *Models, Economic ; *Social Class
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    Publication Date: 2008-06-21
    Description: High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's "moral sentiments." Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2008 Jun 20;320(5883):1605-9. doi: 10.1126/science.1152110.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. samuel.bowles@gmail.com〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18566278" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Economics ; Games, Experimental ; Humans ; *Morals ; *Motivation ; Personal Autonomy ; Policy Making ; Public Policy ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    Publication Date: 2009-06-06
    Description: Since Darwin, intergroup hostilities have figured prominently in explanations of the evolution of human social behavior. Yet whether ancestral humans were largely "peaceful" or "warlike" remains controversial. I ask a more precise question: If more cooperative groups were more likely to prevail in conflicts with other groups, was the level of intergroup violence sufficient to influence the evolution of human social behavior? Using a model of the evolutionary impact of between-group competition and a new data set that combines archaeological evidence on causes of death during the Late Pleistocene and early Holocene with ethnographic and historical reports on hunter-gatherer populations, I find that the estimated level of mortality in intergroup conflicts would have had substantial effects, allowing the proliferation of group-beneficial behaviors that were quite costly to the individual altruist.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2009 Jun 5;324(5932):1293-8. doi: 10.1126/science.1168112.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. samuel.bowles@gmail.com〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19498163" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Anthropology, Cultural ; Archaeology ; *Biological Evolution ; Cooperative Behavior ; *Cultural Evolution ; Female ; Genetic Variation ; Humans ; Male ; Microsatellite Repeats ; Models, Theoretical ; *Social Behavior ; *Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    Publication Date: 2010-05-01
    Description: Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punishment because rare unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and hence are eliminated. Moreover, in human behavioral experiments in which punishment is uncoordinated, the sum of costs to punishers and their targets often exceeds the benefits of the increased cooperation that results from the punishment of free-riders. As a result, cooperation sustained by punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in which punishment of free-riders is not an option. Here, we present a model of coordinated punishment that is calibrated for ancestral human conditions and captures a further aspect of reality missing from both models and experiments: The total cost of punishing a free-rider declines as the number of punishers increases. We show that punishment can proliferate when rare, and when it does, it enhances group-average payoffs.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Boyd, Robert -- Gintis, Herbert -- Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2010 Apr 30;328(5978):617-20. doi: 10.1126/science.1183665.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA. rboyd@anthro.ucla.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20431013" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Communication ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Games, Experimental ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; *Models, Psychological ; *Punishment ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...