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  • 1
    Monograph available for loan
    Monograph available for loan
    Wirtschaft ohne Ethik? : eine ökonomisch-philosophische Analyse (2017)
    Stuttgart : Reclam
    Details Availability
    Call number: PIK B 050-18-91413
    Type of Medium: Monograph available for loan
    Pages: 276 Seiten , Diagramme , 20.5 cm x 12.5 cm
    ISBN: 3150110912 , 9783150110911
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
    Language: German
    Note: Contents: I. Prinzipien einer freiheitlich-rechtsstaatlichen Wirtschaftsethik ; 1. Wirtschaftsethisch relevante Grundwerte freiheitlicher Gesellschaften ; 2. Gemeinwohl und individuelle Entscheidungsautonomie ; 3. Ethik und individuelle (Vertrags-)Autonomie ; 4. Zur (öffentlichen) Sicherung der Freiwilligkeit ; 5. Folgerungen für die Unternehmens- und Wirtschaftsethik ; II. Exemplarische wirtschaftsethisch- und unternehmensethische Falldiskussionen ; 1. Vorstandsgehälter und leistungsgerechte Entlohnung ; 2. Unternehmensübernahmen und -beteiligungen ; 3. Patentrechte und Interessen der »Dritten Welt« ; III. Manager und Verantwortung ; 1. Verantwortung – Elementare Unterscheidungen ; 2. Shareholder- vs. Stakeholder-Ansatz ; 3. (In-)direkte Gewinnorientierung ; 4. Der Manager und das Verhältnis von Eigentumsprivileg und Gewinnstreben ; 5. Friedman vs. Freeman – eine Bestandsaufnahme ; IV. Bindungen ; 1. Bindung an (moralische) Regeln und rationale Interessenverfolgung ; 2. Tugend und intrinsische Motivation am Beispiel des Ultimatumspiels ; 3. Zur Vorteilhaftigkeit von unternehmerischen (Moral-)Bindungen ; 4. Recht handeln – auch wenn die Welt darüber zugrunde geht? ; V. Elemente ethischer Theoriebildung ; 1. Grundlegendes ; 2. Utilitaristische Theorien ; 3. Anti-utilitaristische universalistische Ethiken ; 4. Partikularistische Zweck-Mittel-Ethik ; VI. Zum Überlegungsgleichgewicht ; 1. Rechtfertigung für enttäuschte Kenner ; 2. Das Überlegungsgleichgewicht: Leitintuition ; 3. Die Herstellung von Überlegungsgleichgewichten – eine Skizze ; 4. Anlässe zur Herstellung eines Überlegungsgleichgewichts und die Rolle von Regeln ; 5. Die Methode und ihre Ansprüche ; VII. Wo der Pluralismus endet ; 1. Die unvollständige Realisierbarkeit von Idealen der Zwangsfreiheit ; 2. Individuelle ethische Verantwortung ; 3. Warum es im Westen besser ist
    Location: A 18 - must be ordered
    Branch Library: PIK Library
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One-Off Conflict (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 57 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Most social scientists' views of conflict and cooperation in society are shaped by very elementary, one-off, two by two symmetric simultaneous move games like prisoner's dilemma, chicken, assurance or stag hunt. We think that this diet of examples leads to biased accounts in particular of distributional conflict, and therefore suggest that asymmetry in payoffs and move structure be taken into account systematically. In this paper a new paradigm of asymmetric games to study basic distributional conflicts is introduced, illustrated numerically and discussed theoretically. The results of exploratory experiments on the empirical side of the matter are also reported.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00251.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Rationality and Reality (2001)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    Kyklos 54 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00155
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Finite Lives and Social Institutions (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 47 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: ‘The days of our years are threescore yeas and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away.’
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02066.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    COMPETITION OR CO-OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Metroeconomica 45 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: ”For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coercive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justness of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe…” (Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 14).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.1994.tb00018.x
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Logo logic (1990)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 125-127 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393036
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Reviews (1990)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 129-134 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393037
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On justifying a minimum welfare state (1993)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 4 (1993), S. 159-172 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Since anarchy is not viable, limited government is the best that the realistic libertarian can hope for. But limited government will itself always be threatened by an inherent tendency to transgress its limits. In modern western societies the regulatory and redistributive welfare state is the major threat to a constitution of liberty. However, a “minimum welfare state” which redistributes personal income among its citizens may comply with the same principles of individual liberty and the rule of law that are embodied in the protective state. Since any state, including the minimal state, necessarily incorporates regulation and redistribution and thus is a welfare state of sorts the non-anarchist liberal should turn against welfare state privileges rather than against redistribution and regulation per se. He may even have good reason to go beyond the minimal state to found a “minimum welfare state” if this is instrumental in securing liberty under the rule of law.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393078
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Reviews (1992)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 3 (1992), S. 267-287 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393123
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Evolutionarily Stable Co-operative Commitments (2000)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 49 (2000), S. 197-222 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Trust ; Indirect evolution ; Signaling ; Incomplete contracts ; Intrinsic motivation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract If contracts cannot be fully specified Pareto optimal results may be closed off because individuals cannot rationally trust each other's promises. This paper assumes that human individuals can become internally committed not to act opportunistically and that others can detect to a certain extent whether they are dealing with an uncommitted (untrustworthy) or a committed (trustworthy) partner. Adopting an `indirect evolutionary approach' we show that co-operative commitments can survive in evolutionary competition even if conventional mechanisms like repetition, reputation, contract or promising are lacking. If detection of uncommitted individuals is neither too costly nor too unreliable there will in general be a `niche' for both committed and uncommitted actors even in one off large numbers' interactions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026570914311
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