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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats (2000)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 10 (2000), S. 437-447 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: JEL-classification: C70, C72 ; Key words: Ecological stability – Species survival – Inter- and intraspecies competition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Whoever exists belongs to a species, which did not become extinct, has a (geno-)type, which should be well adjusted, and lives in a habitat which has been sustainable for a long time. We do not only analyze interspecies competition and the conditions for species survival, but also intraspecies competition of (geno-)types as in evolutionary biology and game theory. Survival in inter- and intraspecies competition together with sustainability define ecological stability, a concept which we illustrate by an example of solitary and social grazers who compete for food supply and who are endangered by the same predators. Although our approach is inspired by empirical evidence, no systematic attempt is made to apply it to some specific ecology.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910000045
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    TAX EVASION AND STATE PRODUCTIVITY—AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (2005)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Metroeconomica 56 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In an overlapping generations experiment with multiple families participants can support their parents directly and thereby reduce their tax burden or rely on tax-financed old-age support. State productivity is captured by the factor with which total tax revenues are multiplied to determine old-age support. This factor is systematically varied from 0.75 to 1.25. Tax payments depend on declared endowment. Tax evasion is possible, but monitored. Our results suggest that state productivity influences neither direct support of own parents nor tax evasion. The main effect is that rich endowment triggers relatively low support of own parents and high (and more frequent) tax evasion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00208.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dictatorship—an Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power (1997)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    Metroeconomica 48 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Inspired by Bolton and Zwick (1995) we study four different games, namely the ultimatum and dictator game as well as the two games in which a veto (non-acceptance) of the responder implies that only one of the two players does not receive the proposed payoff. In the experiment the participants had to play either as the proposer or as the responder in all four games. Only the proposer was privately informed about the actual cake size which could be either small or large. The main results were that the offers were more generous when the responder could only veto the proposer's payoff than in ultimatum bargaining which, in turn, induced more generous offers than dictatorship. The worst proposals were observed when the responder could only reject his own payoff. A similar tendency was also observed for the minimal offers required for acceptance although many acceptance strategies were non-monotonic. Allocators with large cakes did not hide behind the small cake by offering an equal share of the small cake. A pre-experimental questionnaire designed to trigger considerations of backward induction led to more generosity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-999X.00033
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One-Off Conflict (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 57 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Most social scientists' views of conflict and cooperation in society are shaped by very elementary, one-off, two by two symmetric simultaneous move games like prisoner's dilemma, chicken, assurance or stag hunt. We think that this diet of examples leads to biased accounts in particular of distributional conflict, and therefore suggest that asymmetry in payoffs and move structure be taken into account systematically. In this paper a new paradigm of asymmetric games to study basic distributional conflicts is introduced, illustrated numerically and discussed theoretically. The results of exploratory experiments on the empirical side of the matter are also reported.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00251.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Attitudes Towards Risk: An Experiment (2003)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Metroeconomica 54 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The evaluations of a repeated lottery with and without the option to sell the second–stage lottery are compared theoretically and experimentally. Comparing individuals’ risk attitudes, we find that risk attitudes differ depending on the measure of risk attitude applied. We also find that subjects show low or no risk aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in the second stage of the decision problem. These findings cast doubts on the suitability of the random price mechanism for truthful revelation of willingness to pay in sequential decision problems.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-999X.00161
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Metroeconomica 55 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical data or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. The female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of two forms of joint venture where more labor division makes her more exploitable by her partner. More specifically, the random profit of the joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in the case of a full engagement whereas marriage bargaining is procedurally fair in the case of a low engagement. Our treatment variables are her and his outside options representing different attitudes to investing in human capital.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0026-1386.2004.00179.x
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    COMPETITION OR CO-OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Metroeconomica 45 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: ”For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coercive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justness of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe…” (Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 14).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.1994.tb00018.x
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Do people care about democracy? An experiment exploring the value of voting rights (1997)
    Springer
    Public choice 91 (1997), S. 27-47 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In almost all democratic national elections an individual vote cannot change the election outcome. The fact that many individuals nevertheless participate voluntarily in such elections suggests that people do care about democracy as such. This experiment investigates the value of democratic voting rights by providing participants the chance to sell them. More specifically, an incentive compatible mechanism is used to elicit the willingness-to-accept value of the voting right in the election of the German Bundestag on 16 October 1994. A postexperimental questionnaire makes it possible to assess the relative importance of answers to the frequently raised question: Why do people vote?
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004972900845
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Efficiency by trust in fairness? multiperiod ultimatum bargaining experiments with an increasing cake (1993)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 22 (1993), S. 51-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Previous ultimatum bargaining experiments have shown that bargainers face the conflict whether to exploit bargaining power or to comply with basic norms of distributive justice. In multiperiod ultimatum bargaining for an increasing cake, trust in fairness can enable cooperation and thus more efficient results but is also open to opportunistic exploitation. In such a game the two players take turns in being the one who suggests an agreement and decides whether this is the final proposal, whereas his partner can only accept this proposal or reject it. While the game theoretic solution implies an immediate agreement assigning nearly all the cake to the demanding player, efficiency requires to postpone the agreement to the last possible round. Our 2 × 2-factorial design varies the number of possible bargaining periods and the cake increase, allowing us to explore several hypotheses.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01245570
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives (1995)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 24 (1995), S. 323-344 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Reciprocal behavior means that recipients of harm respond in kind, that is by harming the other. We try to explain why such a behavior may be rational, although the damage cannot be prevented anymore. Our main approach is the one of evolutionary stability, i.e. we will show that mutants established with incentives to reciprocate are more effective, measured in terms of (reproductive) success. The evolutionary approach is applied to a game model whose sequential decision process allows for reciprocal behavior. We allow for complete and incomplete information about reciprocal incentives. Other ways to generalize our analysis are studied only for the case of complete information.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01243036
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