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  • Articles  (12,850)
  • Springer  (12,850)
  • 1995-1999  (12,850)
  • Economics  (12,850)
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  • Articles  (12,850)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 559-563 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C71 ; D42 ; D51.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically, and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers.
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  • 2
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 457-464 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D90 ; C61.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Boldrin and Montrucchio [2] showed that any twice continuously differentiable function could be obtained as the optimal policy function for some value of the discount parameter in a deterministic neoclassical growth model. I extend their result to the stochastic growth model with non-degenerate shocks to preferences or technology. This indicates that one can obtain complex dynamics endogenously in a wide variety of economic models, both under certainty and uncertainty. Further, this result motivates the analysis of convergence of adaptive learning mechanisms to rational expectations in economic models with (potentially) complicated dynamics.
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  • 3
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 467-494 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C60 ; D60 ; G10 ; D52.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this paper we develop a differential technique for investigating the welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets. Utilizing this technique, and after parametrizing the standard competitive, pure-exchange economy by both endowments and utility functions, we establish the following (weakly) generic property: Let S be the number of states, I be the number of assets and H be the number of households, and consider a particular financial equilibrium. Then, provided that the degree of market incompleteness is sufficiently larger than the extent of household heterogeneity, S−I≥2H−1 [resp. S−I≥H+1], there is an open set of single assets [resp. pairs of assets] whose introduction can make every household better off (and, symmetrically, an open set of single assets [resp. pairs of assets] whose introduction can make them all worse off ). We also devise a very simple nonparametric procedure for reducing extensive household heterogeneity to manageable size, a procedure which not only makes our restrictions on market incompleteness more palatable, but could also prove to be quite useful in other applications involving smooth analysis.
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  • 4
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 523-543 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D2 ; D8 ; L2.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. At an interim stage players possessing only their private information freely communicate with each other to coordinate their strategies. This results in a core strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players' alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. Now with new information thus obtained from each other, the players play a new game to re-write their contract. In all of the optimization and gaming just described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler's multidivisional firm.
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  • 5
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C60 ; D60 ; D52.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this paper we re-examine generic constrained suboptimality of equilibrium allocations with incomplete numeraire asset markets. We provide a general framework which is capable of resolving some issues left open by the previous literature, and encompasses many kinds of intervention in partially controlled market economies. In particular, we establish generic constrained suboptimality, as studied by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, even without an upper bound on the number of households. Moreover, we consider the case where asset markets are left open, and the planner can make lump-sum transfers in a limited number of goods. We show that such a perfectly anticipated wealth redistribution policy, though consistent with the assumed incomplete financial structure, is typically effective.
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  • 6
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 545-562 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: E43 ; E44 ; D91.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances.
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  • 7
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 563-584 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D5.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
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  • 8
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 603-627 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C70 ; C71 ; C72.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted) players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.
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  • 9
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 585-601 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: C71.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
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  • 10
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 629-641 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D20 ; D60 ; D81 ; D71.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. The concept of translation homotheticity is introduced and defined. It is demonstrated that translation homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for: disposable surplus to be independent of the reference utility, Luenberger's compensating and equivalent benefits to be independent of the reference utility and always equal to one another, the risk premium to be independent of reference-level utility, absolute indexes of income inequality to be reference free, and social-welfare functionals to satisfy invariance with respect to the choice of a common origin. Translation homotheticity is also sufficient for Hicks' many-market consumer surplus measure to be a second-order approximation to disposable surplus, compensating benefit, and equivalent benefit. If preferences are translation homothetic and appropriately quadratic, Hicks, many-market consumer surplus measure is exact for these welfare measures.
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  • 11
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 643-655 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C70 ; C73 ; D81 ; D82 ; D83 ; D84.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria. Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993) model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs, and not actual play, are subjective equilibria.
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  • 12
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 667-672 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: C78.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.
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  • 13
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    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 657-665 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D83.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades – situations where socially valuable information is wasted – can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a sufficiently unpredictable way.
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  • 14
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 597-607 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Turnpike theorem, Input output matrix. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C67, D90, O21.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper establishes a ‘turnpike theorem’ for a closed linear model of production with a primitive input requirement matrix. Optimal programs of resource allocation have a ‘turnpike property’ if the growth factor of every sector in the economy converges, in the long run, to a common value. The usefulness of such a theorem is due to the fact that the input requirement matrix for an economy with a large number of goods may be primitive (some power of the matrix is strictly positive).
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  • 15
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 77-102 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D31 ; D63.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Given a set of longitudinal data pertaining to two populations, a question of interest is the following: Which population has experienced a greater extent of income mobility? The aim of the present paper is to develop a systematic way of answering this question. We first put forth four axioms for income movement-mobility indices, and show that a familiar class of measures is characterized by these axioms. An unambiguous (partial) ordering is then defined as the intersection of the (complete) orderings induced by the mobility measures which belong to the characterized class; a transformation of income distributions is “more mobile” than another if, and only if, the former is ranked higher than the latter for all mobility measures which satisfy our axioms. Unfortunately, our mobility ordering depends on a parameter, and therefore, it is not readily apparent how one can apply it to panel data directly. In the second part of the paper, therefore, we derive several sets of parameter-free necessary and sufficient conditions which allow one to use the proposed mobility ordering in making unambiguous income mobility comparisons in practice.
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  • 16
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 103-122 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C61 ; D51 ; G12.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper studies conditions under which the price of an asset is uniquely determined by its fundamental value – i.e., no bubbles can arise – in Lucas-type asset pricing models with unbounded utility. After discussing Gilles and LeRoy's (1992) example, we construct an example of a two-period, representative agent economy to demonstrate that bubbles can arise in a standard model if utility is unbounded below, in which case the stochastic Euler equation may be violated. In an infinite horizon framework, we show that bubbles cannot arise if the optimal sequence of asset holdings can be lowered uniformly without incurring an infinite utility loss. Using this result, we develop conditions for the nonexistence of bubbles. The conditions depend exclusively on the asymptotic behavior of marginal utility at zero and infinity. They are satisfied by many unbounded utility functions, including the entire CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) class. The Appendix provides a complete market version of our two-period example.
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  • 17
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 123-146 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C68 ; C90 ; D46 ; E31.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper reports on the use of laboratory experimental techniques to create relatively complete economic systems. The creation of these market systems reflects a first attempt to explore the nature of inherently interdependent environments and to assess the ability of simultaneous equations equilibrium models like the classical static general competitive equilibrium model, to predict aspects of system behaviors. In addition, the impact of the quantity of a fiat money was studied. The economies were successfully created. Classical models capture much of what was observed.
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  • 18
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 147-162 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D61 ; D71.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y).
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  • 19
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D50 ; D51 ; G10.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky [8] for finite economies. This unification of finite and infinite economies is achieved by proving that in Hilbert spaces limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier. Limited arbitrage has also been shown to be necessary and sufficient for a resolution of the social choice paradox [9], [10], [12], [13], [14].
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  • 20
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 189-198 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D71 ; D82.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable incentive properties. First, a direct economic mechanism that uses the serial formula is coalition strategy-proof, envy-free and satisfies the stand-alone property. Second, the serial mechanism involves partial exclusion, which is important for the reduction of the free-rider problem.
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  • 21
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 199-212 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D43 ; L13.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. The paper shows that, with any rationing mechanism between the efficient and proportional extremes, the Kreps-Scheinkman two-stage quantity-price game reduces to the Cournot model if demand is uniformly elastic and if all costs are sunk at the first stage, thus providing positive results to set against existing negative statements.
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  • 22
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 213-223 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D52.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative statics exercises.
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  • 23
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 259-292 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D4 ; D52 ; D81 ; D84.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents may not be able to foresee all possible future contingencies. In this context, even with nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without appropriate assumptions. Specific examples are provided. An existence result is proved under the main assumption that there are sufficiently many states that all the agents foresee. An intrinsic feature of the model is bankruptcy, which agents may involuntarily experience in the unforeseen states.
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  • 24
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 371-391 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D83.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
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  • 25
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    Economic theory 12 (1998), S. 349-369 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D62 ; E32 ; O41.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This article reexamines the role of consumption in growth and emphasises the external effects of aggregate consumption, viewed as consumption standards, as an additional impediment in the growth process. These external effects raise the productivity of the individuals and are positively related to their valuation of the future. Conditions are established under which this results in a marginal value of wealth that is an increasing function of consumption. This brings new types of multiple steady states, local indeterminacies and cyclical motions. Imposing extra homogeneity restrictions, balanced growth solutions with endogenous impatience emerge. The possibility of multiple convergent paths is univocally related to endogenous discount effects. A comparison with a benchmark planning economy indicates an excessive value for the rate of time preference and emphasises its insufficient adaptation to future utility in a stationary setting. Discrepancies along the transition path that rest on endogenous impatience versus fixed discount appear in a non-stationary environment when the competitive balanced growth solution is indeterminate.
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  • 26
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Real exchange rate ; Capital accumulation ; Credit marker friction. ; JEL Classification Number: F4.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We consider the nature of the relationship between the real exchange rate and capital formation. We present a model of a small open economy that produces and consumes two goods, one tradable and one not. Domestic residents can borrow and lend abroad, and costly state verification (CSV) is a source of frictions in domestic credit markets. The real exchange rate matters for capital accumulation because it affects the␣potential for investors to provide internal finance, which mitigates the CSV problem. We demonstrate that the real exchange rate must monotonically approach its steady state level. However, capital accumulation need not be monotonic and real exchange rate appreciation can be associated with either a rising or a falling capital stock. The relationship between world financial market conditions and the real exchange rate is also investigated.
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  • 27
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 241-256 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D71.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility theorem is obtained.
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  • 28
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 257-276 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D71 ; C69 ; D89.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A social welfare function for a denumerable society satisfies Pairwise Computability if for each pair (x,y) of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide from any description of each profile on {x,y} whether the society prefers x to y. I prove that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence also satisfies Pairwise Computability, then it is dictatorial. This result severely limits on practical grounds Fishburn's resolution (1970) of Arrow's impossibility. I also give an interpretation of a denumerable “society.”
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  • 29
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 369-372 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D50
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  By generalising the Arrow-Hahn approach, we give new conditions under which a preference relation on a metric space can be represented by a continuous utility function.
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 361-367 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C71.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem is given involving only Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and some elementary calculus. A function is explicitly given such that a fixed point of it yields an intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights. Moreover, any intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights corresponds to a fixed point of the function. Furthermore, the proof can be used to show -balanced versions of the K-K-M-S Theorem, with -balancedness as introduced in Billera (1970). The proof makes clear that the conditions made with respect to by Billera can be even weakened.
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 373-379 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: 021 ; 022.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We present a unified mathematical framework within which, among others, pure exchange economies with a finite set of agents, as well as those with a continuum of traders may be studied simultaneously. We prove that the reasoning presented by Balasko (1975) on the equilibrium set for finite economies generalizes very naturally to our setting. His results may therefore be recovered as a special case of those presented in this note.
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  • 32
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 383-411 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: 020 ; 226.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.
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  • 33
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 413-435 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers:C72 ; D8.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions.
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 437-462 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C60 ; D42 ; D51 ; D90 ; G12.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker, and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking economy are carried out.
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    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 483-495 
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    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: E32 ; D84 ; C62.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this paper, I study the existence of Sunspot Equilibria in a general framework whose dynamics allow for the presence of predetermined variables in the system. The main motivation for this research comes from the fact that previous studies did not allow for such predetermined variables which, nevertheless, appear quite naturally in economic models. I show, for a non-negligible subset of dynamics with predetermined variables verifying usual assumptions, the existence of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria fluctuating between an arbitrary finite number of states arbitrarily close to a steady state.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 131-153 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Key words and Phrases:Repeated principal-agent relationship, Adverse selection, Information transmission. ; JEL Classification Numbers:D81, D82.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We examine the strategic role of information transmission in a repeated principal-agent relationship where the agent produces information that is useful to the principal. The agent values continuous employment for the principal because he makes a relationship-specific investment that can yield rents to him when the relationship is renewed. Assuming that the parties are sufficiently impatient, we show that full disclosure of the information produced occurs early in the relationship when the principal can commit to a long-term relationship, when the agent observes his valuation of continuous employment after making a report on information produced, or when the agent obtains a low valuation of continuous employment before making a report. By contrast, a strategic delay in the transmission of information occurs when the principal can only commit to a short-term relationship and the agent obtains a high valuation of continuous employment before making a report.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 155-180 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Key words:Incentive compatibility, Efficiency, Groves mechanisms, Mechanism design ; JEL Classification Numbers:C72, C78, D82
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A mechanism that is both efficient and incentive compatible in the Bayesian-Nash sense is shown to be payoff-equivalent to a Groves mechanism at the point in time when each agent has just acquired his private information. This equivalence result simplifies the question of whether or not an efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism can satisfy other desired objectives, for the search for an appropriate mechanism can be restricted to the family of Groves mechanisms. The method is used to extend the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite on the inefficiency of bilateral bargaining to a multilateral setting.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 285-296 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Differentiability, Expected utility, Risk premium, Probability premium. ; JEL Classification Number:D81.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Differentiability is a convenient property of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions which is almost always imposed but has not been translated into behavioral terms. In applications, expected utility is usually maximized subject to a constraint, and the maximization is carried out by differentiating the utility function. This paper presents two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to be differentiable. The first of them is formulated in terms of the equivalent risk premia of small gambles. It says, in brief, that the equivalent risk premium is of a smaller order of magnitude than the risk itself, as measured by the expectation of the absolute value of the risk. The second set of necessary and sufficient conditions is formulated in terms of the probability premium of small lotteries. It says, essentially, that the probability premium for small binary lotteries goes to zero as the size of the lottery goes to zero.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 257-284 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: The price normalization problem, Imperfect competition, Oligopoly, Firms' objectives, Real wealth maximization, Profits and shareholders' demand. ; JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D42, D43, L13, L21.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences for the resulting set of Nash equilibria when firms are assumed to maximize profits. This is due to the fact that changing the price normalization amounts to altering the objective functions of the firms. Clearly, the objective of a firm must not be based on price normalization rules void of any economic content. In this paper we propose a definition of the objective of a firm, called maximization of shareholders' real wealth, which takes shareholders' demand explicitly into account. This objective depends on relative prices only. Real wealth maxima are shown to exist under certain conditions. Moreover, we consider an oligopolistic market and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which each firm maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 297-310 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Walrasian equilibrium, Edgeworth equilibrium, core-equivalence theorem, F-properness, E-properness, M-properness. ; JEL Classification Numbers:C62, D51.
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    Notes: Summary. This paper proves core-equivalence theorems for exchange economies without ordered preferences, defined on locally convex Riesz commodity spaces such that the price space is a lattice. Properness assumptions are borrowed from some recent equilibrium existence results.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 311-329 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Prases:Robustness, Optimal, Overlapping generations. ; JEL Classification Numbers:C60, C62.
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    Notes: Summary. We combine and strengthen optimality and robustness theorems for the overlapping-generations model of money. Roughly, we find a Pareto-optimal monetary equilibrium of a generic stationary economy that is near an optimal monetary equilibrium of each nearby non-stationary economy. Since the nearby equilibria are monetary, the general problem of macroeconomic stabilization reduces to maintaining the money supply. And since the nearby equilibria are optimal, stabilization is socially desirable.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 439-461 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Fashion, Habits, Limit cycles, Wealth accumulation. ; JEL Classification Numbers:D91, E21.
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    Notes: Summary. This paper examines the influence of fashion on wealth accumulation in an economy with two groups of agents. Fashion is modelled as an externality generated by a particular dependence of individual agents' time preference on the two groups' per-capita consumption habits. It is shown that fashion causes excessive wealth fluctuations in the sense that stronger and more persistent fashion is more likely to generate limit cycles in wealth. Opposite to intuitive arguments , however, the externality in fashion does not necessarily generate instability in wealth. In a special case, equilibrium consumption and wealth are stable but the optimal ones that internalize the externality are locally unstable. Whether equilibrium consumption is excessive relative to optimal consumption depends on the distribution as well as the aggregate level of wealth.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 473-478 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Dynamic programming. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C61 ; 041.
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    Notes: Summary. In this paper I give a method for finding long-run-average policies in the undiscounted economic growth problem using approximations by finite horizons. Required hypothesis is the strong interiority of T-horizon solutions.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 501-503 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Non-homothetic CES function Duality. ; JEL Classification Number: E13.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Based on some elementary results on duality, the paper proposes a much simpler way of deriving the class of non-homothetic CES production functions which was derived as a solution to a partial differential equation that defines the elasticity of substitution.
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    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 479-488 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Optimal growth Policy functions. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C61 ; O41.
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    Notes: Summary. This paper proves the C 1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that the instantaneous utility is C 1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity of the integrand.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 453-467 
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    Notes: Summary A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 469-494 
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    Notes: Summary Tirole (1982) is commonly interpreted as proving that bubbles are impossible with finitely many rational traders with common priors. We study a simple variation of his model in which bubbles can occur, even though traders have common priors and common knowledge that the asset has no fundamental value. In equilibrium, agents purchase the asset at successively higher prices until the bubble “bursts” and no subsequent trade occurs. Each trader's initial wealth determines the last date at which he could possibly trade. The date at which the bubble bursts is a function of these finite “truncation dates” for the individual traders. Since initial wealth is private information, no trader knows when the bubble will burst. There are two key differences between our model and Tirole's which enable us to construct equilibrium bubbles this way. First, Tirole requires ex ante optimality, while we only require every trader's strategy to be optimal conditional on his information — i.e., interim optimal. As we argue in the text, this would seem to be the relevant definition of optimality. Second, Tirole considers competitive equilibria, while we analyze a simple bargaining game.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 523-528 
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    Notes: Summary We show that in a production economy with public goods and a measure space of agents an allocation belongs to the core of the economy if and only if there exists no allocation in the core of a subeconomy that blocks it.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 535-535 
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 536-542 
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 199-205 
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    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D31 ; D63 ; H24.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the class of fiscal rules of income transformation which are equity improving and, at the same time, preserve the ranking of existing distributions. Contrary to the related literature individual well-being depends not just on income but also on prices. We show that, when the environment is restricted such that a general transformation class still can be defined, the only “desirable” fiscal rule is the simple redistributive linear taxation schedule, of the same type that is the rule in practice in most economies.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 1-18 
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    Keywords: Coordination ; delay ; strategic complementarities ; dynamic games
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. In this paper, the extent of delay is studied in a dynamic,N-person, coordination game. There is no social gain from delay, so an equilibrium with delay is always inefficient. For fixedN, there is no coordination failure when the period length is short: all equilibrium outcomes converge to the Pareto efficient outcome as the period length converges to zero. On the other hand, holding period length fixed, there exist equilibria in which delay is proportional toN, for arbitrarily large values ofN. In addition, it can be shown that the possibility of delay depends on the “timing” of strategic complementarities. However, under certain conditions, delay is shown to be a robust phenomenon, in the sense that “well-behaved” equilibria exhibit infinite delay forN sufficiently large.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 51-65 
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    Notes: Summary This paper studies the role of impatience in a model with recursively defined preferences. A method is introduced whereby the rate of impatience can be parametrically adjusted for a given aggregator. Using lattice programming and Topkis' Theorem (1978) sufficient conditions are discovered to guarantee that a reduction in the rate of impatience will lead to greater capital stocks in every period.
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 229-237 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Allocative efficiency ; Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms ; Dominant strategy implementation ; Payoff equivalence. ; JEL Classification Numbers: D82 ; D7.
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    Notes: Summary. An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information.
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 239-246 
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    Keywords: JEL classification Number: D11.
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    Notes: Summary. In this paper we will show that upper semicontinuity of the indirect utility function implies the upper semicontinuity of the direct utility function. By strengthening the assumptions, one can also deduce the continuity of the utility function. Based on indirect utility functions a model of consumer behavior will be established.
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 247-260 
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    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D44.
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    Notes: Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model, bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy” bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may fail to be Pareto-optimal.
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 263-286 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Uncertainty ; Uncertainty aversion ; Choquet expected utility ; Capacity ; Convex capacity ; Risk aversion ; Ambiguity ; Non-additive probability. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C69 ; D81.
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    Notes: Summary. Debreu proposed the notion of `least concave utility' as a way to disentangle risk attitudes from the certainty preferences embedded in a von-Neumann Morgenstern index. This paper studies preferences under uncertainty, as opposed to risk, and examines a corresponding decomposition of preference. The analysis is carried out within the Choquet expected utility model of preference and is centered on the notion of a least convex capacity.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 523-528 
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    Notes: Summary.  We investigate the function of liquid financial markets for the allocation of productive capital. We consider an economy where agents endogenously choose among capital production technologies with differing gestation periods. Longgestation capital investments must be “rolled-over” in secondary capital markets. The use of such investment technologies therefore requires the support of liquid financial markets. We investigate how changes in the liquidity of these markets (i.e., in the costs of transacting) affect (a) the choice of capital production technology, (b) per capita income and the per capita capital stock, (c) the level of financial market activity, (d) the real return on savings and (e) welfare in a steady state equilibrium. Improvements in financial market liquidity raise rates of return on savings, and favor the increased use of long gestation capital investments. However, such improvements may or may not lead to higher levels of real activity or steady state welfare. We describe conditions under which various outcomes occur.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 175-179 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This note offers an alternative derivation of the composite commodity theorem using only elementary economic and mathematical tools. It offers some insight as to why constancy of relative prices induces separability in the consumers optimization problem. It should be more readily accessible to students in upper level microeconomics courses and prove useful in the classroom in presenting this central theorem of economic analysis.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 315-335 
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    Notes: Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 337-351 
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    Notes: Summary In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit from a group of identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simultaneously by auction. The vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one object. In this paper we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding strategies to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a uniform price sealed bid auction using the “first rejected bid pricing rule” in an independent private values environment with two-unit demands. In any symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium, all bidders submit one bid equal to their higher valuation and one bid lower than their lower valuation. We characterize the equilibrium and derive the exact amount of underrevelation in the lower bid.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 353-359 
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    Notes: Summary In order to simplify stability analysis of an economic model one can assume that one of the model variables moves infinitely fast towards equilibrium, given the values of the other slower variables. We present conditions such that stability of the simplified model implies, or is implied by, stability of the original model. The conditions make use of the concept of a negative dominant diagonal. As an example, we analyse the (local) stability of a Walrasian general equilibrium model.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 190-190 
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 361-370 
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    Notes: Summary In this paper, we show that, in markets with a continuum of traders and atoms, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria may be disjoint. We show also that, when the preferences of the traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria have a nonempty intersection.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 383-400 
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    Notes: Summary This paper describes the relationship between the model's growth rate, the set of vectors of equilibrium growth and the set of internal rates of return of the investment matrix. This matrix specifies the renewable and reproducible scale-neutral investment possibilities. An explicit description of quasioptimal strategies and turnpikes is given.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 371-382 
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    Notes: Summary In this paper we present new results on the local and global convergence property of solutions to an optimization model where the objective function is a discounted sum of stationary one-period utilities. The asymptotic local turnpike is given without differentiability assumptions but imposing some mild curvature restrictions on the utility function. This approach allows us to get easy estimates on the range of discount factors and the size of the neighborhood for which the asymptotic property occurs. The paper concludes by providing two global turnpike theorems. The first one is an asymptotic theorem derived from a result similar to Scheinkman's visit lemma. The second one turns out to be a restatement of McKenzie's neighborhood turnpike theorem.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 401-417 
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    Notes: Summary This paper provides a general way to incorporate private ownership production economies into the implementation of the Walrasian correspondence. We present two mechanisms, both of which permit agents to behave strategically with respect to their initial endowments, preferences, and production possibility sets. The first mechanism deals with the case of endowment destruction, the second deals with the case of endowment withholding. We show that each mechanism Nash implements the Walrasian correspondence. In addition, both mechanisms are individually feasible, balanced, continuous and only require the transmission of prices and quantities of goods as messages.
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    Economic theory 7 (1995), S. 63-80 
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    Notes: Summary.  An exchange economy with price rigidities and rationing is considered. The rationing systems allowed are very general. Several characterizations of the set of constrained equilibria are given, and new equilibrium existence results are provided. More specifically, well-known properties like the existence of equilibria without rationing of the numeraire commodity, and the existence of supply and demand constrained equilibria without rationing on the market of at least one commodity follow as special cases from the theorems proved. Finally it is shown that the equilibrium correspondence is upper semi-continuous, while it is continuous on a residual set of points. In order to prove these results a new continuity result for the budget correspondence is given.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 461-489 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. When the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide Markov representations of the equilibria.
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    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 445-459 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary An Arrovian social choice rule is a social welfare function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference. Assume a measurable outcome spaceX with its (Lebesgue) measure normalized to unity. For any Arrovian rule and any fractiont, either some individual dictates over a subset ofX of measuret or more, or at least a fraction 1−t of the pairs of distinct alternatives have their social ordering fixed independently of individual preferences. Also, for any positive integerβ (less than the total number of individuals), there is some subsetH of society consisting of all butβ persons such that the fraction of outcome pairs (x, y) that are social ranked without consulting the preferences of anyone inH, whenever no individual is indifferent betweenx andy, is at least 1−1/4β.
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    Economic theory 7 (1995), S. 125-138 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  In this paper we study fair division problems with the special feature that there exists only one transferable good that everyone likes. This good will be used to compensate some individuals for their differences in other non-transferable resources (like talents or handicaps). In this context we test the traditional no-envy solution and we verify that: 1) its ethical content can be a matter of discussion, and 2) frequently it does not select a non-empty set of allocations. We propose an extension of this criterion that partially solves the existence problem while also retaining the main ethical properties of the preceding solution.
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    Economic theory 7 (1995), S. 139-160 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders’utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices.
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 603-628 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Market game Excess volatility ; Rational expectations ; Asymmetric information ; Information acquisition. ; JEL Classification Numbers: G12 ; G14 ; D84.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals.
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    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 643-670 
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    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Exit Sunk costs ; Coalition formation. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C79 ; D43 ; L13.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 191-205 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multiperiod economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 13-33 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In this paper we study the quantitative implications of nominal wage contracts for business cycle fluctuations. We address this issue using a model economy based on the neoclassical growth model supplemented by the assumption that cash is needed to purchase goods. We consider a variation of the standard recursive competitive equilibrium concept that is intended to capture the important features of wage contracting. We use this equilibrium construct to address three issues. First, we consider whether monetary shocks, propagated by nominal contracts, constitute a viable alternative to technology shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations. Our results suggest that, while monetary shocks and nominal rigidities succeed in causing output volatility of the required magnitude, the resulting data have properties that are inconsistent with several key features of U.S. data. Second, we consider how the behavior of the economy varies with contract length. We find that the volatility induced by both monetary and technology shocks increases sharply with contract length. Finally we consider how much rigidity would be necessary to match the volatility of U.S. output. We find that only a very small amount of rigidity would be necessary to cause output volatility of the magnitude observed.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 35-49 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary A real business cycle economy is studied in which some capital is idle each period and the fraction of capital left idle varies in response to technology shocks. Previous equilibrium business cycle models have the characteristic that the entire stock of capital is used for production in each period. Our objective is to determine whether incorporating idle resources, something regularly observed in actual economies, significantly affects the cyclical properties of the model and hence changes our views about the importance of technology shocks for aggregate fluctuations. In our analysis we do not assume an aggregate production function, but instead model production as taking place at individual plants that are subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. Each period the plant manager must choose whether to operate the plant or to let the plant remain idle. We find that the cyclical properties of this model are surprisingly similar to those of a standard real business cycle economy. One difference is that the model displays variation in factor shares while the standard models does not.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 427-439 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: C61 ; O21
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In this paper we consider a class of time discrete intertemporal optimization models in one dimension. We present a technique to construct intertemporal optimization models with nonconcave objective functions, such that the optimal policy function coincides with any pre-specifiedC 2 function. Our result is a variant of the approach presented in a seminal paper by Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986). Whereas they solved the inverse problem for the reduced form models, we address the different question of how to construct both reduced and primitive form models. Using our technique one can guarantee required qualitative properties not only in reduced, but also in primitive form. The fact that our constructed model has a single valued and continuous optimal policy is very important as, in general, nonconcave problems yield set valued optimal policy correspondences which are typically hard to analyze. To illustrate our constructive approach we apply it to a simple nonconcave model.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 499-510 
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    Keywords: E31
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary Under what conditions is the price of a bubbly asset more (less) volatile than the asset's market fundamental? The answer depends on agents' attitudes towards risk. If higher current consumption makes agents more (less) risk averse in the future, then the bubbly asset price fluctuates less (more) than the fundamental. This result shows that the interaction between intrinsic bubbles and asset fundamentals critically depends on a feature of the utility function that does not appear in standard models with time-separable utility.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 511-528 
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    Keywords: D90
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper investigates the dynamical properties of optimal paths in one-sector overlapping generations models without assuming that the utility function of the representative agent is separable. When the utility function is separable, the optimal growth paths monotonically converges toward the modified golden rule steady state. In the non-separable case, we show that the optimal growth path may be oscillating and optimal two-period cycles may exist. Applying these results to the model with altruism, we show that the condition of operative bequest is fully compatible with endogeneous fluctuations provided that the discount factor is close enough to one. All our results are illustrated using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 529-537 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper establishes an existence theorem of a non-trivial (positive capital stock) steady-state equilibrium in Diamond's (1965) overlapping-generations model with production by employing the steady-state consumption curve introduced in Ihori (1978). The assumptions on preferences and production technologies that ensure the existence of a nontrivial steadystate equilibrium are separated from each other, unlike in Galor and Ryder (1989). We also provide two simple examples which illustrate the importance of two conditions in the theorem.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 571-572 
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 557-569 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: G130 ; G330
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We show that option prices can always be obtained as the values of simple optimization problems. This easy remark has two consequences: sensitivity analysis is simplified (by applying the envelope theorem) and numerical procedures are improved. We give two examples of applications: options on coupon bonds and corporate bonds.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 385-426 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C62 ; D51.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  Contrary to the finite dimensional set-up, the hypothesis of an atomless measure space of traders does not entail convexity of aggregate demand sets if there are infinitely many commodities. In this paper an assumption is introduced which sharpens the non-atomicity hypothesis by requiring that there are “many agents of every type.” When this condition holds, aggregate demand in an infinite dimensional setting becomes convex even if individual preferences are non-convex. This result is applied to prove the existence of competitive equilibria in such a context.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 380-380 
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 191-205 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multi-period economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 263-282 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In a preceding companion paper, a static model of individual decision making was proposed that, due to imprecise perceptions, induces simple and inertial behavior at equilibrium (“status-quo optimal”) points. This paper addresses two complementary issues. Firstly, it studies the learning dynamics induced by the model and shows that its well-defined limit behavior ranges from status-quo optimal to fully optimal, depending on the underlying features of the problem. Secondly, the paper characterizes the behavioral implications of the model and compares them with those derived from standard decision-theoretic frameworks. Specifically, it is shown that, from a Revealed-Preference perspective, status-quo optimal behavior may be identified with that rationalizable by an acyclic preference relation, possibly intransitive.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 323-350 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 357-363 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We give a complete proof of Mas-Colell's [7] result that a continuous transitive preference relation on an open setV ⊂ ℝl' that isC r (in the sense that the indifference relation is aC r hypersurface inV xV) is representable by a Cr utility function without critical points.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 365-371 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 373-387 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: D51 ; H41
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper examines a model of an infinite production economy with a finite number of types of agents andsemi- public goods, which are subjected to crowding and exclusion. The utility of an agent depends not only on the vector of public commodities produced by the coalition to which she belongs, but also on the mass of agents of her type who are the members of this coalition. The main purpose of the paper is to derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the local degrees of congestion which would guarantee the equivalence between the core and the set of equal treatment Lindahl equilibria. We prove that this equivalence holdsif and only if there are constant returns to group size for each type of agents. It implies that linearity of each agent's congestion function with respect to the mass of the agents of her own type is necessary for the core equivalence to hold.
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    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 389-403 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data. When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.
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    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 539-550 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D5.
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  In large games with transferable utility, core payoffs satisfy a comparative statics property: If the proportion of one type of player increases, then the core payoff to that type of player decreases (does not increase). Markets with transferable utility satisfy a similar property: if the aggregate supply of a commodity increases, its value relative to the value of all commodities decreases. In market games, if one type of agent becomes more plentiful, his competitive payoff falls, and its decrease is engineered by a decrease in the relative value of his endowment.
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    Notes: Summary.  In the framework of dynamic equilibrium theory we propose a model of gradual transition from an Economy with centralized budgets regulation to a Market Economy (with self-financing). It is assumed that information about possible change of the economic mechanism affects essentially the behavior of agents. The duration of the transition period is regarded as a random variable. We study conditions when such a transition allows firms to adapt their plans to future markets and guarantees the existence of equilibrium paths. We also discuss the case of Shock Therapy (instantaneous transition) which may cause bankruptcy, jumps in prices and deficits.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 337-357 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  This paper develops a stochastic general equilibrium model of the federal funds market that incorporates non-Fisherian effects on interest rates stemming from both supply and demand shocks to reserves. Such a model may reconcile the widespread belief in a liquidity effect of money supply shocks with the difficulty many researchers have had in finding empirical support for such an effect. The model also cautions against interpreting the observed negative correlation between the federal funds rate and innovations to nonborrowed reserves as empirical confirmation of the ability of the Federal Reserve to lower short-term real interest rates.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 359-363 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We provide a new proof for the optimality of deductible insurance that does not depend on the expected-utility hypothesis. Our model uses only first- and second-degree stochastic dominance arguments.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 365-369 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  Gibbard has shown that a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of dictatorships and pair-wise social choice functions. I use geometric techniques to prove the corollary that every strategy-proof and sovereign social choice function is a random dictatorship.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 371-379 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is neither connected nor closed in allocation space. Furthermore, if the public goods are local, the image of the Pareto set in utility space need not be closed or connected. We provide two independent sufficient conditions for the closedness of the Pareto set. The results are directly applicable to private goods economies with joint production. Our results should be of interest for general equilibrium and mechanism design theory; where for example, the properties of the efficient set are important for proving the existence of an equilibrium and for the study of the properties of monotone-path social choice correspondences.
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    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 463-490 
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    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  The paper considers a model of an economy with after-effects: any production activity generates some subsequent expenses, like compensation of residual damages. Internalizing the after-effects in production costs at the time they are generated proves to substantially change the shape of long-term programs. It results from an interaction of two components corresponding to the conflicting goals: the fastest growth of production, and the most rapid decrease of residual damages. Each component has its own turnpike, so that the model has two dynamic equilibria. Respectively, shadow prices are a combination of two components: “accumulation prices” declining over time, and “compensation prices” that are growing. In some cases this may result in negative market interest rates.
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