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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 10 (1997), S. 361-367 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C71.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem is given involving only Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and some elementary calculus. A function is explicitly given such that a fixed point of it yields an intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights. Moreover, any intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights corresponds to a fixed point of the function. Furthermore, the proof can be used to show -balanced versions of the K-K-M-S Theorem, with -balancedness as introduced in Billera (1970). The proof makes clear that the conditions made with respect to by Billera can be even weakened.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1995), S. 63-80 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  An exchange economy with price rigidities and rationing is considered. The rationing systems allowed are very general. Several characterizations of the set of constrained equilibria are given, and new equilibrium existence results are provided. More specifically, well-known properties like the existence of equilibria without rationing of the numeraire commodity, and the existence of supply and demand constrained equilibria without rationing on the market of at least one commodity follow as special cases from the theorems proved. Finally it is shown that the equilibrium correspondence is upper semi-continuous, while it is continuous on a residual set of points. In order to prove these results a new continuity result for the budget correspondence is given.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 15 (2000), S. 485-490 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Non-cooperative game theory, Tracing procedure, Equilibrium selection, Browder's fixed point theorem. ; JEL Classification Number:C72.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result that is related to Kakutani's fixed point theorem and that is an extension of Browder's fixed point theorem. The second proof shows that it is even possible to avoid the use of correspondences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Rationalizability, Refinements. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that a player believes that with small probability her opponents choose strategies that are irrational, or assuming that their is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if strategy perturbations are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and if there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243–267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 63-80 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary An exchange economy with price rigidities and rationing is considered. The rationing systems allowed are very general. Several characterizations of the set of constrained equilibria are given, and new equilibrium existence results are provided. More specifically, well-known properties like the existence of equilibria without rationing of the numeraire commodity, and the existence of supply and demand constrained equilibria without rationing on the market of at least one commodity follow as special cases from the theorems proved. Finally it is shown that the equilibrium correspondence is upper semi-continuous, while it is continuous on a residual set of points. In order to prove these results a new continuity result for the budget correspondence is given.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 471-498 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: E30
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary There exists an extensive literature about economies with price rigidities, where some constraints on the set of admissible price systems are exogenously given. In this paper a general equilibrium model extended by a political system is described where the price rigidities are endogenously chosen by political candidates. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy and a pure strategy equilibrium are given. Finally an example is discussed, where in equilibrium both political candidates propose price rigidities excluding the Walrasian equilibrium price system.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 471-498 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: E30.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  There exists an extensive literature about economies with price rigidities, where some constraints on the set of admissible price systems are exogenously given. In this paper a general equilibrium model extended by a political system is described where the price rigidities are endogenously chosen by political candidates. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy and a pure strategy equilibrium are given. Finally an example is discussed, where in equilibrium both political candidates propose price rigidities excluding the Walrasian equilibrium price system.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 28 (1999), S. 53-68 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: Rationalizability ; refinements
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way “best responses against small perturbations” are defined. It is shown that applying the spirit of these definitions to rationalizability leads to three different refinements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect rationalizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995) rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other relationships can be found.
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  • 9
    Publication Date: 2005-07-01
    Print ISSN: 0254-5330
    Electronic ISSN: 1572-9338
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Published by Springer
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  • 10
    Publication Date: 2009-02-14
    Print ISSN: 0178-4617
    Electronic ISSN: 1432-0541
    Topics: Computer Science , Mathematics
    Published by Springer
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