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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the set of Pareto efficient allocations in economies with public goods (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 371-379 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is neither connected nor closed in allocation space. Furthermore, if the public goods are local, the image of the Pareto set in utility space need not be closed or connected. We provide two independent sufficient conditions for the closedness of the Pareto set. The results are directly applicable to private goods economies with joint production. Our results should be of interest for general equilibrium and mechanism design theory; where for example, the properties of the efficient set are important for proving the existence of an equilibrium and for the study of the properties of monotone-path social choice correspondences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213913
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 8 (1996), S. 555-564 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: H41 ; D61
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213509
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 8 (1996), S. 555-564 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: H41 ; D61.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213509
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the set of Pareto efficient allocations in economies with public goods (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 371-379 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is neither connected nor closed in allocation space. Furthermore, if the public goods are local, the image of the Pareto set in utility space need not be closed or connected. We provide two independent sufficient conditions for the closedness of the Pareto set. The results are directly applicable to private goods economies with joint production. Our results should be of interest for general equilibrium and mechanism design theory; where for example, the properties of the efficient set are important for proving the existence of an equilibrium and for the study of the properties of monotone-path social choice correspondences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213913
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence (1997)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 15 (1997), S. 121-139 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract.  We consider an economy with non-Samuelsonian public goods and we focus on linear cost sharing. In a linear cost sharing equilibrium all agents in the economy optimize given a certain fixed cost share to be contributed towards the provision of public goods in the economy. Hence, each agent pays a certain fraction of the total establishment costs of public goods and these cost shares are common knowledge. We show that for a certain fixed contribution scheme the resulting linear cost share equilibria are equivalent to corresponding core allocations, in which the core is based on the integral of the individual cost shares. We also show that there is no equivalence of the Foley core with cost share equilibria, even in well-behaved large economies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050096
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On equity with public goods (1992)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 9 (1992), S. 141-157 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Existence theorems for envy-free and efficient allocations are derived for economies with public goods. For economies with an arbitrary but finite number of private and public goods, an adaptation of the existence proof of Svensson for private good economies is used. For economies with one private and one public good, a case often studied in theory and applications, two more direct proofs are given, using different conditions and taking advantage of the particularly simple structure of the set of envy-free allocations in this case. These proofs are also shown to apply to the case of excludable public goods with congestion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00187239
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