ALBERT

Description: The Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES) is a pressurized suit normally worn by astronauts during launch and landing phases of Space Shuttle operations. In 2008, a large tear (0.5 -1 in. long, between the pinky and ring finger) in the ACES left-hand glove made of neoprene latex rubber was found during training for Shuttle flight STS-124. An investigation to help determine the cause(s) of the glove tear was headed by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. Efforts at JSC to reproduce the actual glove tear pattern by cutting/tearing or rupturing were unsuccessful. Chemical and material property data from JSC such as GC-MS, FTIR, DSC and TGA mostly showed little differences between samples from the torn and control gloves. One possible cause for the glove tear could be a wedding ring/band worn by a male astronaut. Even with a smooth edge, such a ring could scratch the material and initiate the tear observed in the left-hand glove. A decision was later made by JSC to not allow the wearing of such a ring during training or actual flight. Another possible cause for the ACES glove tear is crystallinity induced by strain in the neoprene rubber over a long period of time and use. Neoprene is one several elastomeric materials known to be susceptible to crystallization, and such a process is accelerated with exposure of the material to cold temperatures plus strain. When the temperature is lowered below room temperature, researchers have shown that neoprene crystallization may be maintained at temperatures as high as 45-50 F, with a maximum crystallization rate near 20-25 F (1). A convenient conditioning temperature for inducing neoprene crystallization is a typical freezer that is held near 0 F. For work at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), samples were cut from several areas/locations (pinky/ring finger crotch, index finger and palm) on each of two pairs of unstrained ACES gloves for DSC and DMA thermal analysis testing. The samples were conditioned in a freezer for various times up to about 14 days. Some rectangular conditioned samples were unstrained, while most were subjected to strains up to 250% with the aid of two slotted aluminum blocks and two aluminum clamps per sample. Trends were observed to correlate DSC data (heat of fusion) and DMA data (linear CTE and stress for iso-strain testing) with: (a) sample location on each glove; and (b) level of strain during conditioning. Control samples cut as is from each glove location were also tested by DSC and DMA.

Description: There have been a number of studies done in the past drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. Generally, the systemic causes and proximate causes for fatal events have both been examined in considerable detail. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents and failures that narrowly missed being fatal could be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Additionally, review of risk factors for upcoming or future programs will often look at trending statistics, generally focusing on failure/success statistics. Unfortunately, doing so can give a skewed or misleading view of past reliability or a reliability that cannot be presumed to apply to a new program. One reason for this might be that failure/success criteria aren't the same across programs, but also that apparent success can hide systemic faults that, under other circumstances, can be fatal to a program with different parameters. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure and provide very misleading data if it is not examined in detail. This is particularly true for a manned space program where failure/success includes more than making a particular orbit. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. Even more importantly, a thorough understanding of these near miss events can identify conditions that prevented fatalities. Those conditions may be key to a programs reliability, but, without insight to the repercussions if such conditions were not in place, their importance may not be readily clear. As programs mature and political and fiscal responsibilities come to the fore, often there is considerable incentive to eliminate unnecessary conservatism, design margin, redundancy, operational support, testing, training, or safety oversight. An evaluation that demonstrates how these features and capabilities averted disaster can ensure processes that saved lives or missions are not discarded without appropriate review and understanding. Close examination of accidents that almost were can also highlight differences in design from one program to another, either justifying reliability comparisons or negating them. It can also provide considerable insight into how those saving factors were developed and implemented so that similar methods can be used to ensure appropriate life-saving and mission saving factors can be developed, even for a dissimilar space program. The lessons are appropriate for seasoned manned space programs and agencies, but crucial for untried agencies and organizations that are interested in sending man into space. The large body of publicly available near miss and accident data available provide invaluable insight into programmatic, technical, and even political issues that can be addressed before they impact safety. In this paper, we examine a number of these near misses and accidents and steps a program, agency, or potential spacefaring company might take to improve their chances of success and avoid mission or safety disasters using this data.

Description: The International Space Station (ISS) represents a largely closed-system habitable volume which requires active control of atmospheric constituents, including removal of exhaled Carbon Dioxide (CO2). The ISS provides a unique opportunity to observe system requirements for (CO2) removal. CO2 removal is managed by the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) aboard the US segment of ISS and by Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) aboard the Space Shuttle (STS). While the ISS and STS are docked, various methods are used to balance the CO2 levels between the two vehicles, including mechanical air handling and management of general crew locations. Over the course of ISS operation, several unexpected anomalies have occurred which have required troubleshooting, including possible compromised performance of the CDRA and LiOH systems, and possible imbalance in CO2 levels between the ISS and STS while docked. This paper will cover efforts to troubleshoot the CO2 removal systems aboard the ISS and docked STS.

Description: Post flight inspections on the Space Shuttle Atlantis conducted after the STS-11.5 mission revealed a 0.11 inch (2.8 mm) hole in the outer face sheet of the starboard payload bay door radiator panel #4. The payload bay door radiators in this region are 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) thick aluminum honeycomb with 0.011 in (0.279 mm) thick aluminum face sheets topped with 0.005 in (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. Inner face sheet damage included a 0.267 in (6.78 mm) long through crack with measureable deformation in the area of 0.2 in (5.1 mm). There was also a 0.031 in (0.787 nun) diameter hole in the rear face sheet. A large approximately l in (25 mm) diameter region of honeycomb was also destroyed. Since the radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors which are closed during ascent and reentry, the damage could only have occurred during the on-orbit portion of the mission. During the August 2007 STS-118 mission to the International Space Station, a micro-meteoroid or orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacted and completely penetrated one of shuttle Endeavour's radiator panels and the underlying thermal control system (TCS) blanket, leaving deposits on (but no damage to) the payload bay door. While it is not unusual for shuttle orbiters to be impacted by small MMOD particles, the damage from this impact is larger than any previously seen on the shuttle radiator panels. One of the largest impacts ever observed on a crew module window occurred during the November 2008 STS-126 mission to the International Space Station. Damage to the window was documented by the crew on orbit. Post flight inspection revealed a 0.4 in (10.8 mm) crater in the window pane, with a depth of 0.03 in (0.76 mm). The window pane was replaced due to the damage caused by this impact. Analysis performed on residue contained in dental mold impressions taken of the site indicated that a meteoroid particle produced this large damage site. The post flight inspection after the subsequent mission, STS-119 in March of 2009, produced a large MMOD impact feature in a wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panel. The crater measured 0.18 in (4.5 nun) in diameter and was nearly 0.037 in (0.93 nun) deep. The thickness of the silicon carbide coating that protects the carbon substrate is nominally 0.02 in (0.5 nun) to 0.04 in (1 mm), making this a significant impact into the RCC. The damage occurred on the upper surface of the panel, which experiences lower heat loads on re-entry. This poster will document the data collected from the impact sites and will include results of the Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis. Evidence will be presented that suggests a source of the impacts.

Description: The FASTRACK suborbital experiment platform has been developed to provide a capability for utilizing 2.5-5 minute microgravity flight opportunities anticipated from the commercial suborbital fleet (currently in development) for science investigations, technology development and hardware testing. It also provides "express rack" functionality to deliver payloads to ISS. FASTRACK fits within a 24" x 24" x 36" (61 cm x 61 cm x 91.4 cm) envelope and is capable of supporting either two single Middeck Locker Equivalents (MLE) or one double MLE configuration. Its overall mass is 300 lbs (136 kg), of which 160 lbs (72 kg) is reserved for experiments. FASTRACK operates using 28 VDC power or batteries. A support drawer located at the bottom of the structure contains all ancillary electrical equipment (including batteries, a conditioned power system and a data collection system) as well as a front panel that contains all switches (including remote cut-off), breakers and warning LEDs.

Description: EVA activity in the ISS program encounters several dangerous ESD conditions. The ISS program has been aggressive for many years to find ways to mitigate or to eliminate the associated risks. Investments have included: (1) Major mods to EVA tools, suit connectors & analytical tools (2) Floating Potential Measurement Unit (3) Plasma Contactor Units (4) Certification of new ISS flight attitudes (5) Teraflops of computation (6) Thousands of hours of work by scores of specialists (7) Monthly management attention at the highest program levels. The risks are now mitigated to a level that is orders of magnitude safer than prior operations

Description: The starboard Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) from the International Space Station (ISS) began exhibiting off-nominal electrical demands and vibration. Examination by spacewalking astronauts revealed metallic debris contaminating the system and damage to the outboard race of the SARJ. Samples of the contamination were returned to Earth and analyzed. Excessive friction caused the nitride region of the 15-5 PH stainless steel race to spall, generating the debris and damaging the race surface. Excessive vibration and excess power was required to operate the system as a result.

Description: Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

Description: Members of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) team review some of their memories of working on the SSME and the importance of the SSME to the success of the Shuttle program.

Description: Hypergolic fluids are toxic liquids that react spontaneously and violently when they contact each other. These fluids are used in many different rocket and aircraft systems for propulsion and hydraulic power including, orbiting satellites, manned spacecraft, military aircraft, and deep space probes. Hypergolic fuels include hydrazine (N 2H4) and its derivatives including monomethylhydrazine (MMH), unsymmetrical di-methylhydrazine (UDMH), and Aerozine 50 (A-50), which is an equal mixture of N2H4 and UDMH. The oxidizer used with these fuels is usually nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), also known as di-nitrogen tetroxide or NTO, and various blends of N2O4 with nitric oxide (NO). Several documented, unintentional hypergolic fluid spills and fires related to the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, and several other programs from approximately 1968 through the spring of 2009 have been studied for the primary purpose of extracting the lessons learned. Spill sites include KSC, JSC, WSTF, CCAFS, EAFB, McConnell AFB, and VAFB.

Description: The technology is a high-precision, wireless inclinometer. The system was designed for monitoring the suspension angle of the Orbiter vehicle during loading onto the Solid Rocket Boosters of the Space Shuttle. Originally, operators manually measured the alignment of the Orbiter with a hand-held inclinometer on a nonrigid surface. The measurement was open to interpretation by the loader. If the Orbiter is misaligned, it can crush ball joints and delay the loading while repairs are made. With this system, the Orbiter can be loaded without damage and without manual measurement.

Description: No abstract available

Description: Members of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) team review some of their memories of working on the SSME and the importance of the SSME to the success of the Shuttle program. There are many views of shuttle launches.

Description: Long-term projections of the space debris environment indicate that even drastic measures, such as an immediate, complete halt of launch and release activities, will not result in a stable environment of man-made space objects. Collision events between already existing space hardware will within a few decades start to dominate the debris population, and result in a net increase of the space debris population, also in size regimes which may cause further catastrophic collisions. Such a collisional cascading will ultimately lead to a run-away situation ("Kessler syndrome"), with no further possibility of human intervention. The International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) has been investigating the status and the stability of the space debris environment in several studies by first looking into space traffic management possibilities and then investigating means of mitigating the creation of space debris. In an ongoing activity, an IAA study group looks at ways of active space debris environment remediation. In contrast to the former mitigation study, the current activity concentrates on the active removal of small and large objects, such as defunct spacecraft, orbital stages, and mission-related objects, which serve as a latent mass reservoir that fuels initial catastrophic collisions and later collisional cascading. The paper will outline different mass removal concepts, e.g. based on directed energy, tethers (momentum exchange or electrodynamic), aerodynamic drag augmentation, solar sails, auxiliary propulsion units, retarding surfaces, or on-orbit capture. Apart from physical principles of the proposed concepts, their applicability to different orbital regimes, and their effectiveness concerning mass removal efficiency will be analyzed. The IAA activity on space debris environment remediation is a truly international project which involves more than 23 contributing authors from 9 different nations.

Description: Space suits are the most important tool for astronauts working in harsh space and planetary environments; suits keep crewmembers alive and allow them to perform exploration, construction, and scientific tasks on a routine basis over a period of several months. The efficiency with which the tasks are performed is largely dictated by the mobility features of the space suit. For previous space suit development programs, the mobility requirements were written as pure functional mobility requirements that did not separate joint ranges of motion from the joint torques. The Constellation Space Suit Element has the goal to make more quantitative mobility requirements that focused on the individual components of mobility to enable future suit designers to build and test systems more effectively. This paper details the test planning and selection process for the Constellation space suit pressure garment range of motion requirements.

Description: During the Apollo program, the space suit outer layer fabrics were severely abraded after just a few Extravehicular Activities (EVAs). For example, the Apollo 12 commander reported abrasive wear on the boots, which penetrated the outer layer fabric into the thermal protection layers after less than eight hours of surface operations. Current plans for the Constellation Space Suit Element require the space suits to support hundreds of hours of EVA on the Lunar surface, creating a challenge for space suit designers to utilize materials advances made over the last forty years and improve upon the space suit fabrics used in the Apollo program. A test methodology has been developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center Crew and Thermal Systems Division for establishing comparative abrasion wear characteristics between various candidate space suit outer layer fabrics. The abrasion test method incorporates a large rotary drum tumbler with rocks and loose lunar simulant material to induce abrasion in fabric test cylinder elements, representative of what might occur during long term planetary surface EVAs. Preliminary materials screening activities were conducted to determine the degree of wear on representative space suit outer layer materials and the corresponding dust permeation encountered between subsequent sub-layers of thermal protective materials when exposed to a simulated worst case eight hour EVA. The test method was used to provide a preliminary evaluation of four candidate outer layer fabrics for future planetary surface space suit applications. This paper provides a review of previous abrasion studies on space suit fabrics, details the methodologies used for abrasion testing in this particular study, shares the results of the testing, and provides recommendations for future work.

Description: Many of the operational and payload lighting units used in various spacecraft contain elemental mercury. If these devices were damaged on-orbit, elemental mercury could be released into the cabin. Although there are plans to replace operational units with alternate light sources, such as LEDs, that do not contain mercury, mercury-containing lamps efficiently produce high quality illumination and may never be completely replaced on orbit. Therefore, exposure to elemental mercury during spaceflight will remain possible and represents a toxicological hazard. Elemental mercury is a liquid metal that vaporizes slowly at room temperature. However, it may be completely vaporized at the elevated operating temperatures of lamps. Although liquid mercury is not readily absorbed through the skin or digestive tract, mercury vapors are efficiently absorbed through the respiratory tract. Therefore, the amount of mercury in the vapor form must be estimated. For mercury releases from lamps that are not being operated, we utilized a study conducted by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Quality to calculate the amount of mercury vapor expected to form over a 2-week period. For longer missions and for mercury releases occurring when lamps are operating, we conservatively assumed complete volatilization of the available mercury. Because current spacecraft environmental control systems are unable to remove mercury vapors, both short-term and long-term exposures to mercury vapors are possible. Acute exposure to high concentrations of mercury vapors can cause irritation of the respiratory tract and behavioral symptoms, such as irritability and hyperactivity. Chronic exposure can result in damage to the nervous system (tremors, memory loss, insomnia, etc.) and kidneys (proteinurea). Therefore, the JSC Toxicology Group recommends that stringent safety controls and verifications (vibrational testing, etc.) be applied to any hardware that contains elemental mercury that could yield airborne mercury vapor concentrations greater than 0.1 mg/cu m in the total spacecraft atmosphere for exposures lasting 30 days or less or 0.01 mg/cu m mercury vapor for exposures lasting more than 30 days. We also encourage the use of alternative devices that do not contain mercury.

Description: Following the tragedy of the Orbiter Columbia (STS-107) on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the space shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) along with ice and foam debris materials, which could shed on ascent and impact the orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS-DYNA (Livermore Software Technology Corp.) to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: Level 1-fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic constitutive model properties of materials of interest, Level 2-subcomponent impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and Level 3-full-scale orbiter leading-edge impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This report discusses the Level 2 test program conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Ballistic Impact Laboratory with external tank foam impact tests on flat RCC panels, and presents the data observed. The Level 2 testing consisted of 54 impact tests in the NASA GRC Ballistic Impact Laboratory on 6- by 6-in. and 6- by 12-in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated two types of debris projectiles: BX-265 and PDL-1034 external tank foam. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile and validated the use of the foam and RCC models for use in LS-DYNA.

Description: Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Chief Engineer requested a risk comparison of the Integrated Landing System design developed by NASA and the design developed by Contractor- referred to as the LM 604 baseline. Based on the results of this risk comparison, the CEV Chief engineer requested that the NESC evaluate identified risks and develop strategies for their reduction or mitigation. The assessment progressed in two phases. A brief Phase I analysis was performed by the Water versus Land-Landing Team to compare the CEV Integrated Landing System proposed by the Contractor against the NASA TS-LRS001 baseline with respect to risk. A phase II effort examined the areas of critical importance to the overall landing risk, evaluating risk to the crew and to the CEV Crew Module (CM) during a nominal land-landing. The findings of the assessment are contained in this report.

Description: This study was conducted in support of the Orbiter damage assessment activity that takes place for each Shuttle mission since STS-107 (STS - Space Transportation System). As part of the damage assessment activity, the state of boundary layer (laminar or turbulent) during reentry needs to be estimated in order to define the aerothermal environment on the Orbiter. Premature turbulence on the wing leading edge (WLE) is possible if a surface irregularity promotes early transition and the resulting turbulent wedge flow contaminates the WLE flow. The objective of this analysis is to develop a criterion to determine if and when the flow along the WLE experiences turbulent heating given an incoming turbulent boundary layer that contaminates the attachment line. The data to be analyzed were all obtained as part of the MH-13 Space Shuttle Orbiter Aerothermodynamic Test conducted on a 1.8%-scale Orbiter model at Calspan/University of Buffalo Research Center in the Large Energy National Shock Tunnels facility. A rational framework was used to develop a means to assess the state of the WLE flow on the Orbiter during reentry given a contaminated attachment-line flow. Evidence of turbulent flow on the WLE has been recently documented for a few STS missions during the Orbiter s flight history, albeit late in the reentry trajectory. The criterion developed herein will be compared to these flight results.

Description: Orbiter-specific transition data, acquired in four ground-based facilities (LaRC 20-Inch Mach 6 Air Tunnel, LaRC 31-Inch Mach 10 Air Tunnel, LaRC 20-Inch Mach 6 CF4 Tunnel, and CUBRC LENS-I Shock Tunnel) with three wind tunnel model scales (0.75, 0.90, and 1.8%) and from Orbiter historical flight data, have been analyzed to improve a pre-existing engineering tool for reentry transition prediction on the windward side of the Orbiter. Boundary layer transition (BLT) engineering correlations for transition induced by isolated protuberances are presented using a laminar Navier-Stokes (N-S) database to provide the relevant boundary-layer properties. It is demonstrated that the earlier version of the BLT correlation that had been developed using parameters derived from an engineering boundary-layer code has improved data collapse when developed with the N-S database. Of the new correlations examined, the proposed correlation 5, based on boundary-layer edge and wall properties, was found to provide the best overall correlation metrics when the entire database is employed. The second independent correlation (proposed correlation 7) selected is based on properties within the boundary layer at the protuberance height. The Aeroheating Panel selected a process to derive the recommended coefficients for Version 2 of the BLT Tool. The assumptions and limitations of the recommended protuberance BLT Tool V.2 are presented.

Description: Several employees who contributed to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) program describe their most memorable experiences relating to the launching of the Space Shuttle. Some describe the emotional aspects they experienced while watching and filming the launch from Kennedy Space Center.

Description: A micromechanical methodology has been developed for analyzing fiber bridging and resistance-curve behavior in reinforced-carbon-carbon (RCC) panels with a three-dimensional (3D) composite architecture and a silicon carbide (SiC) surface coating. The methodology involves treating fiber bridging traction on the crack surfaces in terms of a weight function approach and a bridging law that relates the bridging stress to the crack opening displacement. A procedure has been developed to deduce material constants in the bridging law from the linear portion of the K-resistance curve. This report contains information on the application of procedures and outcomes.

Description: During manufacture of the existing External Tanks (ETs), the Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam manual spray application processes lacked the enhanced controls/procedures to ensure that defects produced were less than the critical size. Therefore the only remaining option to certify the "fly-as-is" foam is to verify ET120 tank hardware meets the new foam debris requirements. The ET project has undertaken a significant effort studying the existing "fly-as-is" TPS foam. This paper contains the findings of the study.

Description: The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was tasked with assessing the validity of an alternate opinion that surfaced during the investigation of recurrent failures at the Space Shuttle T-0 umbilical interface. The most visible problem occurred during the Space Transportation System (STS)-112 launch when pyrotechnics used to separate Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Hold-Down Post (HDP) frangible nuts failed to fire. Subsequent investigations recommended several improvements to the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and processing changes were implemented, including replacement of ground-half cables and connectors between flights, along with wiring modifications to make critical circuits quad-redundant across the interface. The alternate opinions maintained that insufficient data existed to exonerate the design, that additional data needed to be gathered under launch conditions, and that the interface should be further modified to ensure additional margin existed to preclude failure. The results of the assessment are contained in this report.

Description: The NESC consultation team participated in real-time troubleshooting of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) Engine Cutoff (ECO) sensor system failures during STS-114 launch countdown. The team assisted with External Tank (ET) thermal and ECO Point Sensor Box (PSB) circuit analyses, and made real-time inputs to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) problem resolution teams. Several long-term recommendations resulted. One recommendation was to conduct cryogenic tests of the ECO sensors to validate, or disprove, the theory that variations in circuit impedance due to cryogenic effects on swaged connections within the sensor were the root cause of STS-114 failures.

Description: NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Description: Several days following the Columbia accident a team formed and began planning for the reconstruction of Columbia. A hangar at the Kennedy Space Center was selected for this effort due to it's size, available technical workforce and materials science laboratories and access to the vehicle ground processing infrastructure. The Reconstruction team established processes for receiving, handling, decontamination, tracking, identifying, cleaning and assessment of the debris. Initially, a 2-dimensional reconstruction of the Orbiter outer mold line was developed. As the investigation progressed fixtures which allowed a 3-dimensional reconstruction of the forward portions of the left wing's leading edge was developed. To support the reconstructions and forensic analyses a Materials and Processes (M&P) 'team was formed. This M&P team established processes for recording factual observations, debris cleaning, and engineering analysis. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The Team also assessed left hand airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. A major portion of this analysis was evaluation of metallic deposits were prevalent on left wing leading edge components. Extensive evaluation of the visual, metallurgical and chemical nature of the deposits provided conclusions that were consistent with the visual assessments and interpretations of the NASA lead teams and the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Analytical data collected by the M&P Team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH RCC Panels 8-9, and a correlation was formed between the deposits and overheating in these areas to the wing leading edge components. The analysis of deposits also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1649 C (3200 F), which would severely degrade support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC Panel 8.

Description: This document is a chart that reviews the technology of various NASA projects. Included in the chart is the title, a brief description of the technology, the funding status, a statement of the benefits, the date required, how the element connects to the Constellation project architecture, and how critical the technology is to the Constellation project.

Description: Smoke particle size measurements were obtained under low-gravity conditions by overheating several materials typical of those found in spacecraft. The measurements included integral measurements of the smoke particles and physical sample of the particles for Transmission Electron Microscope analysis. The integral moments were combined to obtain geometric mean particle sizes and geometric standard deviations. These results are presented with the details of the instrument calibrations. The experimental results show that, for the materials tested, a substantial portion of the smoke particles are below 500 nm in diameter.

Description: Recent cut damages sustained on crewmember gloves during extravehicular activity (ISS) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) have been caused by contact with sharp edges or a pinch point according to analysis of the damages. One potential source are protruding sharp edged crater lips from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on metallic handrails along EVA translation paths. A number of hypervelocity impact tests were performed on ISS handrails, and found that mm-sized projectiles were capable of inducing crater lip heights two orders of magnitude above the minimum value for glove abrasion concerns. Two techniques were evaluated for mitigating the cut glove hazard of MMOD impacts on ISS handrails: flexible overwraps which act to limit contact between crewmember gloves and impact sites, and; alternate materials which form less hazardous impact crater profiles. In parallel with redesign efforts to increase the cut resilience of EMU gloves, the modifications to ISS handrails evaluated in this study provide the means to significantly reduce cut glove risk from MMOD impact craters

Description: The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Service Module Reaction Control System engine plume impingement was computed using the plume impingement program (PLIMP). PLIMP uses the plume solution from RAMP2, which is the refined version of the reacting and multiphase program (RAMP) code. The heating rate and pressure (force and moment) on surfaces or components of the Service Module were computed. The RAMP2 solution of the flow field inside the engine and the plume was compared with those computed using GASP, a computational fluid dynamics code, showing reasonable agreement. The computed heating rate and pressure using PLIMP were compared with the Reaction Control System plume model (RPM) solution and the plume impingement dynamics (PIDYN) solution. RPM uses the GASP-based plume solution, whereas PIDYN uses the SCARF plume solution. Three sets of the heating rate and pressure solutions agree well. Further thermal analysis on the avionic ring of the Service Module showed that thermal protection is necessary because of significant heating from the plume.

Description: The constellation program is evaluating current vehicle design capabilities for nominal water landings and contingency land landings of the Orion Crew Exploration vehicle. The Orion Landing Strategy tiger team was formed to lead the technical effort for which associated activities include the current vehicle design, susceptibility to roll control and tip over, reviewing methods for assessing occupant injury during ascent / aborts /landings, developing an alternate seat/attenuation design solution which improves occupant protection and operability, and testing the seat/attenuation system designs to ensure valid results. The EVA physiology, systems and Performance (EPSP) project is leading the effort under the authority of the Tiger Team Steering committee to develop, verify, validate and accredit biodynamics models using a variety of crash and injury databases including NASCAR, Indy Car and military aircraft. The validated biodynamics models will be used by the Constellation program to evaluate a variety of vehicle, seat and restraint designs in the context of multiple nominal and off-nominal landing scenarios. The models will be used in conjunction with Acceptable Injury Risk definitions to provide new occupant protection requirements for the Constellation Program.

Description: This viewgraph presentation reviews NASA's Space Situational Awareness (SSA) activities as preparation for robotic missions and Goddard's role in this work. The presentation includes the preparations that Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has made to provide consolidated space systems protection indluding consolidating GSFC support for Orbit Debris analysis, conjunction assessment and collision avoidance, commercial and foreign support, and protection of GSFC managed missions.

Description: NASA's Human Research Program Integrated Research Plan (HRP-47065) serves as a road-map identifying critically needed information for future space flight operations (Lunar, Martian). VO2max (often termed aerobic capacity) reflects the maximum rate at which oxygen can be taken up and utilized by the body during exercise. Lack of in-flight and immediate postflight VO2max measurements was one area identified as a concern. The risk associated with not knowing this information is: Unnecessary Operational Limitations due to Inaccurate Assessment of Cardiovascular Performance (HRP-47065).

Description: This viewgraph presentation reviews spacecraft water monitoring, and the scientific challenges associated with spacecraft water quality. The contents include: 1) Spacecraft Water 101; 2) Paradigm Shift; and 3) Technology Needs.

Description: This issue of the Orbital Debris Quarterly contains articles on the congressional hearing that was held on orbital debris and space traffic; the update received by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on the collision of the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 satellites; the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) inspection of the Hubble Space Telescope Wide Field Planetary Camera; an analysis of the reentry survivability of the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) spacecraft; an update on recent major breakup fragments; and a graph showing the current debris environment in low Earth orbit.

Description: An assessment methodology is developed to guide quantitative predictions of adverse physical environments and the subsequent effects on the Ares-1 crew launch vehicle associated with the loss of containment of cryogenic liquid propellants from the upper stage during ascent. Development of the methodology is led by a team at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with guidance and support from a number of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) personnel. The methodology is based on the current Ares-1 design and feasible accident scenarios. These scenarios address containment failure from debris impact or structural response to pressure or blast loading from an external source. Once containment is breached, the envisioned assessment methodology includes predictions for the sequence of physical processes stemming from cryogenic tank failure. The investigative techniques, analysis paths, and numerical simulations that comprise the proposed methodology are summarized and appropriate simulation software is identified in this report.

Description: Starting in January 2004, the NESC has received several communications from knowledgeable technical experts at NASA expressing shared concerns (mainly at the Langley Research Center (LaRC) and Ames Research Center (ARC)) about Huygens mission success. It was suggested that NASA become more technically involved directly in the analysis of Huygens' entry, descent and landing (EDL) focusing on the parachute deployment trigger performance and the resultant effects on the operation of the parachute system, and the determination of the radiative heating environment at Titan by ESA and the corresponding thermal protection system (TPS) response. A NESC Team was formed and tasked to provide an independent assessment of these concerns. The results of that assessment are documented in this report.

Description: Topics include: debris clouds left by satellite collision; debris flyby near the International Space Station; and break-up of an ullage motor from a Russian Proton launch vehicle. Findings from the analysis of the STS-126 Shuttle Endeavour window impact damage are provided. Abstracts from the NASA Orbital Debris program office are presented and address a variety of topics including: Reflectance Spectra Comparison of Orbital Debris, Intact Spacecraft, and Intact Rocket Bodies in the GEO Regime; Shape Distribution of Fragments From Microsatellite Impact Tests; Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Mitigation Techniques for the Space Shuttle Orbiter; Space Debris Environment Remediation Concepts; and, In Situ Measurement Activities at the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office. Additionally, a Meeting Report is provided for the 12 meeting of the NASA/DoD Orbital Debris Working Group.

Description: Objectives include: a) Describe the organization of recovery force command and control and landing areas; b) Describe the function and timeline use of the Earth Landing System (ELS); c) Describe Stable 1 vs Stable 2 landing configurations and the function of the Command Module Uprighting System; d) Explain the activities of the helicopter and swimmer teams in egress and recovery of the crew; e)Explain the activities of the swimmer teams and primary recovery ship in recovery of the Command Module; and f) Describe several landing incidents that occurred during Apollo.

Description: This slide presentation will cover the Sequential Events Control System (SECS), which is the Apollo spacecraft subsystem that controls the automatically sequenced functions during the mission and during any a borts that could be performed. Included in this presentation are its general architecture, its integration into and use of the spacecraft' s other systems, and details on the functions it is responsible for c ontrolling during the mission. The objectives are to describe the system's architecture, the major components in the system, and the major system functions.

Description: The existing lightning protection system at Pad 39B for the Space Shuttle is an outgrowth of a system that was put in place for the Apollo Program. Dr. Frank Fisher of Lightning Technologies was a key participant in the design and implementation of that system. He conveyed to the NESC team that the catenary wire provision was put in place quickly (as assurance against possible vehicle damage causing critical launch delays) rather than being implemented as a comprehensive system designed to provide a high degree of guaranteed protection. Also, the technology of lightning protection has evolved over time with considerable work being conducted by groups such as the electric utilities companies, aircraft manufacturers, universities, and others. Several accepted present-day methods for analysis of lightning protection were used by Drs. Medelius and Mata to study the expected lightning environment for the Pad 39B facility and to analyze the degree of protection against direct lightning attachment to the Space Shuttle. The specific physical configuration directly affects the vulnerability, so cases that were considered included the RSS next to and rolled back from the Space Shuttle, and the GOx Vent Arm both extended and withdrawn from the ET. Elements of the lightning protection system at Pad 39B are shown in Figure 6.0-1 and consist of an 80 foot insulating mast on top of the Fixed Support Structure (FSS), a catenary wire system that runs from the mast in a North/South direction to grounds 1000 feet away on each side of the mast, the RSS which can either be next to or away from the Space Shuttle, and a GOx vent that can either be extended or retracted from the top of the ET.

Description: Topics discussed include: new debris from a decommissioned satellite with a nuclear power source; debris from the destruction of the Fengyun-1C meteorological satellite; quantitative analysis of the European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle 'Jules Verne' reentry event; microsatellite impact tests; solar cycle 24 predictions and other long-term projections and geosynchronus (GEO) environment for the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2008). Abstracts from the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, examining satellite reentry risk assessments and statistical issues for uncontrolled reentry hazards, are also included.

Description: The origin of the aluminum equivalent shield approximation in space radiation analysis can be traced back to its roots in the early years of the NASA space programs (Mercury, Gemini and Apollo) wherein the primary radiobiological concern was the intense sources of ionizing radiation causing short term effects which was thought to jeopardize the safety of the crew and hence the mission. Herein, it is shown that the aluminum equivalent shield approximation, although reasonably well suited for that time period and to the application for which it was developed, is of questionable usefulness to the radiobiological concerns of routine space operations of the 21 st century which will include long stays onboard the International Space Station (ISS) and perhaps the moon. This is especially true for a risk based protection system, as appears imminent for deep space exploration where the long-term effects of Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) exposure is of primary concern. The present analysis demonstrates that sufficiently large errors in the interior particle environment of a spacecraft result from the use of the aluminum equivalent approximation, and such approximations should be avoided in future astronaut risk estimates. In this study, the aluminum equivalent approximation is evaluated as a means for estimating the particle environment within a spacecraft structure induced by the GCR radiation field. For comparison, the two extremes of the GCR environment, the 1977 solar minimum and the 2001 solar maximum, are considered. These environments are coupled to the Langley Research Center (LaRC) deterministic ionized particle transport code High charge (Z) and Energy TRaNsport (HZETRN), which propagates the GCR spectra for elements with charges (Z) in the range I 〈= Z 〈= 28 (H -- Ni) and secondary neutrons through selected target materials. The coupling of the GCR extremes to HZETRN allows for the examination of the induced environment within the interior' of an idealized spacecraft as approximated by a spherical shell shield, and the effects of the aluminum equivalent approximation for a good polymeric shield material such as genetic polyethylene (PE). The shield thickness is represented by a 25 g/cm spherical shell. Although one could imagine the progression to greater thickness, the current range will be sufficient to evaluate the qualitative usefulness of the aluminum equivalent approximation. Upon establishing the inaccuracies of the aluminum equivalent approximation through numerical simulations of the GCR radiation field attenuation for PE and aluminum equivalent PE spherical shells, we Anther present results for a limited set of commercially available, hydrogen rich, multifunctional polymeric constituents to assess the effect of the aluminum equivalent approximation on their radiation attenuation response as compared to the generic PE.

Description: A synopsis of experience from the fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft communities in handling qualities development and the use of the Cooper-Harper pilot rating scale is presented as background for spacecraft handling qualities research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). In addition, handling qualities experiences and lessons-learned from previous United States (US) spacecraft developments are reviewed. This report is intended to provide a central location for references, best practices, and lessons-learned to guide current and future spacecraft handling qualities RDT&E.

Description: This guideline discusses a standard approach for defining, determining, and addressing safety, handling, and qualification standards for lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries to help the implementation of the technology in aerospace applications. Information from a variety of other sources relating to Li-ion batteries and their aerospace uses has been collected and included in this document. The sources used are listed in the reference section at the end of this document. The Li-Ion chemistry is highly energetic due to its inherent high specific energy and its flammable electrolyte. Due to the extreme importance of appropriate design, test, and hazard control of Li-ion batteries, it is recommended that all Government and industry users and vendors of this technology for space applications, especially involving humans, use this document for appropriate guidance prior to implementing the technology.

Description: Mr. Christopher Johnson, NASA's Systems Manager for the Orion Project Crew Module (CM) Landing and Recovery at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), and Mr. James Corliss, Project Engineer for the Orion CM Landing System Advanced Development Project at the Langley Research Center (LaRC) requested an independent assessment of the wave model that was developed to analyze the CM water landing conditions. A NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) initial evaluation was approved November 20, 2008. Mr. Bryan Smith, NESC Chief Engineer at the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), was selected to lead this assessment. The Assessment Plan was presented and approved by the NESC Review Board (NRB) on December 18, 2008. The Assessment Report was presented to the NRB on March 12, 2009. This document is the final Assessment Report.

Description: Based on an anonymous request, an NESC Assessment Team was formed to investigate potential leakage problems from the ISS Program's Node 2 Anhydrous Ammonia System AN fittings. The Team's charter was to provide the ISS Program with a path to follow, which could include testing, to ensure the ISS Program felt confident that the AN fittings' leakage would not exceed specified limits in orbit. The findings from that assessment are contained in this document.

Description: Spacecraft are subject to micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impact damage which have the potential to degrade performance, shorten the mission, or result in catastrophic loss of the vehicle. Specific MMOD protection requirements are established by NASA for each spacecraft early in the program/project life, to ensure the spacecraft meets desired safety and mission success goals. Both the design and operations influences spacecraft survivability in the MMOD environment, and NASA considers both in meeting MMOD protection requirements. The purpose of this handbook is to provide spacecraft designers and operations personnel with knowledge gained by NASA in implementing effective MMOD protection for the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and various science spacecraft. It has been drawn from a number of previous publications [10-14], as well as new work. This handbook documents design and operational methods to reduce MMOD risk. In addition, this handbook describes tools and equations needed to design proper MMOD protection. It is a living report, in that it will be updated and re-released periodically in future with additional information. Providing effective and efficient MMOD protection is essential for ensuring safe and successful operations of spacecraft and satellites. A variety of shields protect crew modules, external pressurized vessels and critical equipment from MMOD on the International Space Station (ISS). Certain Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle systems are hardened from MMOD impact, and operational rules are established to reduce the risk from MMOD (i.e., flight attitudes are selected and late inspection of sensitive thermal protection surfaces are conducted to reduce MMOD impacts). Science spacecraft include specific provisions to meet MMOD protection requirements in their design (for example, Stardust & GLAST). Commercial satellites such as Iridium and Bigelow Aerospace Genesis spacecraft incorporate MMOD protection. The development of low-weight, effective MMOD protection has enabled these spacecraft missions to be performed successfully. This handbook describes these shielding techniques. For future exploration activities to the Moon and Mars, implementing high-performance MMOD shielding will be necessary to meet protection requirements with minimum mass penalty. A current area of technology development in MMOD shielding is the incorporation of sensors to detect and locate MMOD impact damage. Depending on the type of sensor the signals from the sensor can be processed to infer the location of the impact and the extent of damage. The objective of the sensors is to locate critical damage that would endanger the spacecraft or crew immediately or during reentry (such as an air leak from crew module or critical damage to thermal protection system of reentry vehicles). The information from the sensors can then be used with repair kits, patch kits, hatch closure or other appropriate remedial techniques to reduce MMOD risk.

Description: The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will be exposed to the Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) during missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and to the micrometeoroid environment during lunar missions. The CEV will be equipped with a docking system which enables it to connect to ISS and the lunar module known as Altair; this docking system includes a hatch that opens so crew and supplies can pass between the spacecrafts. This docking system is known as the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) and uses a silicone rubber seal to seal in cabin air. The rubber seal on LIDS presses against a metal flange on ISS (or Altair). All of these mating surfaces are exposed to the space environment prior to docking. The effects of atomic oxygen, ultraviolet and ionizing radiation, and MMOD have been estimated using ground based facilities. This work presents an initial methodology to predict meteoroid and orbital debris threats to candidate docking seals being considered for LIDS. The methodology integrates the results of ground based hypervelocity impacts on silicone rubber seals and aluminum sheets, risk assessments of the MMOD environment for a variety of mission scenarios, and candidate failure criteria. The experimental effort that addressed the effects of projectile incidence angle, speed, mass, and density, relations between projectile size and resulting crater size, and relations between crater size and the leak rate of candidate seals has culminated in a definition of the seal/flange failure criteria. The risk assessment performed with the BUMPER code used the failure criteria to determine the probability of failure of the seal/flange system and compared the risk to the allotted risk dictated by NASA s program requirements.

Description: Recommendations for minimal in-flight capabilities: Retinal Imaging - provide in-flight capability for the visual monitoring of ocular health (specifically, imaging of the retina and optic nerve head) with the capability of downlinking video/still images. Tonometry - provide more accurate and reliable in-flight capability for measuring intraocular pressure. Ultrasound - explore capabilities of current on-board system for monitoring ocular health. We currently have limited in-flight capabilities on board the International Space Station for performing an internal ocular health assessment. Visual Acuity, Direct Ophthalmoscope, Ultrasound, Tonometry(Tonopen):

Description: Launching a rocket, running a business, driving to work and even day-to-day living all involve some degree of risk. Risk is ever present yet not always recognized, adequately assessed and appropriately mitigated. Identification, assessment and mitigation of risk are elements of the risk management component of the "continuous improvement" way of life that has become a hallmark of successful and progressive enterprises. While the application of risk management techniques to provide continuous improvement may be detailed and extensive, the philosophy, ideals and tools can be beneficially applied to all situations. Experiences with the use of risk identification, assessment and mitigation techniques for complex systems and processes are described. System safety efforts and tools used to examine potential risks of the Ares I First Stage of NASA s new Constellation Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) presently being designed are noted as examples. Recommendations from lessons learned are provided for the application of risk management during the development of new systems as well as for the improvement of existing systems. Lessons learned and suggestions given are also examined for applicability to simple systems, uncomplicated processes and routine personal daily tasks. This paper informs the reader of varied uses of risk management efforts and techniques to identify, assess and mitigate risk for improvement of products, success of business, protection of people and enhancement of personal life.

Description: Spacecraft fire safety emphasizes fire prevention, which is achieved primarily through the use of fire-resistant materials. Materials selection for spacecraft is based on conventional flammability acceptance tests, along with prescribed quantity limitations and configuration control for items that are non-pass or questionable. ISO 14624-1 and -2 are the major methods used to evaluate flammability of polymeric materials intended for use in the habitable environments of spacecraft. The methods are upward flame-propagation tests initiated in static environments and using a well-defined igniter flame at the bottom of the sample. The tests are conducted in the most severe flaming combustion environment expected in the spacecraft. The pass/fail test logic of ISO 14624-1 and -2 does not allow a quantitative comparison with reduced gravity or microgravity test results; therefore their use is limited, and possibilities for in-depth theoretical analyses and realistic estimates of spacecraft fire extinguishment requirements are practically eliminated. To better understand the applicability of laboratory test data to actual spacecraft environments, a modified ISO 14624 protocol has been proposed that, as an alternative to qualifying materials as pass/fail in the worst-expected environments, measures the actual upward flammability limit for the material. A working group established by NASA to provide recommendations for exploration spacecraft internal atmospheres realized the importance of correlating laboratory data with real-life environments and recommended NASA to develop a flammability threshold test method. The working group indicated that for the Constellation Program, the flammability threshold information will allow NASA to identify materials with increased flammability risk from oxygen concentration and total pressure changes, minimize potential impacts, and allow for development of sound requirements for new spacecraft and extravehicular landers and habitats. Furthermore, recent research has shown that current normal gravity materials flammability tests do not correlate with flammability in ventilated, micro- or reduced-gravity conditions. Currently, the materials selection for spacecraft is based on the assumption of commonality between ground flammability test results and spacecraft environments, which does not appear to be valid. Materials flammability threshold data acquired in normal gravity can be correlated with data obtained in microgravity or reduced-gravity experiments, and consequently a more accurate assessment of the margin of safety of the material in the real environment can be made. In addition, the method allows the option of selecting better or best space system materials, as opposed to what would be considered just acceptable from a flammability point of view and realistic assessment of spacecraft fire extinguishment needs, which could result in significant weight savings. The knowledge afforded by this technique allows for limited extrapolations of flammability behavior to conditions not specifically tested and that could potentially result in significant cost and time savings. The intent of this Technical Specification is to bring to the attention of International Aerospace Community the importance of correlating laboratory test data with real-life space systems applications. The method presented is just one of the possibilities that are believed will lead to better understanding the applicability of laboratory aerospace materials flammability test data. International feedback on improving the proposed method, as well as suggestions for correlating other laboratory aerospace test data with real-life applications relevant to space systems are being sought.

Description: This slide presentation reviews the use of ground test data in reference to flammability to spacecraft environments. It reviews the current approach to spacecraft fire safety, the challenges to fire safety that the Constellation program poses, the current trends in the evaluation of the Constellation materials flammability, and the correlation of test data from ground flammability tests with the spacecraft environment. Included is a proposal for testing and the design of experiments to test the flammability of materials under similar spacecraft conditions.

Description: Complex systems require integrated analysis teams which sometimes are divided into subsystem teams. Proper division of the analysis in to subsystem teams is important. Safety analysis is one of the most difficult aspects of integration.

Description: This viewgraph presentation reviews topics on test methods for space systems and operations safety through experimentation and analysis. The contents include: 1) Perception of reality through experimentation and analysis; 2) Measurements, methods, and correlations with real life; and 3) Correlating laboratory aerospace materials flammability data with data in spacecraft environments.

Description: Commercial partnerships and organizational constraints, combined with complex systems, may lead to division of hazard analysis across organizations. This division could cause important hazards to be overlooked, causes to be missed, controls for a hazard to be incomplete, or verifications to be inefficient. Each organization s team must understand at least one level beyond the interface sufficiently enough to comprehend integrated hazards. This paper will discuss various ways to properly divide analysis among organizations. The Ares I launch vehicle integrated safety analyses effort will be utilized to illustrate an approach that addresses the key issues and concerns arising from multiple analysis responsibilities.

Description: This paper describes efforts to improve on typical packed beds of sorbent pellets by making use of structured sorbents and alternate bed configurations to improve system efficiency and reliability. The benefits of the alternate configurations include increased structural stability gained by eliminating clay bound zeolite pellets that tend to fluidize and erode, and better thermal control during sorption to increase process efficiency. Test results that demonstrate such improvements are described and presented.

Description: Analysis of amateur video of the early reentry phases of the Columbia accident is discussed. With poor video quality and little theoretical guidance, the analysis team estimated mass and acceleration ranges for the debris shedding events observed in the video. Camera calibration and optical performance issues are also described.

Description: Successful trace chemical contamination control is one of the components necessary for achieving good cabin atmospheric quality. While employing seemingly simple process technologies, sizing the active contamination control equipment must employ a reliable design basis for the trace chemical load in the cabin atmosphere. A simplified design basis that draws on experience gained from the International Space Station program is presented. The trace chemical contamination control design load refines generation source magnitudes and includes key chemical functional groups representing both engineering and toxicology challenges.

Description: The trace contaminant control system (TCCS) located in the International Space Station s (ISS) U.S. laboratory module employs physical adsorption, thermal catalytic oxidation, and chemical adsorption to remove trace chemical contamination produced by equipment offgassing and anthropogenic sources from the cabin atmosphere. The chemical adsorption stage, consisting of a packed bed of granular lithium hydroxide (LiOH), is located after the thermal catalytic oxidation stage and is designed to remove acid gas byproducts that may be formed in the upstream oxidation stage. While in service on board the ISS, the LiOH bed exhibited a change in flow resistance that leading to flow control difficulties in the TCCS. Post flight evaluation revealed LiOH granule size attrition among other changes. An experimental program was employed to investigate mechanisms hypothesized to contribute to the change in the packed bed s flow resistance. Background on the problem is summarized, including a discussion of likely mechanisms. The experimental program is described, results are presented, and implications for the future are discussed.

Description: The Conjunction Assessment Team at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center provides conjunction risk assessment for many NASA robotic missions. These risk assessments are based on several figures of merit, such as miss distance, probability of collision, and orbit determination solution quality. However, these individual metrics do not singly capture the overall risk associated with a conjunction, making it difficult for someone without this complete understanding to take action, such as an avoidance maneuver. The goal of this analysis is to introduce a single risk index metric that can easily convey the level of risk without all of the technical details. The proposed index is called the conjunction "F-value." This paper presents the concept of the F-value and the tuning of the metric for use in routine Conjunction Assessment operations.

Description: This slide presentation reviews the work that is being done to resolve a potential problem with the flow control valve poppet that controls the flow of GH2 into the space shuttle's main engine. The STS Hydrogen Flow Control Valve (HFVC) and potential problems that could arise from the failure of a poppet are reviewed. The analysis and testing that were performed are discussed. There is discussion about the current work involved in finding a resolution to the problem, including finding new materials to use in construction of poppetts,

Description: Normalizing drop test reefed drag area for suspension line length with data from Wolf allows best match of test results with Knacke reefing ratio curve. Various sizes and porosities of quarter spherical ribbon parachutes were tested. All appear to fit the published reefing ratio curve-quarter spherical parachutes match.

Description: Emergency mask approach on Orion poses a challenge to the traditional Shuttle or Station approaches. Currently, in the case of a fire or toxic spill event, the crew utilizes open loop oxygen masks that provide the crew with oxygen to breath, but also dumps the exhaled oxygen into the cabin. For Orion, with a small cabin volume, the extra oxygen will exceed the flammability limit within a short period of time, unless a nitrogen purge is also provided. Another approach to a fire or toxic spill event is the use of a filtering emergency masks. These masks utilize some form of chemical beds to scrub the air clean of toxic providing the crew safe breathing air for a period without elevating the oxygen level in the cabin. Using the masks and a form of smoke-eater filter, it may be possible to clean the cabin completely or to a level for safe transition to a space suit to perform a cabin purge. Issues with filters in the past have been the reaction time, breakthroughs, and high breathing resistance. Development in a new form of chemical filters has shown promise to make the filtering approach feasible.

Description: This slide presentation reviews some ways to reduce the problem posed by debris in orbit around the Earth. It reviews the orbital debris environment, the near-term needs to minimize the Kessler syndrome, also known as collisional cascading, a survey of active orbital debris mitigation strategies, the best paths to actively remove orbital debris, and technologies that are required for active debris mitigation.

Description: Combustion and rupture of a liquid oxygen tank during the Apollo 13 mission provides lessons and insights for future spacecraft designers and operations personnel who may never, during their careers, have participated in saving a vehicle and crew during a spacecraft emergency. Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) challenges were the reestablishment of attitude control after the oxygen tank incident, re-establishment of a free return trajectory, resolution of a ground tracking conflict between the LM and the Saturn V S-IVB stage, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) alignments, maneuvering to burn attitudes, attitude control during burns, and performing manual GNC tasks with most vehicle systems powered down. Debris illuminated by the Sun and gaseous venting from the Service Module (SM) complicated crew attempts to identify stars and prevented execution of nominal IMU alignment procedures. Sightings on the Sun, Moon, and Earth were used instead. Near continuous communications with Mission Control enabled the crew to quickly perform time critical procedures. Overcoming these challenges required the modification of existing contingency procedures.

Description: The presentation includes information about growth of the satellite population, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, tracking and catalog maintenance, Haystack and HAX radar observation, Goldstone radar, the Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope (MODEST), spacecraft surface examinations and sample of space shuttle impacts. GEO/LEO observations from Kwajalein Atoll, NASA s Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2008), a LEO-to-GEO Environment Debris Model (LEGEND), Debris Assessment Software (DAS) 2.0, the NASA/JSC BUMPER-II meteoroid/debris threat assessment code, satellite reentry risk assessment, optical size and shape determination, work on more complicated fragments, and spectral studies.

Description: The NASA Constellation uncrewed cargo mission delivers cargo to any designated location on the lunar surface (or other staging point) in a single mission. This capability is used to deliver surface infrastructure needed for lunar outpost construction, to provide periodic logistics resupply to support a continuous human lunar presence, and potentially deliver other assets to various locations.In the nominal mission mode, the Altair lunar lander is launched on Ares V into Low Earth Orbit (LEO), following a short Low Earth Orbit (LEO) loiter period, the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) performs the Trans Lunar Injection (TLI) burn and is then jettisoned. The Altair performs translunar trajectory correction maneuvers as necessary and performs the Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) burn. Altair then descends to the surface to land near a designated target, presumably in proximity to an Outpost location or another site of interest for exploration.Alternatively, the EDS and Altair Descent Stage could deliver assets to various staging points within their propulsive capabilities.

Description: The intent of this Technical Consultation Report is to document the finding and recommendations of the NESC Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) Peer Review conducted at NASA s Johnson Space Center (JSC) with the ORM Working Group (WG) over the period 8-10 June 2005.

Description: No abstract available

Description: Severe thunderstorms with associated hail and high winds struck the STS-117 stack on February 26, 2007. Peak winds were recorded at 62 knots with hail sizes ranging from 0.3 inch to 0.8 inch in diameter. As a result of the storm, the North Carolina Foam Institute (NCFI) type 24-124 Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam on the liquid oxygen (LO2) ogive acreage incurred significant impact damage. The NCFI on the ET intertank and the liquid hydrogen (LH2) acreage sustained hail damage. The Polymer Development Laboratory (PDL)-1034 foam of the LO2 ice frost ramps (IFRs) and the Super-Lightweight Ablator (SLA) of the LO2 cable tray also suffered minor damage. NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to assess the technical feasibility of repairing the ET TPS, the reasonableness of conducting those repairs with the vehicle in a vertical, integrated configuration at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vehicle Assemble Building (VAB), and to address attendant human factors considerations including worker fatigue and the potential for error. The outcome of the assessment is recorded in this document.

Description: The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) project is responsible for the design, development, fabrication, qualification and delivery of the CEV parachute system to support the Orion pad/ascent flight tests and the first three orbital flight tests (including the first human mission). This article will discuss the technical and research achievements accomplished in calendar year 2008, broken into three key categories: prototype testing and analysis (also referred to as the Generation 1 design), system requirements definition and design of the flight engineering development unit, and support for the Orion vehicle flight testing (primarily Pad-Abort 1).

Description: Recent cut damages to crewmember extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) gloves during extravehicular activity (EVA) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) has been found to result from contact with sharp edges or pinch points rather than general wear or abrasion. One possible source of cut-hazards are protruding sharp edged crater lips from impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles on external metallic handrails along EVA translation paths. During impact of MMOD particles at hypervelocity an evacuation flow develops behind the shock wave, resulting in the formation of crater lips that can protrude above the target surface. In this study, two methods were evaluated to limit EMU glove cut-hazards due to MMOD impact craters. In the first phase, four flexible overwrap configurations are evaluated: a felt-reusable surface insulation (FRSI), polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, double-layer polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, and multi-layer beta-cloth with intermediate Dacron netting spacers. These overwraps are suitable for retrofitting ground equipment that has yet to be flown, and are not intended to protect the handrail from impact of MMOD particles, rather to act as a spacer between hazardous impact profiles and crewmember gloves. At the impact conditions considered, all four overwrap configurations evaluated were effective in limiting contact between EMU gloves and impact crater profiles. The multi-layer beta-cloth configuration was the most effective in reducing the height of potentially hazardous profiles in handrail-representative targets. In the second phase of the study, four material alternatives to current aluminum and stainless steel alloys were evaluated: a metal matrix composite, carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP), fiberglass, and a fiber metal laminate. Alternative material handrails are intended to prevent the formation of hazardous damage profiles during MMOD impact and are suitable for flight hardware yet to be constructed. Of the four materials evaluated, only the fiberglass formed a less hazardous damage profile than the baseline metallic target. Although the CFRP laminate did not form any noticeable crater lip, brittle protruding fibers are considered a puncture risk. In parallel with EMU glove redesign efforts, modifications to metallic ISS handrails such as those evaluated in this study provide the means to significantly reduce cut-hazards from MMOD impact craters.

Description: As part of the FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery) Project for the Constellation Program, a task was designed within the context of the Constellation Program FDIR project called the Legacy Benchmarking Task to document as accurately as possible the FDIR processes and resources that were used by the Space Shuttle ground support equipment (GSE) during the Shuttle flight program. These results served as a comparison with results obtained from the new FDIR capability. The task team assessed Shuttle and EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) historical data for GSE-related launch delays to identify expected benefits and impact. This analysis included a study of complex fault isolation situations that required a lengthy troubleshooting process. Specifically, four elements of that system were considered: LH2 (liquid hydrogen), LO2 (liquid oxygen), hydraulic test, and ground special power.

Description: A review has been performed of exploration science and payload operations during the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs to extract information of potential usefulness to the Constellation program. That work has resulted in creation of the concept for a unique type of flight controller: the exploration science officer. The controller s primary responsibility is to integrate the tasks and goals of the spacecraft flight control team and the science team in order to maximize science return while maximizing crew safety. Far from being just a mouthpiece for either team, this individual must be fluent in the knowledge and language of two communities: spacecraft operations and planetary science. Responsibilities begin during the requirements phase of vehicle and lunar surface systems development and continue through development, training, planning, mission execution, and post-flight mission phases.

Description: The new version of the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2008) requires accurate populations as input template files to be used in the calculation of orbital debris fluxes on chosen spacecraft or within telescope/radar fields-of-view. Populations in ORDEM2008 are derived from a consortium of data and modeling. Geosynchronous (GEO) satellites and debris form a distinct ORDEM2008 population that is applied to the distinct analysis of GEO fluxes. Low Earth orbit (LEO) populations are derived by combining modeling results with ground-based data, primarily from radar systems and in-situ data. In contrast, the GEO region has not been as well observed. The distance between orbiting objects and ground-based instruments precludes the wide usage of radar as a means of observation. Instead, optical instruments dominate in the study of GEO. Of these, the NASA sponsored Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope (MODEST) has provided 4 years of surveys of the region detecting cataloged objects (correlated targets) and non-cataloged objects (uncorrelated targets) to an estimated minimum size of 30 cm. This paper describes the methods of combining NASA launch database and satellite breakup and orbital propagation modeling with MODEST 2004-to-2006 uncorrelated target data to attain a GEO environment to 10 cm. Assuming that MODEST uncorrelated targets are breakup debris allows for the extension of the debris survey data to smaller sizes with the NASA Standard Breakup model. Each orbit within the total resulting GEO population is marked by a random argument of perigee and nearly constant mean motion, eccentricity, inclination, and node over the nearly 3 years of observation. Lack of published references of past breakups in GEO is mitigated by the orbital propagation of MODEST extended data to 1995 (the beginning epoch of ORDEM2008).

Description: Human testing was conducted to more fully characterize the integrated performance of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES) with liquid cooling provide by an Individual Cooling Unit (ICU) across a broad range of environmental conditions and metabolic rates. Together with a correlation for the ACES Liquid Cooling Garment as a function of inlet temperature, metabolic rate, and crew size, a reasonably conservative correlation for core temperature was achieved for the human thermal model applied to the ACES with ICU cooling. A key observation for this correlation was accounting for transpiration of evaporated sweat through the Gortex(Registered TradeMark) liner of the ACES indicated by as much as 0.6 lbm of sweat evaporated over the course of the 1 hour test profile, most of which could not be attributed to respiration or head sweat evaporation of the crew. Historically it has been assumed that transpiration was not an important design feature of the ACES suit. The correlated human thermal model will show transpiration to be highly useful in hot survival situations for the Orion Program when adequate liquid cooling is not available.

Description: In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. There was at the time no viable technique to repair the orbiter s thermal protection system if it were to be damaged by debris during ascent. Furthermore in the event of damage, since the mission was not to the International Space Station, there was no safe haven for the crew to wait for an extended period of time for a rescue. The HST servicing mission was reconsidered because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for the astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damage thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of servicing mission, the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For HST there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue because of the limited consumables available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depends upon several factors including when a problem is identified, when and to what extent power down procedures are begun, and where the rescue vehicle is in its ground processing cycle. Severe power downs maximize crew rescue success but would eliminate the option for the orbiter servicing the HST to attempt a landing. Therefore, crew rescue success needed to be weighed against preserving the ability of the orbiter to have landing option in case there was a problem with the rescue vehicle. This paper focuses on quantification of the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down capabilities. That work supported NASA s decision to proceed with the HST service mission, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009.

Description: The new version of the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2010) requires accurate populations as input files to be used in the calculation of orbital debris fluxes on chosen spacecraft or within telescope/radar fields-of-view. Populations in ORDEM2010 are derived from an amalgam of data and modeling. Geosynchronous orbit (GEO) satellites and debris form a distinct ORDEM2010 population that is applied to the distinct analysis of GEO fluxes. Low Earth orbit (LEO) populations are derived by combining modeling results with ground-based data, primarily from radar systems, and in-situ data. In contrast, the GEO region has not been as well observed. The distance between orbiting objects and ground-based instruments precludes the wide usage of radar as a means of observation. Instead, optical instruments dominate in the study of GEO. Of these, the NASA sponsored Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope (MODEST) has provided 3 years of surveys of the region detecting cataloged objects (correlated targets) and non-cataloged objects (uncorrelated targets) to an estimated minimum size of 30 cm. This paper describes the methods of combining NASA launch database and satellite breakup and orbital propagation modeling with MODEST 2004-to-2006 uncorrelated target data to attain a GEO environment to 10 cm. Assuming that MODEST uncorrelated targets are breakup debris allows for the extension of the debris survey data to smaller sizes using the NASA Standard Breakup Model. Each orbit within the total resulting GEO population is marked by a random argument of perigee and nearly constant mean motion, eccentricity, inclination, and right ascension of ascending node (RAAN) over the nearly 3 years of observation. Lack of published references of past breakups in GEO is mitigated by the orbital propagation of MODEST extended data to 1995 (the beginning epoch of ORDEM2010).

Description: There are over 13,000 pieces of catalogued objects 10cm and larger in orbit around Earth [ODQN, January 2009, p12]. More than 6000 of these objects are fragments from explosions and collisions. As the earth-orbiting object count increases, debris-generating collisions in the future become a statistical inevitability. To aid in understanding this collision risk, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has developed computer models that calculate quantity and orbits of debris both currently in orbit and in future epochs. In order to create a reasonable computer model of the orbital debris environment, it is important to understand the mechanics of creation of debris as a result of a collision. The measurement of the physical characteristics of debris resulting from ground-based, hypervelocity impact testing aids in understanding the sizes and shapes of debris produced from potential impacts in orbit. To advance the accuracy of fragment shape/size determination, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office recently implemented a computerized measurement system. The goal of this system is to improve knowledge and understanding of the relation between commonly used dimensions and overall shape. The technique developed involves scanning a single fragment with a hand-held laser device, measuring its size properties using a sophisticated software tool, and creating a three-dimensional computer model to demonstrate how the object might appear in orbit. This information is used to aid optical techniques in shape determination. This more automated and repeatable method provides higher accuracy in the size and shape determination of debris.

Description: Past research has demonstrated the substantial potential of synthetic and enhanced vision (SV, EV) for aviation (e.g., Prinzel & Wickens, 2009). These augmented visual-based technologies have been shown to significantly enhance situation awareness, reduce workload, enhance aviation safety (e.g., reduced propensity for controlled flight -into-terrain accidents/incidents), and promote flight path control precision. The issues that drove the design and development of synthetic and enhanced vision have commonalities to other application domains; most notably, during entry, descent, and landing on the moon and other planetary surfaces. NASA has extended SV/EV technology for use in planetary exploration vehicles, such as the Altair Lunar Lander. This paper describes an Altair Lunar Lander SV/EV concept and associated research demonstrating the safety benefits of these technologies.

Description: This paper documents the data collected from two hypervelocity micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) impact events where the shuttle payload bay door radiator sandwich panel was completely perforated. Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy-Dispersive x-ray Spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) analysis of impact residue provided evidence to identify the source of each impact. Impact site features that indicate projectile directionality are discussed, along with hypervelocity impact testing on representative samples conducted to simulate the impact event. The paper provides results of a study of impact risks for the size of particles that caused the MMOD damage and the regions of the orbiter vehicle that would be vulnerable to an equivalent projectile

Description: The United States has one of the most active programs of research of the orbital debris environment in the world. Much of the research is conducted by NASA s Orbital Debris Program Office at the Johnson Space Center. Past work by NASA has led to the development of national space policy which seeks to limit the growth of the debris population and limit the risk to spacecraft and humans in space and on the Earth from debris. NASA has also been instrumental in developing consistent international policies and standards. Much of NASA's efforts have been to measure and characterize the orbital debris population. The U.S. Department of Defense tracks and catalogs spacecraft and large debris with it's Space Surveillance Network while NASA concentrates on research on smaller debris. In low Earth orbit, NASA has utilized short wavelength radars such as Haystack, HAX, and Goldstone to statistically characterize the population in number, size, altitude, and inclination. For higher orbits, optical telescopes have been used. Much effort has gone into the understanding and removal of observational biases from both types of measurements. NASA is also striving to understand the material composition and shape characteristics of debris to assess these effects on the risk to operational spacecraft. All of these measurements along with data from ground tests provide the basis for near- and long-term modeling of the environment. NASA also develops tools used by spacecraft builders and operators to evaluate spacecraft and mission designs to assess compliance with debris standards and policies which limit the growth of the debris environment.

Description: Most spaceflight crewmembers agree that emergency training is among the most important training they receive. If an emergency event occurs on-orbit crewmembers want to be able to rely on a thorough and proficient knowledge of emergency operations and procedures. The inherent complexity of ISS and the international nature of the onboard operations have resulted in emergency procedures that are complex by any measure; as a result, a very robust apparatus has been developed to give crewmembers initial training on emergency procedures and ensure proficiency up to (and even after) launch. One of the most important aspects of complex onboard operations in general, and emergency operations specifically, is learning how to coordinate roles and responsibilities with fellow crewmembers. A primary goal of NASA s emergency training program is to allow the crewmembers who will actually be together on-orbit to practice executing the emergency responses together before they fly. As with any operation that includes the use of software and hardware, the fidelity of the simulation environment is a critical element to successful training. The NASA training division has spent considerable time and effort to develop a simulator that addresses the most important aspects of emergency response, working within very difficult space and budgetary constraints.

Description: This slide presentation reviews the modeling activities for modeling of the long-term debris environment, the updated assessments of the environment, and the necessity to model the effectiveness of the technologies aimed at the removal of orbital debris. The model being used is named a LEO to GEO environment debris (LEGEND). It is a high fidelity three dimensional numerical simulation model with the capability to treat objects individually. It uses a Monte Carlo approach and a collision probability evaluation algorithm to simulate future satellite breakups and the growth of the debris populations.

Description: Detecting and extinguishing fires, along with post-fire atmospheric cleaning and monitoring, are vital components of a spacecraft fire response system. Preliminary efforts focused on the technology evaluation of these systems under realistic conditions are described in this paper. While the primary objective of testing is to determine a smoke mitigation filter s performance, supplemental evaluations measuring the smoke-filled chamber handheld commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) atmospheric monitoring devices (combustion product monitors) are also conducted. The test chamber consists of a 1.4 cubic meter (50 cu. ft.) volume containing a smoke generator. The fuel used to generate the smoke is a mixture of polymers in quantities representative of materials involved in a circuit board fire as a typical spacecraft fire. Two fire conditions were examined: no flame and flame. No flame events are produced by pyrolyzing the fuel mixture in a quartz tube furnace with forced ventilation to produce a white, lingering-type smoke. Flame events ignite the smoke at the outlet of the tube furnace producing combustion characterized by a less opaque smoke with black soot. Electrochemical sensor measurements showed carbon monoxide is a major indicator of each fire. Acid gas measurements were recorded, but cross interferents are currently uncharacterized. Electrochemical sensor measurements and sample acquisition techniques from photoacoustic sensors are being improved. Overall, this research shows fire characterization using traditional analytical chemistry techniques is required to verify measurements recorded using COTS atmospheric monitoring devices.

Description: Objectives: 1. To collect spinal elongation induced seated height data for subjects exposed to microgravity environments. 2. To provide information relating to the seated height rate of change over time for astronauts subjected to microgravity. We will collect: Seated Height measurement (ground & flight) and digital still photograph (ground and flight).

Description: Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing, performed by Space Shuttle crews, has contributed to what is arguably one of the most successful astronomy missions ever flown. Both nominal and contingency proximity operations techniques were developed to enable successful servicing, while lowering the risk of damage to HST systems, and improve crew safety. Influencing the development of these techniques were the challenges presented by plume impingement and HST performance anomalies. The design of both the HST and the Space Shuttle was completed before the potential of HST contamination and structural damage by shuttle RCS jet plume impingement was fully understood. Relative navigation during proximity operations has been challenging, as HST was not equipped with relative navigation aids. Since HST reached orbit in 1990, proximity operations design for servicing missions has evolved as insight into plume contamination and dynamic pressure has improved and new relative navigation tools have become available. Servicing missions have provided NASA with opportunities to gain insight into servicing mission design and development of nominal and contingency procedures. The HST servicing experiences and lessons learned are applicable to other programs that perform on-orbit servicing and rendezvous, both human and robotic.

Description: Supersonic/hypersonic laminar heating correlations that were developed for damage assessment analysis of atmospheric re-entry vehicles have been modified and extended to cover fully-turbulent conditions over rectangular cavity geometries that are aligned with the local velocity. Turbulent boundary layer properties were computationally determined and used to develop the cavity geometry parametrics and to correlate experimental closed cavity heating data to yield new relationships for the floor-averaged and centerline endwall peak-heating augmentation. With the form of the closed-cavity correlations established, historical data were used to develop new correlations for turbulent open-cavity heating.

Description: Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Description: The Bird Vision system is a multicamera photogrammerty software application that runs on a Microsoft Windows XP platform and was developed at Kennedy Space Center by ASRC Aerospace. This software system collects data about the locations of birds within a volume centered on the Space Shuttle and transmits it in real time to the laptop computer of a test director in the Launch Control Center (LCC) Firing Room.

Description: After the loss of Columbia, there was great concern in the Space Shuttle program for the impact of debris against the leading edges of the Orbiter wings. It was quickly recognized that, in addition to impacts by foam, ice that formed on the liquid-oxygen bellows running down the outside of the External Tank could break free during launch and hit this sensitive area. A Center Director s Discretionary Fund (CDDF) project would concentrate on novel ideas that were potentially applicable. The most successful of the new concepts for ice mitigation involved shape memory alloy materials. These materials can be bent into a given shape and, when heated, will return to their original shape.

Description: The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility project that uses tracking and attitude data from onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) and inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors and configurable rule-based algorithms to make flight termination decisions. AFSS objectives are to increase launch capabilities by permitting launches from locations without range safety infrastructure, reduce costs by eliminating some downrange tracking and communication assets, and reduce the reaction time for flight termination decisions.

Description: Uninsulated areas on cryogenic propellant tanks and feedlines cause moisture in the air to condense or ice to form. Flange joints, bracket supports, expansion bellows, and other cavities are uninsulated by design. These areas cannot be sealed because conventional thermal insulation materials would restrict mechanical articulations. Aerogel-based thermal insulation systems are able to seal critical locations such as the liquid-oxygen (LO2) feedline bellows. A new thermal insulation system was also necessary between the intertank wall, flange, and the liquid-hydrogen (LH2) tank dome, where there is a cavity (or crevice) with an exposed 20-K surface. When nitrogen gas is used for purging within the intertank volume, it condenses on this cold surface. Some solid nitrogen may also form on the colder side of the crevice. Voids or discontinuities within the foam can pressurize and cause areas of foam to weaken and break off, reducing thermal efficiency and creating potentially dangerous debris. To prevent this foam loss, we developed a thermal insulation system using bulk-fill aerogel material and demonstrated it with a one-tenth-scale model of the LH2 intertank flange area

Description: The history of the space industry stretches far and above lunar landings to the construction of the International Space Station. For years, humans have sought to understand the nature of the universe. As society grows in knowledge and curiosity of space, the focus of maintaining the safety of the crew and vehicle habitability is of utmost importance to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) community. Through the years, Payload Safety has developed not only as a Panel, but also as part of the NASA community, striving to enhance the efficiency and understanding of how business should be conducted as more International Partners become involved. This is the first in a series of papers and presentations in what is hoped to be an annual update that provides continuous challenges and lessons learned in the areas of communication, safety requirements and processes and other areas which have been vital to the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP).

Description: The toxicological assessments of 2 grab sample canisters (GSCs) from the Shuttle are reported. Formaldehyde badges were not used. Analytical methods have not changed from earlier reports. The recoveries of the 3 surrogates (C-13-acetone, fluorobenzene, and chlorobenzene) from the 2 GSCs averaged 111, 82, and 78%, respectively. The Shuttle atmosphere was acceptable for human respiration.

Description: This CD-ROM contains a two-part case study of the Apollo 13 accident. The first lesson contains an overview of the electrical system hardware on the Apollo spacecraft, providing a context for the details of the oxygen tank explosion, and the failure chain reconstruction that led to the conditions present at the time of the accident. Given this background, the lesson then covers the tank explosion and immediate damage to the spacecraft, and the immediate response of Mission Control to what they saw. Part 2 of the lesson picks up shortly after the explosion of the oxygen tank on Apollo 13, and discusses how Mission Control gained insight to and understanding of the damage in the aftermath. Impacts to various spacecraft systems are presented, along with Mission Control's reactions and plans for in-flight recovery leading to a successful entry. Finally, post-flight vehicle changes are presented along with the lessons learned.

Description: Spaceflight mechanisms have a reputation for being difficult to develop and operate successfully. This reputation is well earned. Many circumstances conspire to make this so: the environments in which the mechanisms are used are extremely severe, there is usually limited or no maintenance opportunity available during operation due to this environment, the environments are difficult to replicate accurately on the ground, the expense of the mechanism development makes it impractical to build and test many units for long periods of time before use, mechanisms tend to be highly specialized and not prone to interchangeability or off-the-shelf use, they can generate and store a lot of energy, and the nature of mechanisms themselves, as a combination of structures, electronics, etc. designed to accomplish specific dynamic performance, makes them very complex and subject to many unpredictable interactions of many types. In addition to their complexities, mechanism are often counted upon to provide critical vehicle functions that can result in catastrophic events should the functions not be performed. It is for this reason that mechanisms are frequently subjected to special scrutiny in safety processes. However, a failure tolerant approach, along with good design and development practices and detailed design reviews, can be developed to allow such notoriously troublesome mechanisms to be utilized confidently in safety-critical applications.