ALBERT

Description: Precipitation extremes with devastating socioeconomic consequences within the South American Monsoon System (SAMS) are expected to become more frequent in the near future. The complexity in SAMS behavior, however, poses severe challenges for reliable future projections. Thus, robust paleomonsoon records are needed to constrain the high spatiotemporal variability in the response of SAMS rainfall to different climatic drivers. This study uses Ti/Ca ratios from X‐ray fluorescence scanning of a sediment core retrieved off eastern Brazilian to trace precipitation changes over the past 322 Kyr. The results indicate that despite the spatiotemporal complexity of the SAMS, insolation forcing is the primary pacemaker of variations in the monsoonal system. Additional modulation by atmospheric p CO 2 suggests that SAMS intensity over eastern Brazil will be suppressed by rising CO 2 emissions in the future. Lastly, our record reveals an unprecedented strong and persistent wet period during Marine Isotope Stage 6 driven by anomalously strong trade winds.

Description: Cold‐water coral (CWC) reefs and mounds are and have been biodiversity hotspots of the deep sea. As their occurrence depends on specific environmental parameters, gaining hindsight on changing ocean conditions under on‐going climate change is the key to a better understanding of CWC mound development through time. A convenient technique for reconstructing the palaeoenvironment during periods of CWC mound growth is by extracting geochemical proxies from biologically mediated carbonates. Here, the focus is on probably the two most abundant calcareous archives, that are, cold‐water Scleractinia and Foraminifera, with an overview of the geochemical proxies (selection) used in these aragonitic and calcitic skeletons from CWC mounds. A particular emphasis is set on constraining proxies for temperature, salinity, seawater density, seawater carbonate systems parameters (pH, CO 3 2− ), nutrients, oxygen and water mass tracers.

Description: The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is expected to launch in October 2023, with reporting obligations only. The scheme aims to ensure that European efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions do not induce so-called ‘carbon leakage’, which could occur if companies based in the EU relocate carbon-intensive production to countries with less ambitious climate standards or increase imports of carbon-intensive products to the EU. The mechanism will require companies importing certain products to the EU to offset embedded GHG emissions by purchasing CBAM certificates, thus ensuring that the carbon price of imported products is equivalent to that of products made by European producers under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). CBAM’s effectiveness and impact will be evaluated by the EU towards the end of its phase-in period. This evaluation will likely lead to adjustments in the mechanism’s design and will be followed closely by third countries considering the introduction of similar instruments. Economies and sectors dependent on exports to the EU will be both more exposed and vulnerable to the mechanism. In this policy brief we explore the views of stakeholders in South Africa, the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa, and consider measures necessary to ensure that CBAM addresses issues of justice and sustainability. In particular we identify three key recommendations for European policymakers.

Description: In mid-2021, the Republic of Nauru invoked a treaty provision at the International Seabed Authority known as the “two-year rule”. This effectively imposed a deadline on the Council of the International Seabed Authority to complete the elaboration and adoption of regulations for the exploitation of seabed minerals in the international seabed Area by 9 July 2023. Come 10 July 2023, the Authority would be presented with a new legal situation, whereby applications for mining activities may be submitted despite the absence of applicable regulations. There remain many outstanding matters in the negotiations and, considering that the regulations for exploitation must be adopted by consensus at the Council, it would appear that there is still a long and winding road ahead before an agreement is reached among member states – if this is at all possible. In light of this, the Council clearly needs to discuss what would occur if an application for the approval of a plan of work for exploitation activities happens to be submitted in the absence of applicable regulations. While the open legal questions that arise from the invocation of the two-year rule and upon the expiration of the deadline have been analysed elsewhere, this discussion paper examines the new political reality that the Authority finds itself in following the expiry of the deadline on 9 July 2023. Building on previous work by the author, this discussion paper attempts to underscore what is at stake at the Authority and explores how member states should approach this situation.

Description: This paper examines the challenges and prospects for Norway’s internal and external hydrogen strategy from around 2019, when Norway’s low-carbon hydrogen policies and activities began to gain traction. Norway has taken a technology-neutral approach to ‘green’ and ‘blue’ hydrogen technologies linked to reducing emissions. Two end-use sectors have been prioritised: maritime transport and energy-intensive industries. This strategy is based on Norway’s energy mix, industry structure/interest and research competence. While climate concerns appear as the predominant motivation underlying the Norwegian government’s low-carbon hydrogen strategy, industrial value creation is an additional key goal. Political priorities roughly align with actual funding priorities – there has been a massive increase in direct state aid to low-carbon hydrogen projects. Externally, Norway’s hydrogen strategy has potential significance for Europe, particularly for countries with maritime interests and high hydrogen import needs. However, Norway’s technology-neutral approach deviates from most other European countries. What Norway’s hydrogen strategy will mean for Europe remains to be seen – but its main interests concern the export of ‘blue’ hydrogen, with ‘green’ hydrogen primarily suited to meet domestic needs.

Description: The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a surge in online communication, offering a unique burning glass perspective on the advantages of transferring formerly face-to-face conversations online as well as uncovering limitations of using technical applications to this end. These experiences are of great importance for the development of new e-participation instruments. So far, digital participation has failed to match the quality of real-world procedures. This paper discusses various emerging formats for online participation and their prerequisites. Blended participation models, in particular, appear to offer the most promise, enhancing negotiation processes between heterogenous social groups and facilitating responsive policy making.

Description: Die Corona-Pandemie hat die Nutzung der Online-Kommunikation stark befördert. Diese einzigartige experimentelle Situation machte die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Wechsels der Kommunikationsmedien von Face-to-Face- in Online-Formate sichtbar. Die gesammelten Erfahrungen sind von erheblicher Bedeutung für die Entwicklung neuer Instrumente und Tools der Online-Beteiligung. Bislang allerdings sind Online-Beteiligungsformate den klassischen Offline-Beteiligungsformaten qualitativ nicht ebenbürtig. Daher werden in diesem Beitrag Ansatzpunkte für neue Formate und deren Grundvoraussetzungen diskutiert. Insbesondere Konzepte, welche sowohl Online- als auch Offline-Elemente verbinden (Blended Participation), erscheinen vielversprechend, da sie Austauschprozesse zwischen heterogenen sozialen Gruppen verbessern und die Responsivität des politischen Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses erhöhen können.

Description: The invocation of a treaty provision known as the "two-year rule" at the International Seabed Authority effectively placed a deadline on the Authority to complete the adoption of regulations for exploitation activities within two years, i.e. by 9 July 2023. However, it is not a hard "deadline" and it is likely that the Authority might miss this deadline. In recent months, the member states of the Authority have commenced discussions on what would happen if the deadline is missed (or the "what if scenario"). It follows that missing the deadline will give rise to a host of open legal questions. Building on previous work, this discussion paper attempts to provide some insights and possible interpretations to answer some of those questions.

Description: Stakeholder engagement has become increasingly important in energy research and is now even required by many funding agencies. Recent energy modelling projects also claim to involve stakeholders in the research process, although this is usually a process of one-way communication. This raises the question of the extent to which stakeholder involvement can have an impact on the modelling work, or whether it is often a case of mere ‘stakeholder-washing’ to meet funding requirements. In this discussion paper, I reflect on the experiences of stakeholder engagement in the EU Horizon 2020 project Sustainable Energy Transition Laboratory (SENTINEL), discuss the impacts of stakeholder participation on the energy modelling and unfold key challenges of involving stakeholders in energy modelling. I discuss that it worked well to engage stakeholders in defining user needs and discussing modelling results, while only a few stakeholders could be continuously involved through the project period. I also show that although the project successfully identified research questions and needs, the ability of models to answer questions was limited, and making models understandable to users remains a key challenge. Stakeholder engagement in SENTINEL was more than ‘stakeholder-washing’: it led to the identification of user needs and research questions, impacted scenario design, modelling improvements and the development of new modelling tools, and enabled critical reflection on modelling approaches and results. Finally, I make nine recommendations for future stakeholder engagement in energy (modelling) research that can enable mutual learning and enhance the legitimacy, relevance and impact of modelling. The further development of multi-stakeholder communities of practice around innovative energy modelling approaches can facilitate the transition to climate neutrality.

Description: This chapter provides a review of Germany’s ambitious import-oriented hydrogen strategy. It places the German policy approach in the context of its broader Energiewende (energy transition) strategy, aimed not only at a transition of Germany’s energy and industrial system to carbon neutrality by 2045 but also at the promotion of the German Energiewende approach abroad. The chapter begins by providing a short review of the German Energiewende policy legacy, relating it to it emerging hydrogen policy. On this basis, it provides a comprehensive review of Germany’s National Hydrogen Strategy (NHS) with a particular focus on its outward-oriented elements. It discusses Germany’s external hydrogen policy along the following five dimensions: political dialogue and diplomacy (both bilateral and multilateral); interventions aimed at building international supply chains; cooperation in research and innovation; capacity building and skill development; and activities aimed at addressing questions of sustainability. The chapter closes with discussion of key strengths and weaknesses of the strategy and highlights areas for its further development. While Germany's outward-oriented approach is identified as an important strength of the strategy, it could place greater emphasis on cooperation with partners in the EU. Moreover, collaboration with partner countries, both in- and outside the EU, should go beyond the relatively narrow focus on the promotion of hydrogen production and trade. Rather, it should take a broader perspective, aimed at promoting competitive and resilient industrial value chains centered on the EU and its policy and regulatory model. In particular, countries in the European Neighborhood represent important partners in such a strategy. Broadening the scope of cooperation with these countries will also increase the incentives for these countries to engage in partnership development. Finally, the chapter points out that Germany has taken an ambiguous stance on the role that blue hydrogen should play in a future hydrogen economy. While its strategy comes out strongly in favor of green hydrogen, it is also pursuing partnerships for the import of blue hydrogen. This has resulted in a mismatch. While analytical capacities and standardization-related activities are being advanced for green hydrogen production, the government also needs to clearly define its stance on blue hydrogen imports and develop the needed analytical tools and policy instruments for this purpose.

Description: The UK aims to become a leader in green industries by developing a competitive hydrogen industry, bringing new jobs, and revitalizing peripheral areas of the country. Hydrogen is also seen as an opportunity for the country to improve its energy security, as extracting fossil fuels is increasingly costly and unfeasible given the UK’s decarbonization goals. Its hydrogen strategy takes a “twin track” approach, that is, simultaneously promoting hydrogen from gas with carbon capture and hydrogen from low-carbon electricity. The UK strategy focuses on the importance of applying hydrogen to industry including chemicals, steel, and glass. However, its funding and research initiatives rather place an emphasis on developing local hydrogen markets by using hydrogen for heating and transportation. In the short term, the UK aims to develop “blue” hydrogen, which is perceived as cheaper, to replace household gas use. Funding for hydrogen innovation comes from the government, but revenue support is likely to be funded by levies on energy consumption. This approach seems unlikely to result in the green industrial leadership the government hopes to achieve. The unwillingness of the government to take strategic decisions on hydrogen types and uses means that its funding is stretched across different cases. And, while the UK participates in international standard-setting initiatives to better participate in global markets, it is not officially coordinating with or investing in hydrogen infrastructure that could connect it with Europe and thereby enable regional hydrogen trade. Given the rise in industrial policy measures including for hydrogen in the US and EU, the UK’s goal of becoming a major hydrogen player seems unlikely without a significant change in policy clarity and ambition.

Description: Der Strukturwandel in den ehemaligen Braunkohlerevieren wird mit erheb- lichen Bundes- und Landesmitteln gefördert. Sie fließen zum einen als Kompensation für einen vorzeitigen Kohleausstieg. Damit verbunden ist zum anderen der Anspruch, dass Transformationen Erfolg haben können, indem neue Arbeitsplätze sowie lebenswerte und zukunftsfähige Regionen entstehen. Es geht um Nachhaltigkeit im Strukturwandel und nicht nur um den Kohleausstieg. Da es bisher kein Nachhaltigkeitsmonitoring für die Lausitz gibt, lassen sich aufgrund der vorliegen- den Projekte und Projektanträge sowie zahlreicher Gespräche vor Ort nur erste vorsichtige Schlüsse zie- hen. Diese beziehen sich auf die verabschiedeten und vorgeschlagenen Projekte, bei denen das Land Bran- denburg die Verantwortung hat (sog. Arm 1-Projekte): Antragsstellende müssen erläutern, wie ihre Projek- te einen positiven Beitrag zu einem ökologischen und einem weiteren der 17 nachhaltigen Entwick- lungsziele der Vereinten Nationen leisten. Diese Auflage führte bislang kaum dazu, dass die Projek- te einen hohen Nachhaltigkeitsanspruch verfolgen. Hohe Förderquoten würden es bereits jetzt ermög- lichen ambitioniertere Nachhaltigkeitsinvestitionen zu vertretbaren Kosten umzusetzen. Eher günstige geographische und makroökonomi- sche Bedingungen führen dazu, dass viele Projekte auf eine Reduktion von Treibhausgasemissionen bzw. zur Erforschung entsprechender Technologi- en ausgerichtet sind. Mit seinem bisherigen Verfahren verfolgt Branden- burg einen anderen Ansatz als Sachsen, das Nachhal- tigkeit in einem Scoring-Verfahren berücksichtigt. Sowohl die Nachhaltigkeitserklärungen als auch die Scoring-Verfahren setzen geringe Nachhaltigkeitsan- reize im Vergleich etwa zu EU-Vorgaben. In diesem Policy Brief liefern wir drei umsetzbare und kostengünstige Vorschläge, wie sich die Nach- haltigkeit des Strukturwandels in der brandenburgischen Lausitz verbessern ließe.

Description: This RIFS discussion paper presents preliminary insights from transdisciplinary research on the Co-Creative Reflection and Dialogue Space (CCRDS) implemented at the 25th, 26th and 27th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP). The transformative research design and findings from over six years of dedicated experimentation with different participatory formats and design principles at the CCRDS are emphasised. The aim was to better understand the communication culture at the COP and to orientate the experimental formats towards reflecting the rich and diverse perspectives, knowledge, and potential of COP participants. A key objective was thereby to better understand whether participatory and reflective formats can support individual and collective climate action. Building on this, CCRDS research and practice design at COP 28 is presented, which aims to understand more relational communication practices as a way to more effective and supportive communication pathways and to work with other organisations and individuals to scale these efforts.

Description: This deliverable provides a summary of a two-day expert workshop conducted in hybrid format. The workshop’s primary objective was aimed towards identifying future opportunities within the global ocean governance regime to strengthen governance of ocean-based NETs in a comprehensive manner. The workshop was organised by the Research Institute for Sustainability – Helmholtz Centre Potsdam (RIFS) as part of the work of Task 2.2 of the OceanNETs project. This deliverable follows a first online workshop (see Deliverable 2.3) that identified challenges within the current governance framework for ocean-based NETs. The second workshop consisted of breakout groups and plenary discussions designed to explore scenarios that reflect on identified governance challenges within the current and potential future global ocean governance regimes. Participants were asked to reflect on the concept of „good governance” and develop responses to the scenarios presented through specific prompts. They were encouraged to actively contribute to discussions that aimed to advance our understanding of the future governance of ocean-based NETs.

Description: Europe's growing interest in securing green hydrogen from North Africa is part of a strategic effort to enhance its energy security. The promise of green hydrogen projects in Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania is substantial, offering economic growth and job opportunities. However, numerous factors limit these countries’ ability to develop robust local green hydrogen sectors, while political disputes—particularly around Western Sahara—complicate regional collaboration. European actors can play an important role in advancing green hydrogen’s development in the region, but must tread carefully to secure local buy-in and avoid exacerbating tensions within or between these countries.

Description: À la suite de la fermeture de ses mines dans les années 1980, Loos-en-Gohelle, ancien haut lieu minier du nord de la France, est devenu un modèle de commune écologique. L’action culturelle et son importance singulière dans la transformation dite « du noir au vert » demeurent encore peu connues. À l’échelle du Bassin minier des Hauts-de-France, la sortie du charbon a été accompagnée par une politique d’équipement et d’investissement culturel visant à faire évoluer l’image extérieure de ce territoire. Cette étude met en évidence la singularité de l’approche loossoise, dont l’ambition est d’abord d’impliquer ses propres habitant.e.s à la transition écologique et sociale du territoire. Ce travail culturel participatif est ainsi devenu un outil d’émancipation. Toutefois, au cours des dernières années, les possibilités de mobilisation de la population semblent être à un tournant. Loos-en-Gohelle fait face au défi de construire de nouvelles formes de participation culturelle afin d’éviter l’essoufflement de son dynamisme.

Description: Following the end of coal production in 1986, the small town of Loos-en-Gohelle in northern France transformed itself from a former mining stronghold into a model municipality for sustainability. This article highlights the importance of cultural policy measures in this structural change: while in other municipalities in the northern French coalfield, cultural policy was used to change the image of the region, Loos-en-Gohelle aimed to involve the local population in the socio-ecological transformation process. Participatory cultural work thus became an instrument of emancipation. However, the possibilities for mobilising the population appear to have reached a turning point in recent years. Loos-en-Gohelle is faced with the challenge of developing new forms of cultural participation in order to prevent the momentum from slowing down.

Description: Städte stehen vor der Herausforderung, ihr Verwaltungshandeln auf komplexe sozial-ökologische Transformationsprozesse auszurichten. Die Landeshauptstadt München hat mit dem Modell der Handlungsräume einen Ansatz entwickelt, um dieser Herausforderung zu begegnen. Durch eine strategische Priorisierung von Teilgebieten, und agilen, fachübergreifenden Kooperationsstrukturen ermöglicht der Handlungsraumansatz eine konstruktive Moderation von komplexen Interessenslagen, die Akquise von innovativen Entwicklungs- und Forschungsprojekten und schafft Synergieeffekte zwischen Verwaltung und Zivilgesellschaft. Die vorliegende Analyse untersucht die Potenziale des Ansatzes und legt Empfehlungen zu seiner Weiterentwicklung in München vor. Gleichzeitig bietet die Analyse empirische Evidenz zu Debatten über die Rolle von strategischen Planungsräumen und ‚soft spaces‘ in der nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung.

Description: Cities are faced with the challenge of aligning their administrative actions with complex socio-ecological transformation processes. The City of Munich has developed an approach to meet this challenge with strategic action spaces or opportunity areas (Handlungsraumansatz). Through a strategic prioritisation of geographic areas in the city and agile, interdisciplinary cooperation structures, the action space approach enables a constructive moderation of complex interests, the acquisition of innovative development and research projects and creates synergy effects between administration and civil society. The present analysis examines the potentials of the approach and presents recommendations for its further development in Munich. At the same time, the analysis provides empirical evidence for debates on the role of strategic planning spaces and 'soft spaces' in sustainable urban development.

Description: The Dutch government believes hydrogen will play an important role in decarbonizing the energy system. Industry, NGOs and the government work together in the Netherlands to setup low-carbon hydrogen supply chains. The Netherlands is in a good position to make a significant contribution to Europe's low-carbon hydrogen market, thanks to its current role as a European energy hub, large chemical industry, geographic location at the North Sea, offshore wind potential and existing gas and oil infrastructure. The Dutch national hydrogen strategy predominantly focuses on hydrogen produced via electrolysis from renewable electricity. However, there is also room for hydrogen produced from natural gas or waste gases with CCS, given that this effectively contributes to the development of the broader Dutch hydrogen system, without hampering the growth of hydrogen produced via electrolysis from renewable electricity. In the initial market phase, the Dutch government will prioritize hydrogen supply for the hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy industry and heavy-duty transportation. In later market phases more sectors could be using hydrogen as an energy carrier. The Dutch government has chosen for a combination of obligations and a variety of subsidies schemes, to increase investment security and scale up the low-carbon hydrogen market by 2030. Internationally the Netherlands aims to position itself as the low-carbon hydrogen hub of Northwest Europe, connecting international exporters and Dutch domestic production at the North Sea with industrial demand centres in Northwest Europe. Acknowledging the scale of the task at hand, the Dutch government is open for partnerships along the whole value chain to work towards an international low-carbon hydrogen market.

Description: This paper examines the recent evolution of the domestic and external dimension of hydrogen in Spain. When published in 2020, the Spanish Hydrogen Strategy was focused on the creation of hydrogen clusters that could concentrate production and consumption, attracting economic activity associated with the molecule. For this reason, the external dimension of Spain's hydrogen strategy was relatively modest in its nascent state. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the EU Commission's call in the REPowerEU to increase the level of ambition for renewable hydrogen has led to a change in Spain's hydrogen policy, reinforcing its external and energy security dimensions and contributing to a more geopolitically resilient Europe. This new approach to hydrogen development creates a complex tension between the promises of industrial development and the potential for integrating Spain in the European energy system.

Description: Southeast Asia is one of the fastest growing regions worldwide by both gross domestic product and electricity demand. Solar photovoltaics (PV) will play an increasingly important role as the region strives to decarbonize and meet rising energy demand. High solar resource potential, a significant cost drop for installed PV in the region (about 45 percent between 2012 and 2016), and favourable policies have allowed Southeast Asia to surpass other regions in solar capacity growth, from approximately 23 GW in 2020 a projected 241 GW by 2030. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) deems solar “the flagship resource for ASEAN’s decarbonization”. Two countries in particular–Vietnam and Malaysia–have led the way in solar offtake in recent years and installed more new PV capacity than others in the region in 2020. They are the world’s second and third largest manufacturers of solar PV modules and have significantly lowered barriers to utility-scale and residential solar adoption. However, their diverging approaches to electricity markets, renewables integration, and distributed energy resources have resulted in very different outcomes for solar growth. In many respects, Malaysia’s holistic approach to solar pricing, grid modernization, and regional interconnectivity provides lessons for both Vietnam’s solar market and the broader ASEAN region.

Description: Hydrogen is a much-discussed facet of Hungary’s energy transition that has seen little progress, but offers an important tool to extend the government’s foreign and energy policy. Policy-making in Hungary is highly centralised and government ambitions have prioritised the continued role of nuclear power, natural gas, and a solar PV boom. These closely trace foreign policy priorities as well, given that the former two entrench relations with Russia, while the latter enhances self-reliance while allowing the country to meet EU renewable energy targets. A hydrogen economy supports such ambitions, while the government has also welcomed EU funds and foreign investment into novel (green) technologies that increase the value added in the economy. Domestic demand offers a secondary, but nonetheless important, push for the uptake of hydrogen in industry and transportation. Hungary’s case shows how pre-existing political economic confines shape the uptake of hydrogen, as governments and other key actors take action while disrupting pre-existing practices to the least extent possible.

Description: This paper investigates the main elements, drivers and challenges of the hydrogen sector in Sweden. A particular focus is placed on the approach of the Swedish government to hydrogen development and its internal and external dimensions. The Swedish government has intensified its support for the decarbonization of the economy in recent years in a bid to meet its goals of reaching climate neutrality by 2045 and reducing transport emissions (excluding aviation) by 70% until 2030, relative to 2010. Climate Leap, introduced in 2015, and Industrial Leap, launched in 2018, are the two main government funding schemes for private and public investments in low-carbon technologies in Sweden. While the government has set ambitious long-term climate goals and put in place the corresponding funding programs, investment and technology decisions have been mainly left to the business actors. Although such a market-based and private sector-driven approach may have worked well in the past, the Swedish government will need to embrace a more coherent steering role in ensuring smooth decarbonization and successful integration of hydrogen in the energy system of the future. The domestic interest in hydrogen in Sweden has in the past been primarily focused on the decarbonization of hard-to-abate industrial sectors, in particular the steel industry. Given the current surplus of low-carbon electricity supply, which relies on hydropower, nuclear and increasingly wind power, the attention was solely directed towards domestic production and use of low-carbon hydrogen for the industry. With the growing importance of hydrogen at the EU level, accompanied by the introduction of an EU hydrogen strategy, investment funds and common standards, there has been a rapid increase in interest by business actors in various hydrogen sectors (e-fuels, green hydrogen, ammonia) in Sweden. Individual regions in Sweden have also taken the initiative and made use of EU funds to try position themselves in and benefit economically from the emerging hydrogen sectors. As most private investors aim to use green hydrogen produced by renewable energy sources, the demand for green electricity, particularly in onshore and offshore wind, is expected to skyrocket. The government, however, has so far failed to enact credible plans and policies detailing where and how new wind power projects will be built and which sectors may gain priority access to renewable electricity. There has also been a lack of effort in facilitating the realization of infrastructure for the potential transport of hydrogen through pipelines or Swedish ports. The draft of the national hydrogen strategy by the Swedish Energy Agency laid out the ambitious target of 5 GW of electrolyser capacity by 2030. Such a target has been formulated largely based on the expressed intentions of business actors and without a direct link to EU strategic hydrogen targets. In light of the growing interest in low-carbon hydrogen, the considerable industry know-how and the vast renewable energy potential in Sweden, there is a pressing need for a more comprehensive approach by the government and a stronger alignment with the efforts of the EU and other Member States.

Description: In this report, the authors reflect on three key lessons they learned for the community from the two- day event that led to follow-up questions and elaborations: ▪ Transformative research critically advances from collaborative questioning: Is it really a mat- ter of combining efforts to formulate the right questions instead of generating fast knowledge and solutions? ▪ Transformative research benefits from a shared identity: Who are we and what does trans- formative research change for us in our role and every-day scientific practice? ▪ Embodying participatory practices is key for transformative research: What kind of attitudes and formats do we use to come together in meaningful ways?

Description: The U.S. is a leading actor in today’s hydrogen economy and possesses significant geo-economic potential to lead in the global clean hydrogen economy. The U.S. hydrogen strategy has been shaped by the strive to balance a) energy independence b) the fight against climate change, and c) expanding technology leadership. The recent landmark legislative packages of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act reflect these priorities and include large-scale investments and financial incentives to promote the supply of clean hydrogen at lower costs, to strengthen innovation, and domestic value chains. The U.S. has been pioneering policy instruments for scaling up domestic clean hydrogen production and use cases across multiple sectors, which raised significant interest among policymakers and industrial actors worldwide. The international dimension of the U.S. hydrogen strategy has received much less attention in the U.S. policy debate and is less defined. This is apparent in comparison with other actors, such as a much more outward-oriented European Union, which reached out to numerous countries as potential trading partners for much-needed hydrogen imports. In contrast, the United States currently focuses much more on building up domestic hydrogen value chains, enabled by a favorable resource endowment. Nevertheless, the U.S. has fostered bilateral partnerships on hydrogen and strengthened its hydrogen-related engagement in international organizations and multilateral initiatives in the past five years. Emerging priorities for the United States' international collaboration on hydrogen include international demand creation and management, upscaling investments, international research collaborations, and joint efforts on regulation, standards, and certification. These efforts can be seen as the first steps towards the U.S. long-term goal to export hydrogen and related technologies to regional and global partners from the 2030s onwards.

Description: The Marine Regions Forum 2023 was held under the headline “Navigating Ocean Sustainability in the Western Indian Ocean and Beyond”, placing a focus on the Western Indian Ocean ( WIO) region and its challenges, and featuring many of the region’s ocean actors and experts. It provided an opportunity to reconnect in-person after the COVID -19 pandemic in a biodiversity-rich area that is particularly vulnerable to climate change, food insecurity and where a large proportion of the population is reliant on the coast for their livelihoods. But the WIO region is also pioneering a regional ocean governance strategy and is a hub of research, capacity development and science-to-policy engagement. This conference provided a platform to share best practices from the WIO region with other marine regions and learn from experiences from other parts of the world. Further, the conference offered a space for on-going processes to receive input from stakeholders and advance work, such as for the regional ocean governance strategy for the WIO that is being developed through an extensive collaborative process and under the auspices of the Nairobi Convention Secretariat. And, at a time where it can feel like international relationships are breaking down, and nations are looking inwards more than out, it was encouraging to gather over 180 people in Dar es Salaam and be hosted by both the United Republic of Tanzania and Republic of Seychelles to look at ways to work together towards a common goal of improved ocean governance at national, regional, and global levels. The conference programme of the Marine Regions Forum 2023 was developed together with partners from the WIO region and experts engaging in the region and built on a yearlong process of engagement and consultation. The coordinating team facilitated the overall co-design and co-delivery of the Marine Regions Forum conference. The shaping of the programme, fine-tuning of content, the selection of speakers and other contributors, and the moderation of sessions and discussions at the conference were a collaborative effort of the team, its partners, and the co-chairs of topical strands and sessions. This is reflected in the key messages of the Marine Regions Forum 2023 which have been compiled by the coordinating team from summary notes of plenaries and workshop sessions and developed jointly with the co-chairs. Although the four topical strands dealt with a broad range of issues, there were commonalities that spread across the discussions. These are summarised below as key messages that emerged and stood out from the three days of the conference.

Description: The Marine Regions Forum 2023 was held under the headline “Navigating Ocean Sustainability in the Western Indian Ocean and Beyond”, placing a focus on the Western Indian Ocean ( WIO) region and its challenges, and featuring many of the region’s ocean actors and experts. It provided an opportunity to reconnect in-person after the COVID -19 pandemic in a biodiversity-rich area that is particularly vulnerable to climate change, food insecurity and where a large proportion of the population is reliant on the coast for their livelihoods. But the WIO region is also pioneering a regional ocean governance strategy and is a hub of research, capacity development and science-to-policy engagement. This conference provided a platform to share best practices from the WIO region with other marine regions and learn from experiences from other parts of the world. Further, the conference offered a space for on-going processes to receive input from stakeholders and advance work, such as for the regional ocean governance strategy for the WIO that is being developed through an extensive collaborative process and under the auspices of the Nairobi Convention Secretariat. And, at a time where it can feel like international relationships are breaking down, and nations are looking inwards more than out, it was encouraging to gather over 180 people in Dar es Salaam and be hosted by both the United Republic of Tanzania and Republic of Seychelles to look at ways to work together towards a common goal of improved ocean governance at national, regional, and global levels. The conference programme of the Marine Regions Forum 2023 was developed together with partners from the WIO region and experts engaging in the region and built on a yearlong process of engagement and consultation. The coordinating team facilitated the overall co-design and co-delivery of the Marine Regions Forum conference. The shaping of the programme, fine-tuning of content, the selection of speakers and other contributors, and the moderation of sessions and discussions at the conference were a collaborative effort of the team, its partners, and the co-chairs of topical strands and sessions. This is reflected in the key messages of the Marine Regions Forum 2023 which have been compiled by the coordinating team from summary notes of plenaries and workshop sessions and developed jointly with the co-chairs. Although the four topical strands dealt with a broad range of issues, there were commonalities that spread across the discussions. These are summarised below as key messages that emerged and stood out from the three days of the conference.

Description: Welche Rolle spielen Akteure in Energiewende-Konflikten? Inwiefern müssen spezifische Akteurskonstellationen beachtet werden, um Konfliktlösungsstrategien zu finden? Welche Einstellungen, Interessenlagen und Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen bei Stakeholdern und in der Bevölkerung spielen hierbei eine zu berücksichtigende Rolle. Die Studienergebnisse einer im Rahmen des DEMOKON-Forschungsprojektes durchgeführten deutschlandweiten vergleichenden Fallanalyse weisen darauf hin, dass Konfliktfälle in der Energiewende trotz vordergründiger Parallelen höchst unterschiedlich gelagert sind und die Präferenzen von Akteuren in jedem Einzelfall berücksichtigt und abgewogen werden müssen. Es hat sich gezeigt: Sowohl die Anerkennungs-, Prozess- als auch Verteilungsgerechtigkeit sind hierbei außerordentlich bedeutsam. Vertreter:innen betroffener Kommunen sollten aktiv mit Konflikten umgehen und Strategien entwickeln; eine passive Rolle ist nicht erfolgversprechend. Grundsätzlich gilt: Je mehr Beteiligung gewährt wird und Akteure sich in den Entscheidungsfindungsprozess einbringen können, desto besser ist es. Dies ist in vielen Anwendungsfällen der Energiewende jedoch schwer möglich, polarisierte Pro- und Contra-Lager sind eher die Regel als die Ausnahme. Wichtig ist daher die vermittelnde Rolle von neutralen Akteuren, die in polarisierten Konfliktfällen mediativ wirken können. Lokale Charakteristika sollten in den Diskursen angemessen widergespiegelt sein (z.B. ein von Windkraft betroffener Wald). Lokale Identitäten fußen häufig auf Ortsverbundenheiten und Heimatgefühle, auf deren Verletzung lokale Gemeinschaften empfindlich reagieren. Entsprechend sind (hoch)sensible Umgangsweisen mit den betroffenen Standorten und Schutzgütern erforderlich. Sie sollten bestenfalls neben Einbezug und Gehör sowie finanzieller Beteiligung (Bürgerenergie) auch Kompensation und andere Benefits für die Allgemeinheit bieten (z.B. Investitionen in öffentliche Einrichtungen und Infrastrukturen, lokale Stromtarife, Vergünstigungen), um möglichen Beeinträchtigungen, Benachteiligungen und Ungleichheiten entgegenzuwirken.

Description: What role do various actors play within conflicts relating to the energy transition? To what extent do specific constellations of actors need to be considered in order to identify adequate conflict resolution strategies? Which views, interests and notions of justice held by stakeholders and the wider public need to be taken into account? The findings of a nationwide comparative case analysis conducted as part of the DEMOKON research project indicate that, while some superficial similarities exist, the spectrum of conflicts relating to the German energy transition is highly diverse and actors’ preferences should be considered and carefully weighed in each individual case. This research shows that recognition, procedural, and distributive justice all play an important role here. Representatives of affected communities must actively engage with conflicts and develop strategies as passivity is unlikely to deliver positive outcomes. The more opportunities for participation that are available and the more that stakeholders are able to engage with the decision-making processes, the better the outcome. However, this is not easily achieved in many cases; the polarization of supporters and opponents is the rule rather than the exception. Neutral actors with the ability to mediate in polarized conflicts are an important asset. Local characteristics should be carefully considered in discourse (e.g., a forest affected by a wind power project). Local identities are often based on a sense of place and a sense of home. Local communities can respond sensitively when these values are disregarded. Highly sensitive approaches are needed to address conflicts arising in connection with affected sites and prized assets. At best, these should provide compensation and other benefits to the community (e.g. investment in public facilities and infrastructure, local electricity tariffs, concessions) along with opportunities for participation and consultation as well as financial participation (community energy / ownership) in order to mitigate possible adverse effects, disadvantages, and inequalities.

Description: Die geplante Verordnung der Europäischen Union (EU) über forstwirtschaftliche Risikowaren verlangt von Unternehmen, die in den oder aus dem EU-Markt verkaufen, die Bereitstellung von Geolokalisierungsdaten der Produktionsgebiete. Zur Umsetzung der obligatorischen Sorgfaltspflicht schreiben die Regulierungsbehörden die Nutzung von EU-Datenerfassungs- und Analyseinstrumenten wie dem Raumfahrtprogramm der Union (EGNOS/Galileo und Copernicus) und der EU-Beobachtungsstelle vor. Darüber hinaus empfiehlt der Gesetzentwurf, auf bestehenden öffentlich oder privat verfügbaren Datenquellen und Überwachungsinitiativen aufzubauen. In dieser Arbeit werden digitale Transparenzinitiativen in Brasilien untersucht, um den Beitrag der digitalen Technologien zur Rückverfolgung der sozio-ökologischen Herkunft von Produkten zu verstehen. Als Rohstoffproduzent und Heimat des größten Regenwaldes der Welt bietet der brasilianische Fall Lehren für die Umsetzung der EU-Abholzungsverordnung und bietet gleichzeitig die Möglichkeit, über das Potenzial des Technologie- und Wissenstransfers aus dem globalen Süden nachzudenken. Darüber hinaus können staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure durch die Nutzung vorhandener Datensätze und digitaler Artefakte wie in Brasilien digitale Innovationen fördern, den Wert für die Gesellschaft steigern und Wege für eine verstärkte transnationale Zusammenarbeit eröffnen. Die Fallstudie zeigt, dass es mehrere hochwertige offene Datenquellen und digitale Plattformen gibt. Das Haupthindernis für die Umgestaltung des brasilianischen agroindustriellen Komplexes liegt eher in der Verwirklichung institutioneller als technologischer Innovationen. Insbesondere müssen die brasilianische Regierung und die Agrarindustrie von rückwärtsgewandten Narrativen und Handlungen Abstand nehmen, einschließlich des Datenmissbrauchs und der Instrumentalisierung von Maßnahmen im Zusammenhang mit digitalen Technologien, die mit der aktuellen globalen Klimakrise unvereinbar sind. Während Unternehmen, Behörden und die Zivilgesellschaft sich darauf verlassen können sollten, dass die brasilianischen digitalen Initiativen die Einhaltung der Abholzungsvorschriften überprüfen, muss die EU einen kooperativeren Ansatz verfolgen, um Brasilien bei der Bewältigung seiner dringenden politisch-institutionellen Herausforderungen zu unterstützen.

Description: The upcoming European Union (EU) forest-risk commodities regulation requires companies selling to or from the EU market to provide the geolocation data of production areas. To implement the mandatory due diligence requirements, regulators prescribe using EU data collection and analysis tools such as the Union’s Space programme (EGNOS/Galileo and Copernicus) and the EU Observatory. Furthermore, the draft law recommends building on existing publicly or privately available data sources and monitoring initiatives. This paper examines digital transparency initiatives in Brazil to understand digital technologies’ contribution to tracing products’ socio-environmental origin. As a commodity powerhouse and home to the world’s largest rainforest, the Brazilian case offers lessons for implementing the EU Deforestation Regulation while presenting a chance to reflect on the potential of technology and knowledge transfer from the Global South. Moreover, by building on existing datasets and digital artifacts as those in Brazil, state and non-state actors may foster digital innovation, increase value to society, and open paths for enhanced transnational collaboration. The case study shows several high-quality open data sources and digital platforms exist. The major obstacle to transforming the Brazilian agro-industrial complex lies in realising institutional rather than technological innovations. Specifically, the Brazilian government and agribusiness must abandon retrograde narratives and actions, including data misuse and the instrumentalization of policies related to digital technologies, which are incompatible with the current global climate crisis. While operators, authorities, and civil society should rely on Brazilian digital initiatives to conduct non-deforestation compliance checks, the EU must adopt a more collaborative approach to help Brazil address its pressing political-institutional challenges.

Description: France was one of the European frontrunners in formulating policies to develop hydrogen for decarbonisation, publishing its first hydrogen plan in 2018, followed by a larger, €9-billion plan in 2020, hot on the heels of plans released by the European Commission and Germany. The French strategy for hydrogen deployment focuses in particular on applications where hydrogen is key for deep decarbonisation, including refineries and the chemical industry as well as steel production, and the mobility sector. The country aims to have a head start on European and world competitors thanks to large electricity resources from the existing nuclear fleet and by building new nuclear capacity. Additionally, it relies on several existing innovation hubs specialised in hydrogen, as well as the support of many local governments involved in hydrogen development and a relatively structured hydrogen industry. The French strategy for hydrogen does not include ambitions at the international level beyond scientific and technological cooperation within the European Union. The political priority is to develop a domestic industry sized to meet national demand, which is seen as a more secure sourcing strategy than relying on imports. This comes in contrast with the positions of France’s neighbours, notably Spain, Portugal and Germany, which are pushing to enable cross-border trade of hydrogen as early as possible. This situation has generated political tensions within the European Union and in particular in the Franco-German relationship.

Description: Poland is the third largest producer of hydrogen in the EU, with around 1.3 million tonnes produced every year. This grey hydrogen is generated almost exclusively from steam methane reforming and utilised mainly by the chemical, petrochemical, steel and food sectors. The emergence of low-carbon hydrogen technologies has captured a significant interest by various Polish stakeholders, including both oil and gas sector incumbents, renewable energy promoters and local governments. In 2021, the Polish Hydrogen Strategy until 2030 with an outlook until 2040 was published as the first official government strategy affecting low-carbon hydrogen development. The document presents an optimistic and ambitious approach to hydrogen potential, with a focus on domestic production and use in multiple sectors. This is despite the fact that production of low-carbon hydrogen in Poland could face significant challenges, such as a relatively low availability of clean electricity, reliance on natural gas imports and limited experience with CCS. Issues regarding the global hydrogen market and international trade are largely omitted. This paper analyses the possible background of this fact, as well as the factors affecting the future Polish approach to the European and global hydrogen market. Although Poland would not be a frontrunner in these developments, we believe that it could become a pragmatic participant. In fact, we note that Polish companies, including state-owned enterprises, have already launched some relevant cooperative initiatives at European level.

Description: This report provides a comprehensive review of China’s emerging hydrogen economy with a particular focus on policy and regulation, both at the national and sub-national level. China’s promotion of the hydrogen sector is emblematic of its broader efforts to promote greenhouse gas reductions, while pursuing ambitious industrial development goals and promoting energy security. To date, industrial policy goals have clearly taken center stage, with a particular focus on fuel cell vehicles. For now, China is pursuing a diversified strategy in support of hydrogen supply, which includes all different types of hydrogen production, including coal-based hydrogen. Nevertheless, policy documents increasingly emphasize the potential of renewable hydrogen as a vehicle for stabilizing an electricity system based on variable renewable energy as well as broader decarbonization efforts. They also increasingly highlight the need to transition to an exclusively renewable hydrogen supply in the future. In a number of cases, local-level strategies have come out more strongly in support of renewable hydrogen than current central government policies. Local-level policy has also played a key role in the promotion of fuel cell vehicles. Policies for hydrogen-based decarbonization of industry are only at a nascent stage. Similarly, China’s ambitions to promote hydrogen storage and transport remain at a relatively early stage of development with an important emphasis on the promotion of innovation and acquisition of technological know-how. Finally, both China’s hydrogen strategy and the engagement of its energy SOEs do not appear to be strongly motivated by considerations of geopolitics at this stage. To be sure, Chinese officials are considering increasing opportunities for investment in hydrogen projects around the world. In this vein, the national hydrogen development plan considers the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for promoting hydrogen-related standards and investments. Beyond these geoeconomic considerations, the role of hydrogen as a future energy commodity and its geopolitical implications do not figure prominently in Chinese policy efforts. Indeed, due to China’s relative abundance of renewable energy resources, it is does not exhibit major vulnerabilities related to the future provision of hydrogen. Conversely, hydrogen could even offer an opportunity to reduce its energy dependence in the future. This and other efforts to shape global hydrogen trade do not seem to be a significant driver of its policy efforts, however.

Description: Im Rahmen des Projektes „Aufbau und Betrieb eines erweiterten umweltsensitiven Verkehrsmanagementsystems in Berlin (eUVM)“ wird die mögliche Aufhebung der Tempo-30-Zone in der Leipziger Straße und die Rückkehr zu Tempo 50 untersucht. In diesem Zwischenbericht werden die ersten Ergebnisse einer Messkampagne rund um die Leipziger Straße vorgestellt, insbesondere die Erfassung von Rad- und Fußverkehr und die Befragungen beider Gruppen bezüglich deren geschätzter Sicherheit.

Description: Die nordfranzösische Kleinstadt Loos-en-Gohelle mauserte sich nach dem Kohleausstieg 1986 von einer ehemaligen Bergbauhochburg zur Modellkommune für Nachhaltigkeit. Weniger bekannt ist die Bedeutung von kulturpolitischen Maßnahmen in diesem Strukturwandel: Während in anderen Kommunen des Nordfranzösischen Kohlereviers die Kulturpolitik eingesetzt wurde, um das Image der Region zu verändern, zielte Loos-en-Gohelle darauf ab, die lokale Bevölkerung in den sozial-ökologischen Transformationsprozess mit einzubinden. Partizipative Kulturarbeit wurde somit zum Instrument der Emanzipation. Jedoch scheinen die Möglichkeiten einer Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung in den letzten Jahren an einem Wendepunkt angelangt zu sein. Loos-en-Gohelle steht vor der Herausforderung, neue Formen der kulturellen Teilhabe aufzubauen, um zu verhindern, dass die Dynamik nachlässt.

Description: Following the end of coal production in 1986, the small town of Loos-en-Gohelle in northern France transformed itself from a former mining stronghold into a model municipality for sustainability. This article highlights the importance of cultural policy measures in this structural change: while in other municipalities in the northern French coalfield, cultural policy was used to change the image of the region, Loos-en-Gohelle aimed to involve the local population in the socio-ecological transformation process. Participatory cultural work thus became an instrument of emancipation. However, the possibilities for mobilising the population appear to have reached a turning point in recent years. Loos-en-Gohelle is faced with the challenge of developing new forms of cultural participation in order to prevent the momentum from slowing down.

Description: L’alimentation est à la fois un levier central pour engager la transition socio-écologique et un theme quotidien tangible pour chaque citoyen.ne. En Allemagne comme en France, quelques collectivités territoriales engagent des mesures innovantes pour promouvoir une alimentation locale et durable. Le Forum pour l’avenir franco-allemand s’est penché sur les expériences de certaines de ces collectivités et a facilité le dialogue entre elles durant plusieurs mois afin de comprendre quelles politiques nationales peuvent soutenir de telles initiatives locales. En associant des expert.e.s issus de la sphère scientifique, de l’administration et de la société civile, il a recommandé de « Donner la priorité au développement de systèmes alimentaires locaux et durables » avec cinq propositions d’action concrètes aux gouvernements français et allemand. Cette étude présente les initiatives françaises et allemandes ayant nourri les propositions d’action du Forum pour l’avenir.

Description: Food and food policy is central to social-ecological transformation. It is also an everyday issue that is easy to communicate to citizens. Municipalities in Germany and France have recognized the potential of innovative local food policies and have developed and tested innovative approaches to transforming local food systems. However, they are encountering structural barriers that cannot be overcome at the municipal level. The Franco-German Forum for the Future has researched the opportunities and obstacles of local nutritional change and brought engaged municipalities from both countries into exchange with each other. Together with experts from academia, public administrations and civil society, it has developed the seven recommendations for the national governments, one of which concerns "Prioritizing the development of local and sustainable food systems" with five proposals for action. This study is intended as a background paper to the Recommendation. With recourse to the concrete example of Mouans-Sartoux and other municipalities in France and Germany, it describes the potentials of a sustainable municipal food policy and provides – from concrete local practice – the background knowledge for each of the five proposals for action.

Description: Italy presents, potentially, some important comparative advantages in the emerging clean hydrogen economy. However, unlike other large EU countries, Italy has not yet issued a comprehensive strategy on hydrogen nor has it developed a coherent hydrogen diplomacy. It was only with the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, launched in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, that Italy upgraded its measures for promoting green hydrogen and related activities. The main players in the Italian hydrogen landscape are national industrial actors, especially state-owned energy companies. This leading role can be an important asset to overcome the problems related to an industrial system otherwise composed of small and medium companies, which can find it difficult to compete with hydrogen frontrunners. Externally, Italy has supported all the European and multilateral initiatives on hydrogen, although in the EU the country is a policy-taker rather than a policy-shaper. The main focus of the Italian international approach is linked to the hydrogen hub concept, which targets the MENA region and is also supported by its national energy companies. This concept has received a further push after the beginning of the war in Ukraine. However, its practical realization is very problematic because of domestic and external challenges.

Description: The European Union has identified clean hydrogen as essential to its climate targets, technology leadership and energy security in the decarbonizing world. The bloc is developing a comprehensive regulatory framework for a hydrogen economy, complete with supply-side policies and binding demand-side targets. In addition to boosting domestic production, the EU is planning to import large volumes of hydrogen and derivatives from third countries. Hydrogen is thus beginning to play a more prominent role in the EU’s bilateral partnerships. The EU is also actively participating in multilateral hydrogen governance with the goal of creating a functioning international hydrogen market featuring strong sustainability standards. At the same time, aligning the diverging interests of Member States and various hydrogen stakeholders has been a challenge. As the global hydrogen race accelerates, the bloc has struggled to keep up with powerful players like the United States, which are offering massive subsidies to the hydrogen industry. This discussion paper examines the domestic and external dimensions of the EU's hydrogen vision, situating it within the bloc's wider climate and energy policy and recent geopolitical developments. It discusses key policies, regulations, and funding schemes for hydrogen in the EU, highlighting existing points of contention and the interplay between the EU and Member State level. It then goes on to analyze the EU's evolving international engagement on hydrogen and the challenges of fostering mutually beneficial green industrial partnerships that go beyond securing hydrogen supplies. It remains to be seen whether the EU succeeds in drawing on its early mover advantage and potential synergies to remain an attractive investment destination and build resilient clean hydrogen supply chains.

Description: South Africa and Namibia are seeking to become leaders in green hydrogen production. Leveraging world-class renewable energy resources, both nations are working to scale their green hydrogen production capabilities. However, given their very different starting points, they also face different opportunities and challenges. In particular, South Africa hopes to develop its green hydrogen industry through green ammonia exports and applications in hard-to-abate industries, namely steel, chemicals, and aviation fuel. It also seeks to leverage its reserves of so-called platinum grade metals to position the country as a produce of protone-exchange membrane (PEM) electrolyzers, which rely on this rare metal. Namibia has mainly focused on the development of green ammonia exports, though policy documents have also identified potential opportunities for the production of green steel and aviation fuels. Given green hydrogen’s technological complexity and the countries' export-oriented ambitions, both countries must cooperate with foreign actors to facilitate technology sharing, financial flows, and technical assistance. To this end, international partnerships are playing a pivotal role in the development of both countries’ green hydrogen industries.

Description: Technologien für CO₂-Abscheidung und -Speicherung machen Hoffnung, werden aber gleichzeitig als Rechtfertigung für die geringe Reduktion von Emissionen aus fossilen Energiequellen genutzt. Das ist nicht vereinbar mit dem Ziel, die Erderwärmung auf 1,5 oder 2 °C zu begrenzen.

Description: Technologies for Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) only represent climate solutions in as much as they go hand in hand with deep emissions reductions. The (future) availability of CCUS and CDR technologies does not mean we can delay or avoid phasing out fossil fuels if we are to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C or even 2°C. Likewise, the expansion of renewable energy technologies will be nowhere near adequate for meeting agreed-upon climate targets unless fossil fuels are simultaneously ramped down. Up until now, renewables have been largely in addition to, rather than substituting for fossil fuels. Achieving our climate and broader sustainable development goals will require transformations that go beyond energy systems and reevaluate the structures and institutions behind our patterns of consumption, mobility, and food production, among others.

Description: In this paper, the authors discuss the role of China in the emerging geopolitics of hydrogen. It begins with a review of China's external energy policy and its evolution over the past decades, highlighting China's transition to a net-energy importer as an important inflection point in that process. It then goes on to describe the main pillars of China's national hydrogen policy. Building on this the paper provides and overview of China's external hydrogen policy and how this aligns with both its broader energy foreign policy and its hydrogen policy objectives. The paper finds that China’s hydrogen strategy – both internal and external – are still at an emergent stage. National targets remain modest, and policy remains ambiguous regarding the preferred production pathway. China’s long-term vision clearly emphasizes the role of renewable hydrogen to help balance an energy system dominated by wind and solar energy. However, current policy provides ample space for the promotion of other forms of hydrogen production. Rather, than a strong, centralized policy approach, local and provincial governments along with SOEs have been driving investment and policy experimentation in the sector, which includes efforts to boost fossil-based hydrogen production.

Description: This chapter reviews Japan’s hydrogen strategy with a particular focus on its international elements. It begins by outlining Japan’s international commitment to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions. The chapter then reviews Japan's domestic policy settings designed to support the deployment of hydrogen in power generation, transport, and industrial uses. The chapter then reviews the strategy that the government is using to enable the development of international supply chains to enable the required imports to satisfy projected hydrogen use in the country. It outlines bilateral technology partnerships and international activities within multilateral forums. It concludes with a short discussion of the geopolitical implications of Japan's hydrogen strategy. Japan has been at the forefront of global efforts to increase the role of hydrogen and ammonia as an option for supporting decarbonization. Japan’s government is positioning hydrogen to play a large role in its overall decarbonisation strategy in support of its mid-century, net zero emissions reduction goal. In this context, the Japanese government is supporting the development of technologies on both the supply and demand side, informed by its understanding of feasible decarbonization pathways domestically and the industrial policy opportunities it has identified to promote Japan's technological leadership. Key features of Japan’s strategy are the central focus on the need to import hydrogen and ammonia and the emphasis domestically on the use of hydrogen and ammonia co-combustion in existing thermal power generation as a transition technology, which is not emphasised in other countries’ national hydrogen strategies. In addition, the Japanese government is championing hydrogen and ammonia internationally through forums such as AZEC, which includes proposing ammonia as a technology option for reducing emissions from the power sector in the Asia-Pacific. A key near-term focus on the supply-side is testing the feasibility of different technology options for hydrogen transport, based on the strong emphasis on hydrogen and ammonia imports within Japan’s hydrogen strategy. Coupled with the potential for exporting technologies for hydrogen use, this suggests that new patterns of trade and investment may emerge, although there remain crucial questions about commercial feasibility in addition to technical challenges. Indeed, Japan’s hydrogen strategy is predicated on the ability to build international supply chains at scale. These are currently being enabled by public investment in early-stage projects. These testing different technology options to enable the export of hydrogen to Japan to support domestic decarbonization. Another challenge lies in unlocking hydrogen demand given that processes using hydrogen and ammonia remain more expensive than alternatives in most cases. A case in point is FCVs, in which consumer demand remains far lower than envisioned. In response, the Japanese government is developing a series of policies to reduce the gap between hydrogen and ammonia and best available technologies. The revised 2023 NHS also signalled a shift towards emphasising Japan’s technology leadership in fuel cells and taking a more neutral approach towards end-use sectors. We can expect Japan’s national hydrogen strategy to continue to develop in response to the effectiveness of policies implemented domestically and internationally to increase the demand for, and supply of hydrogen and associated vectors.