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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Monopolistic competition and non-neighboring-goods (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1996), S. 129-142 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: D23 ; C70.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper studies price games played by a continuum of differentiated producers who face demands generated by additively separable preferences exhibiting a non-neighboring goods property. The examples of exact equilibria show that an asymmetric Chamberlian outcome is compatible with nonzero profits for nonmarginal firms and also with constant average costs, contrary to long sustained views. The paper tries also to short out the structure behind this class of examples and identify as general features the presence of nonperfectly elastic demands facing individual firms and the existence of an approximate Chamberlinian equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213447
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Monopolistic competition and non-neighboring-goods (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 129-142 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: D23 ; C70
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper studies price games played by a continuum of differentiated producers who face demands generated by additively separable preferences exhibiting a non-neighboring goods property. The examples of exact equilibria show that an asymmetric Chamberlian outcome is compatible with nonzero profits for nonmarginal firms and also with constant average costs, contrary to long sustained views. The paper tries also to short out the structure behind this class of examples and identify as general features the presence of nonperfectly elastic demands facing individual firms and the existence of an approximate Chamberlinian equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213447
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 545-563 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Perfect competition, Continuum economies, Incentive compatibility, Thick markets, Walrasian equilibrium. ; JEL Classification Numbers: D41, D51.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. We show that, under thickness conditions, economies with a finite number of types and economies whose set of agents' preferences is compact, pass this perfect competition test. Limiting results for replica economies are also presented.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050339
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers (1998)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 83-92 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Nash equilibrium ; nonatomic game ; law of large numbers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Pascoa (1993a) showed that the failure of the law of large numbers for a continuum of independent randomizations implies that Schmeidler's (1973) concept of a measure-valued profile function in equilibrium might not coincide with the concept of mixed strategies equilibrium of a nonatomic game. The latter should be defined as a probability measure on pure strategies profiles which is induced by the product measure of players' mixed strategies. This paper addresses existence and approximate purification of the latter and presents an assumption on continuity of payoffs that guarantees the equivalence between the two equilibrium concepts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01243196
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers (1998)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 83-92 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: Nash equilibrium ; nonatomic game ; law of large numbers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Pascoa (1993a) showed that the failure of the law of large numbers for a continuum of independent randomizations implies that Schmeidler's (1973) concept of a measure-valued profile function in equilibrium might not coincide with the concept of mixed strategies equilibrium of a nonatomic game. The latter should be defined as a probability measure on pure strategies profiles which is induced by the product measure of players' mixed strategies. This paper addresses existence and approximate purification of the latter and presents an assumption on continuity of payoffs that guarantees the equivalence between the two equilibrium concepts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050059
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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