Summary.
In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. We show that, under thickness conditions, economies with a finite number of types and economies whose set of agents' preferences is compact, pass this perfect competition test. Limiting results for replica economies are also presented.
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Received: July 25, 1997; revised version: December 5, 1998
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Hervés-Beloso, C., Moreno-García, E. & Páscoa, M. Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation. Econ Theory 14, 545–563 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050339
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050339