ISSN:
1432-0592
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Architecture, Civil Engineering, Surveying
,
Geography
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract The use of land-use control ordinances and regulatory agencies is seen by some as the answer to externality-related land-use problems. Such devices necessarily shift the allocation of land and related resources from the market to the realm of the politician. Because of this, regulatory bodies often are in position to confer large gains on selected individuals or groups and large costs on others. This has led to a variety of pressures on regulators by developers and others who would benefit from zoning changes and by other groups who oppose such change. In this paper, a detailed analysis of land-use control decisions in one city demonstrates that applicants for rezoning decisions who have significant economic and/or political power are able to obtain favorable rezoning decisions with a significantly higher frequency than do those who lack such power. One explanation for this phenomenon is that those with such power, which is often shared with the regulators, are able to use their influence and relationships with the members of the regulatory board in order to obtain decisions in their favor. Indeed, they may even use their power to insure that the requests of others are denied. Advocates of strong land-use controls should realize the potential resource allocation costs that tend to be associated with politically- rather than market-oriented decisions.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01287492
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