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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2012-07-17
    Description: Author(s): E. Fehr, K. J. Schrenk, N. A. M. Araújo, D. Kadau, P. Grassberger, J. S. Andrade, Jr., and H. J. Herrmann We study the corrections to scaling for the mass of the watershed, the bridge line, and the optimal path crack in two and three dimensions (2D and 3D). We disclose that these models have numerically equivalent fractal dimensions and leading correction-to-scaling exponents. We conjecture all three mo... [Phys. Rev. E 86, 011117] Published Mon Jul 16, 2012
    Keywords: Statistical physics
    Print ISSN: 1539-3755
    Electronic ISSN: 1550-2376
    Topics: Physics
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2011-09-28
    Description: Author(s): E. Fehr, D. Kadau, N. A. M. Araújo, J. S. Andrade, Jr., and H. J. Herrmann We study the morphology of watersheds in two and three dimensional systems subjected to different degrees of spatial correlations. The response of these objects to small, local perturbations is also investigated with extensive numerical simulations. We find the fractal dimension of the watersheds to... [Phys. Rev. E 84, 036116] Published Tue Sep 27, 2011
    Keywords: Interdisciplinary physics
    Print ISSN: 1539-3755
    Electronic ISSN: 1550-2376
    Topics: Physics
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2011-01-26
    Description: Author(s): E. Fehr, D. Kadau, J. S. Andrade, Jr., and H. J. Herrmann We find that watersheds in real and artificial landscapes can be strongly affected by small, local perturbations like landslides or tectonic motions. We observe power-law scaling behavior for both the distribution of areas enclosed by the original and the displaced watershed as well as the probabili... [Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 048501] Published Tue Jan 25, 2011
    Keywords: Soft Matter, Biological, and Interdisciplinary Physics
    Print ISSN: 0031-9007
    Electronic ISSN: 1079-7114
    Topics: Physics
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  • 4
    Publication Date: 2008-08-30
    Description: Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences, that is, a concern for the welfare of others. These preferences are important for a unique aspect of human sociality-large scale cooperation with genetic strangers-but little is known about their developmental roots. Here we show that young children's other-regarding preferences assume a particular form, inequality aversion that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At age 3-4, the overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, whereas most children at age 7-8 prefer resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for favouring the members of one's own social group. These results indicate that human egalitarianism and parochialism have deep developmental roots, and the simultaneous emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during childhood is intriguing in view of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary process jointly drives both human altruism and parochialism.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Fehr, Ernst -- Bernhard, Helen -- Rockenbach, Bettina -- England -- Nature. 2008 Aug 28;454(7208):1079-83. doi: 10.1038/nature07155.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. efehr@iew.uzh.ch〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18756249" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Age Factors ; *Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; Candy ; Child ; Child, Preschool ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Decision Making ; Female ; Humans ; Male ; Morals ; Motivation ; Sex Characteristics ; Social Justice ; Switzerland
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 5
    Publication Date: 2009-12-10
    Description: Both biosociological and psychological models, as well as animal research, suggest that testosterone has a key role in social interactions. Evidence from animal studies in rodents shows that testosterone causes aggressive behaviour towards conspecifics. Folk wisdom generalizes and adapts these findings to humans, suggesting that testosterone induces antisocial, egoistic, or even aggressive human behaviours. However, many researchers have questioned this folk hypothesis, arguing that testosterone is primarily involved in status-related behaviours in challenging social interactions, but causal evidence that discriminates between these views is sparse. Here we show that the sublingual administration of a single dose of testosterone in women causes a substantial increase in fair bargaining behaviour, thereby reducing bargaining conflicts and increasing the efficiency of social interactions. However, subjects who believed that they received testosterone-regardless of whether they actually received it or not-behaved much more unfairly than those who believed that they were treated with placebo. Thus, the folk hypothesis seems to generate a strong negative association between subjects' beliefs and the fairness of their offers, even though testosterone administration actually causes a substantial increase in the frequency of fair bargaining offers in our experiment.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Eisenegger, C -- Naef, M -- Snozzi, R -- Heinrichs, M -- Fehr, E -- England -- Nature. 2010 Jan 21;463(7279):356-9. doi: 10.1038/nature08711.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland. eisenegger@iew.uzh.ch〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19997098" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Administration, Sublingual ; Adult ; Aggression/drug effects/physiology/psychology ; Cooperative Behavior ; Double-Blind Method ; Female ; *Game Theory ; Humans ; Models, Biological ; Placebos ; *Prejudice ; Reproducibility of Results ; *Social Behavior ; Social Class ; Testosterone/administration & dosage/*pharmacology
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 6
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    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2006-01-10
    Description: The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when "Economic Man" dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate. Here we show that strategic incentives are the key to answering this question. A minority of self-regarding individuals can trigger a "noncooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for the majority of other-regarding individuals to mimic the minority's behavior. Likewise, a minority of other-regarding individuals can generate a "cooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for a majority of self-regarding people to behave cooperatively. Similarly, in strategic games, aggregate outcomes can be either far from or close to Nash equilibrium if players with high degrees of strategic thinking mimic or erase the effects of others who do very little strategic thinking. Recently developed theories of other-regarding preferences and bounded rationality explain these findings and provide better predictions of actual aggregate behavior than does traditional economic theory.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Camerer, Colin F -- Fehr, Ernst -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2006 Jan 6;311(5757):47-52.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. camerer@hss.caltech.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16400140" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Competitive Behavior ; Cooperative Behavior ; Forecasting ; Game Theory ; Humans ; Investments ; Models, Economic ; Models, Psychological ; *Motivation ; *Social Behavior ; Thinking
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 7
    Publication Date: 2006-10-07
    Description: Humans restrain self-interest with moral and social values. They are the only species known to exhibit reciprocal fairness, which implies the punishment of other individuals' unfair behaviors, even if it hurts the punisher's economic self-interest. Reciprocal fairness has been demonstrated in the Ultimatum Game, where players often reject their bargaining partner's unfair offers. Despite progress in recent years, however, little is known about how the human brain limits the impact of selfish motives and implements fair behavior. Here we show that disruption of the right, but not the left, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) by low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation substantially reduces subjects' willingness to reject their partners' intentionally unfair offers, which suggests that subjects are less able to resist the economic temptation to accept these offers. Importantly, however, subjects still judge such offers as very unfair, which indicates that the right DLPFC plays a key role in the implementation of fairness-related behaviors.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Knoch, Daria -- Pascual-Leone, Alvaro -- Meyer, Kaspar -- Treyer, Valerie -- Fehr, Ernst -- K24 RR018875/RR/NCRR NIH HHS/ -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2006 Nov 3;314(5800):829-32. Epub 2006 Oct 5.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland. dknoch@iew.unizh.ch〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17023614" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Adult ; Decision Making ; Functional Laterality ; *Games, Experimental ; Humans ; Interpersonal Relations ; Judgment ; Male ; Prefrontal Cortex/*physiology ; *Social Behavior ; Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 8
    Publication Date: 2004-08-31
    Description: Many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms. Evolutionary models and empirical evidence indicate that such altruistic punishment has been a decisive force in the evolution of human cooperation. We used H2 15O positron emission tomography to examine the neural basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange. Subjects could punish defection either symbolically or effectively. Symbolic punishment did not reduce the defector's economic payoff, whereas effective punishment did reduce the payoff. We scanned the subjects' brains while they learned about the defector's abuse of trust and determined the punishment. Effective punishment, as compared with symbolic punishment, activated the dorsal striatum, which has been implicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions. Moreover, subjects with stronger activations in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. Our findings support the hypothesis that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations and that the activation in the dorsal striatum reflects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉de Quervain, Dominique J-F -- Fischbacher, Urs -- Treyer, Valerie -- Schellhammer, Melanie -- Schnyder, Ulrich -- Buck, Alfred -- Fehr, Ernst -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2004 Aug 27;305(5688):1254-8.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Division of Psychiatry Research, University of Zurich, Lenggstrasse 31, 8029 Zurich, Switzerland. quervain@bli.unizh.ch〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15333831" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Adult ; Altruism ; Brain Mapping ; Caudate Nucleus/*physiology/radionuclide imaging ; Corpus Striatum/*physiology/radionuclide imaging ; *Emotions ; Frontal Lobe/physiology/radionuclide imaging ; Games, Experimental ; Humans ; Male ; *Personal Satisfaction ; Prefrontal Cortex/physiology/radionuclide imaging ; *Punishment ; Reward ; Surveys and Questionnaires ; Thalamus/physiology/radionuclide imaging ; Tomography, Emission-Computed
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 9
    Publication Date: 2014-11-20
    Description: Trust in others' honesty is a key component of the long-term performance of firms, industries, and even whole countries. However, in recent years, numerous scandals involving fraud have undermined confidence in the financial industry. Contemporary commentators have attributed these scandals to the financial sector's business culture, but no scientific evidence supports this claim. Here we show that employees of a large, international bank behave, on average, honestly in a control condition. However, when their professional identity as bank employees is rendered salient, a significant proportion of them become dishonest. This effect is specific to bank employees because control experiments with employees from other industries and with students show that they do not become more dishonest when their professional identity or bank-related items are rendered salient. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines the honesty norm, implying that measures to re-establish an honest culture are very important.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Cohn, Alain -- Fehr, Ernst -- Marechal, Michel Andre -- England -- Nature. 2014 Dec 4;516(7529):86-9. doi: 10.1038/nature13977. Epub 2014 Nov 19.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25409154" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Behavior/ethics ; Commerce/*ethics ; *Culture ; Humans
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 10
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    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2008-09-27
    Description: Cultural boundaries have often been the basis for discrimination, nationalism, religious wars, and genocide. Little is known, however, about how cultural groups form or the evolutionary forces behind group affiliation and ingroup favoritism. Hence, we examine these forces experimentally and show that arbitrary symbolic markers, though initially meaningless, evolve to play a key role in cultural group formation and ingroup favoritism because they enable a population of heterogeneous individuals to solve important coordination problems. This process requires that individuals differ in some critical but unobservable way and that their markers be freely and flexibly chosen. If these conditions are met, markers become accurate predictors of behavior. The resulting social environment includes strong incentives to bias interactions toward others with the same marker, and subjects accordingly show strong ingroup favoritism. When markers do not acquire meaning as accurate predictors of behavior, players show a markedly reduced taste for ingroup favoritism. Our results support the prominent evolutionary hypothesis that cultural processes can reshape the selective pressures facing individuals and so favor the evolution of behavioral traits not previously advantaged.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Efferson, Charles -- Lalive, Rafael -- Fehr, Ernst -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2008 Sep 26;321(5897):1844-9. doi: 10.1126/science.1155805.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland. efferson@iew.uzh.ch〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18818361" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Cultural Evolution ; Games, Experimental ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; Prejudice ; *Social Behavior ; *Social Identification
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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