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  • 1
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    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
    Publication Date: 2008-03-21
    Description: 〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Milinski, Manfred -- Rockenbach, Bettina -- England -- Nature. 2008 Mar 20;452(7185):297-8. doi: 10.1038/452297a.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18354472" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; *Cooperative Behavior ; *Game Theory ; Humans ; Models, Psychological ; *Punishment/psychology
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2008-08-30
    Description: Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences, that is, a concern for the welfare of others. These preferences are important for a unique aspect of human sociality-large scale cooperation with genetic strangers-but little is known about their developmental roots. Here we show that young children's other-regarding preferences assume a particular form, inequality aversion that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At age 3-4, the overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, whereas most children at age 7-8 prefer resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for favouring the members of one's own social group. These results indicate that human egalitarianism and parochialism have deep developmental roots, and the simultaneous emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during childhood is intriguing in view of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary process jointly drives both human altruism and parochialism.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Fehr, Ernst -- Bernhard, Helen -- Rockenbach, Bettina -- England -- Nature. 2008 Aug 28;454(7208):1079-83. doi: 10.1038/nature07155.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. efehr@iew.uzh.ch〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18756249" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Age Factors ; *Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; Candy ; Child ; Child, Preschool ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Decision Making ; Female ; Humans ; Male ; Morals ; Motivation ; Sex Characteristics ; Social Justice ; Switzerland
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2009-01-06
    Description: 〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Rockenbach, Bettina -- Milinski, Manfred -- England -- Nature. 2009 Jan 1;457(7225):39-40. doi: 10.1038/457039a.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19122632" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Female ; *Game Theory ; Humans ; Male ; Models, Psychological ; *Punishment/psychology
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 4
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    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2007-07-28
    Description: 〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Milinski, Manfred -- Rockenbach, Bettina -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2007 Jul 27;317(5837):464-5.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, D-24306 Plon, Germany. milinski@mpil-ploen.mpg.de〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17656712" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Animals ; Behavior, Animal ; Cues ; Eye Movements ; Fixation, Ocular ; Humans ; *Interpersonal Relations ; Observation ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 5
    Publication Date: 2006-04-08
    Description: Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Gurerk, Ozgur -- Irlenbusch, Bernd -- Rockenbach, Bettina -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2006 Apr 7;312(5770):108-11.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉University of Erfurt, Nordhauser Strasse 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16601192" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Cooperative Behavior ; *Cultural Evolution ; *Games, Experimental ; Group Processes ; Humans ; *Punishment ; *Social Behavior ; Social Sciences
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 6
    Publication Date: 2011-10-10
    Print ISSN: 0027-8424
    Electronic ISSN: 1091-6490
    Topics: Biology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General
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  • 7
    Publication Date: 2011-11-09
    Description: Conflicts of interest between the community and its members are at the core of human social dilemmas. If observed selfishness has future costs, individuals may hide selfish acts but display altruistic ones, and peers aim at identifying the most selfish persons to avoid them as future social partners. An interaction involving hiding and seeking information may be inevitable. We staged an experimental social-dilemma game in which actors could pay to conceal information about their contribution, giving, and punishing decisions from an observer who selects her future social partners from the actors. The observer could pay to conceal her observation of the actors. We found sophisticated dynamic strategies on either side. Actors hide their severe punishment and low contributions but display high contributions. Observers select high contributors as social partners; remarkably, punishment behavior seems irrelevant for qualifying as a social partner. That actors nonetheless pay to conceal their severe punishment adds a further puzzle to the role of punishment in human social behavior. Competition between hiding and seeking information about social behavior may be even more relevant and elaborate in the real world but usually is hidden from our eyes.
    Print ISSN: 0027-8424
    Electronic ISSN: 1091-6490
    Topics: Biology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General
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  • 8
    Publication Date: 2014-11-12
    Description: Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals’ willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish...
    Print ISSN: 0027-8424
    Electronic ISSN: 1091-6490
    Topics: Biology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General
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