ALBERT

Description: The Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment III (SAGE III) instrument is the fifth in a series of instruments developed for monitoring aerosols and gaseous constituents in the stratosphere and troposphere. SAGE III will be delivered to the International Space Station (ISS) via the SpaceX Dragon vehicle. A detailed thermal model of the SAGE III payload, which consists of multiple subsystems, has been developed in Thermal Desktop (TD). Many innovative analysis methods have been used in developing this model; these will be described in the paper. This paper builds on a paper presented at TFAWS 2013, which described some of the initial developments of efficient methods for SAGE III. The current paper describes additional improvements that have been made since that time. To expedite the correlation of the model to thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing, the chambers and GSE for both TVAC chambers at Langley used to test the payload were incorporated within the thermal model. This allowed the runs of TVAC predictions and correlations to be run within the flight model, thus eliminating the need for separate models for TVAC. In one TVAC test, radiant lamps were used which necessitated shooting rays from the lamps, and running in both solar and IR wavebands. A new Dragon model was incorporated which entailed a change in orientation; that change was made using an assembly, so that any potential additional new Dragon orbits could be added in the future without modification of the model. The Earth orbit parameters such as albedo and Earth infrared flux were incorporated as time-varying values that change over the course of the orbit; despite being required in one of the ISS documents, this had not been done before by any previous payload. All parameters such as initial temperature, heater voltage, and location of the payload are defined based on the case definition. For one component, testing was performed in both air and vacuum; incorporating the air convection in a submodel that was only built for the in-air cases allowed correlation of all testing to be done in a single model. These modeling improvements and more will be described and illustrated in the paper.

Description: No abstract available

Description: The Visual Impairment Intracranial Pressure (VIIP) syndrome is currently NASA's number one human space flight risk. The syndrome, which is related to microgravity exposure, manifests with changes in visual acuity (hyperopic shifts, scotomas), changes in eye structure (optic disc edema, choroidal folds, cotton wool spots, globe flattening, and distended optic nerve sheaths). In some cases, elevated cerebrospinal fluid pressure has been documented postflight reflecting increased intracranial pressure (ICP). While the eye appears to be the main affected end organ of this syndrome, the ocular affects are thought to be related to the effect of cephalad fluid shift on the vascular system and the central nervous system. The leading hypotheses for the development of VIIP involve microgravity induced head-ward fluid shifts along with a loss of gravity-assisted drainage of venous blood from the brain, both leading to cephalic congestion and increased ICP. Although not all crewmembers have manifested clinical signs or symptoms of the VIIP syndrome, it is assumed that all astronauts exposed to microgravity have some degree of ICP elevation in-flight. Prolonged elevations of ICP can cause long-term reduced visual acuity and loss of peripheral visual fields, and has been reported to cause mild cognitive impairment in the analog terrestrial population of Idiopathic Intracranial Hypertension (IIH). These potentially irreversible health consequences underscore the importance of identifying the factors that lead to this syndrome and mitigating them.

Description: No abstract available

Description: This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for longterm health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASASTD3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASASTD3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Description: The Low-Density Supersonic Decelerator (LDSD) Project's first Supersonic Flight Dynamics Test (SFDT-1) occurred June 28, 2014. Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST2) was utilized to develop trajectory simulations characterizing all SFDT-1 flight phases from drop to splashdown. These POST2 simulations were used to validate the targeting parameters developed for SFDT- 1, predict performance and understand the sensitivity of the vehicle and nominal mission designs, and to support flight test operations with trajectory performance and splashdown location predictions for vehicle recovery. This paper provides an overview of the POST2 simulations developed for LDSD and presents the POST2 simulation flight dynamics support during the SFDT-1 launch, operations, and recovery.

Description: NASA's Low Density Supersonic Decelerator (LDSD) project conducted its first Supersonic Flight Dynamics Test (SFDT-1) on June 28, 2014. Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST2) was one of the flight dynamics codes used to simulate and predict the flight performance and Monte Carlo analysis was used to characterize the potential flight conditions experienced by the test vehicle. This paper compares the simulation predictions with the reconstructed trajectory of SFDT-1. Additionally, off-nominal conditions seen during flight are modeled in post-flight simulations to find the primary contributors that reconcile the simulation with flight data. The results of these analyses are beneficial for the pre-flight simulation and targeting of the follow-on SFDT flights currently scheduled for summer 2015.