Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK
:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Review of international economics
4 (1996), S. 0
ISSN:
1467-9396
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfarc are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.1996.tb00107.x
|
Location |
Call Number |
Expected |
Availability |
