Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK
:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal of economic surveys
10 (1996), S. 0
ISSN:
1467-6419
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract. We survey recent theoretical research on the effects of short-term share-price based managerial incentive schemes. Such schemes can induce inefficient managerial behaviour in both hidden action and hidden type contexts. These problems arise from informational asymmetries: managers take actions to manipulate the information flow rather than to maximize firm value. More generally, imperfect transmission of information between managers and shareholders or between managers of different firms can lead to similar distortions even when the parties' interests are aligned.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1996.tb00001.x
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