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  • 1
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Bargaining Problem with Incomplete Information ; Incentive Compatible Mechanisms ; Nash-/Harsanyi-Selten-Solution
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper I analyze whether the generalized Nash solution which has been defined by Harsanyi and Selten for bargaining problems with incomplete information can be characterized in the mechanism framework introduced by Myerson. I show that the solution is uniquely determined by a set of axioms in the case of independently distributed types. It can be seen that the axioms given by Harsanyi and Selten cannot be used if the types are not independently distributed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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