Electronic Resource
Springer
Review of industrial organization
10 (1995), S. 247-267
ISSN:
1573-7160
Keywords:
Allocative efficiency
;
monopoly
;
privatization
;
public enterprise
;
regulation
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract The paper presents a simple model that calculates — as a percentage of industry revenues — the welfare gains or losses that might ensue when a public enterprise natural monopoly is replaced by a profit maximizing private monopoly. The model incorporates both the pre-privatization demand elasticity and production efficiency changes subsequent to privatization. The magnitude of the welfare changes suggests that allocative efficiency improvements do not provide a compelling rationale for post-privatization regulation. Greater consideration must be given to other regulatory objectives including distributional concerns and the need to create an institutional environment that encourages investment.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01027074
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