ISSN:
1573-6911
Keywords:
L20
;
O31
;
Economic theory
;
dynamic game
;
innovations
;
R&D investment
;
evolution
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract In the recent literature about the explanation of the behaviour of innovating firms there coexist two basically different approaches. To so calledneoclassical approach assumes maximising behaviour relating to an exogenously given innovation technology and theevolutionary approach postulates time constant routine decisions. Both explanations are supported by well known arguments. Nevertheless they seem to be completely separated in the literature. The evolutionary approach even defines itself by the separation of the neo-classical approach. In this paper the two methods or philosophies are linked in a simple duopolistic model. It will be shown, that the strategic maximising behaviour of innovating firms leads in a dynamic model to routine decisions as equilibrium strategies.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01383978
