Electronic Resource
Springer
Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉
106 (1996), S. 205-226
ISSN:
1573-0964
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Natural Sciences in General
,
Philosophy
Notes:
Abstract In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00413700
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