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  • Articles  (2,461)
  • Springer  (2,461)
  • 1995-1999  (2,461)
  • Philosophy  (2,461)
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  • Articles  (2,461)
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  • 1
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 109 (1996), S. 47-62 
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  • 2
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 167-190 
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    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A reading is given of Curie's Principle that the symmetry of a cause is always preserved its effects. The truth of the principle is demonstrated and its importance, under the proposed reading, is defended. “As far as I see, all a priori statements in physics have their origin in symmetry.” (Weyl, Symmetry, p. 126)
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  • 3
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 257-276 
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    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The transition from the traditional to the representational theory of measurement around the turn of the century was accompanied by little sustained criticism of the former. The most forceful critique was Bertrand Russell's 1897 Mind paper, ‘On the relations of number and quantity’. The traditional theory has it that real numbers unfold from the concept of continuous quantity. Russell's critique identified two serious problems for this theory: (1) can magnitudes of a continuous quantity be defined without infinite regress; and (2) can additive relations between such magnitudes exist if magnitudes are not divisible? The present paper shows how the traditional theory answers these questions and compares the traditional and representational theories as contributions to our understanding of the logic of application.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 297-334 
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    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper aims at a partial rehabilitation of E. A. Moody's characterization of the 14th century as an age of rising empiricism, specifically by contrasting the conception of the natural science of psychology found in the writings of a prominent 13th-century philosopher (Thomas Aquinas) with those of two 14th-century philosophers (John Buridan and Nicole Oresme). What emerges is that if the meaning of empiricism can be disengaged from modern and contemporary paradigms, and understood more broadly in terms of a cluster of epistemic doctrines concerned with the methodology of knowing, it characterizes very appropriately some of the differences between the ways in which late-medieval thinkers both understood and practised the science of psychology. In particular, whereas Aquinas thinks psychology is about reasoning demonstratively to the real nature of the soul from its evident operations (thereby assimilating psychology to metaphysics), Buridan and Oresme, both of whom doubt whether real animate natures can be known empirically, focus on giving detailed accounts of those operations themselves (thereby assimilating psychology to physics).
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 343-355 
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    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In his book, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollock’s argument is ineffective — because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollock’s argument by restricting his conclusion to theories that do involve action-guiding norms and providing a better reason to think that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. But I claim that if Pollock’s argument is made strong enough to rule out all externalisms, it rules out too much, namely, any plausible conception of epistemic norms.
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  • 6
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 111 (1997), S. 147-154 
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  • 7
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 111 (1997), S. 183-196 
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  • 8
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 112 (1997), S. 135-136 
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  • 9
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 112 (1997), S. 1-2 
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  • 10
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 112 (1997), S. 125-133 
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  • 11
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 113 (1997), S. 205-216 
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  • 12
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 113 (1997), S. 241-249 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 113 (1997), S. 381-421 
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    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A continuum is here a primitive notion intended to correspond precisely to a path-connected subset of the usual euclidean space. In contrast, however, to the traditional treatment, we treat here continua not as pointsets, but as irreducible entities equipped only with a partial ordering ≤ interpreted as parthood. Our aim is to examine what basic topological and geometric properties of continua can be expressed in the language of ≤, and what principles we need in order to prove elementary facts about them. Surprisingly enough ≤ suffices to formulate the very heart of continuity (=jumpless and gapless transitions) in a general setting. Further, using a few principles about ≤ (together with the axioms of ZFC), we can define points, joins, meets and infinite closeness. Most important, we can develop a dimension theory based on notions like path, circle, line (=one-dimensional continuum), simple line and surface (=two-dimensional continuum), recovering thereby in a rigorous way Poincaré's well-known intuitive idea that dimension expresses the ways in which a continuum can be torn apart. We outline a classification of lines according to the number of circles and branching points they contain. The ordering (C,≤) is a topped and bottomed, atomic, almost dense and complete partial ordering, weaker than a lattice. Continuous transformations from C to C are also defined in a natural way and results about them are proved. The key notions on which the dimension theory is based are the “minimal extensions of continua”, or “joins”, and the “splittings of continua over subcontinua”.
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  • 14
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 114 (1998), S. 161-162 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 114 (1998), S. 371-371 
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  • 16
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 117 (1998), S. 251-274 
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  • 17
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 117 (1998), S. 409-417 
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  • 18
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 117 (1998), S. 485-485 
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  • 19
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 117 (1998), S. 375-408 
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    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.
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  • 20
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 118 (1999), S. 49-68 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper problematizes the analogy that Hubert Dreyfus has presented between phenomenology and cognitive science. It argues that Dreyfus presents Merleau-Ponty's modification of Husserl's phenomenology in a misleading way. He ignores the idea of philosophy as a radical interrogation and self-responsibility that stems from Husserl's work and recurs in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. The paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the phenomenological reduction. It shows that his critical idea was not to restrict the scope of Husserl's reductions but to study the conditions of possibility for the thetic acts. Merleau-Ponty argued, following Husserl's texts, that the thetic acts rest on the basis of primordial pre-thetic experience. This layer of experience cannot, by its nature, be explicated or clarified, but it can be questioned and unveiled. This is the recurrent task of phenomenological philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty understands it.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 118 (1999), S. 69-88 
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    Notes: Abstract This article presents an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's notion of pre-reflective intentionality, explicating the similarities and differences between his and Husserl's understandings of intentionality. The main difference is located in Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl's noesis-noema structure. Merleau-Ponty seems to claim that there can be intentional acts which are not of or about anything specific. He defines intentionality by its “directedness”, which is described as a bodily, concrete spatial motility. Merleau-Ponty's understanding of intentionality is part of his attempt to rewrite the relation between the universal and the particular. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and impossible to analyse by a distinction between form and matter. Still, Merleau-Ponty's notion of meaning and philosophy is strictly opposed to any naturalized philosophy. This becomes explicated at the end of the article, where his attempt to embody intentionality is compared to Daniel Dennett's corresponding approach.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 118 (1999), S. 307-307 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 119 (1999), S. 299-311 
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    Notes: Abstract While the Phase Space formulation of quantum mechanics has received considerable attention it has seldom been defended as a viable interpretation. In this paper I expound the Phase Space Picture, use it to provide a quasi-classical ‘hidden variables’ interpretation of quantum mechanics and offer a defence of it against various objections.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 119 (1999), S. 253-286 
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    Notes: Abstract To state an important fact about the photon, physicists use such expressions as (1) “the photon has zero (null, vanishing) mass” and (2) “the photon is (a) massless (particle)” interchangeably. Both (1) and (2) express the fact that the photon has no non-zero mass. However, statements (1) and (2) disagree about a further fact: (1) attributes to the photon the property of zero-masshood whereas (2) denies that the photon has any mass at all. But is there really a difference between saying that something has zero mass (charge, spin, etc.) and saying that it has no mass (charge, spin, etc.)? Does the distinction cut any physical or philosophical ice? I argue that the answer to these questions is yes. Put briefly, the claim of this paper is that some zero-value physical quantities are not mere “privations”, “absences” or “holes in being”. They are respectable properties in the same sense in which their non-zero partners are. This, I will show, has implications for the debate between two rival views of the nature of property, dispositionalism and categoricalism.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 119 (1999), S. 313-323 
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    Notes: Abstract In Pérez Laraudogoitia (1996), I introduced a simple example of a supertask that involved the possibility of spontaneous self-excitation and, therefore, of a particularly interesting form of indeterminism in classical dynamics. Alper and Bridger (1998) criticised (among other things) this result. In the present article, I answer their criticisms. In what follows I assume familiarity both with Pérez Laraudogoitia (1996) and Alper and Bridger’s subsequent article.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 89-94 
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    Notes: Abstract The thesis that species are individuals, and not classes as the traditional view had it, has been influential in the last 25 years. In this paper David Hull's arguments for the thesis are surveyed, as well as some counterarguments presented by Philip Kitcher. It is claimed that though species can be conceptualized as individuals, we are not compelled to view them in that way. The importance of the issue seems to have been somewhat exaggerated. However, it might happen that empirical findings concerning species selection would strengthen the case for the thesis, thereby rendering it straightforwardly empirical. The applicability of teleological explanation is suggested as a criterion for biological individuality.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 265-270 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 345-374 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 411-418 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 395-410 
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    Notes: Abstract The Tractatus contains twodifferent proofs of the Grundgedanke, or thenonreferentiality of logical constants. In thispaper, I explicate the first proof in TLP 5.4s andreconstruct the less explicitly stated second proof. My explication of the first proof shows it to beelegant but based on an invalid inference. In myreconstruction of the second proof, the main argumentis that the sign of a logical constant does not denotebecause it possesses the punctuation-mark-nature. Andit possesses the punctuation-mark-nature because,given the analyticity thesis in TLP 5, one canestablish for everyday language an adequate symbolismwith N as the sole fundamental operation such that itssign is a bar indicating merely the order and scope ofits application.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 121 (1999), S. 357-383 
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    Notes: Abstract What is central to the progression of a sequence is the idea of succession, which is fundamentally a temporal notion. In Kant's ontology numbers are not objects but rules (schemata) for representing the magnitude of a quantum. The magnitude of a discrete quantum 11...11 is determined by a counting procedure, an operation which can be understood as a mapping from the ordinals to the cardinals. All empirical models for numbers isomorphic to 11...11 must conform to the transcendental determination of time-order. Kant's transcendental model for number entails a procedural semantics in which the semantic value of the number-concept is defined in terms of temporal procedures. A number is constructible if and only if it can be schematized in a procedural form. This representability condition explains how an arbitrarily large number is representable and why Kant thinks that arithmetical statements are synthetic and not analytic.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 102 (1995), S. 139-164 
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    Notes: Abstract A variation of Bell's theorem that deals with the indeterministic case is formulated and proved within the logical framework of Lewis's theory of counterfactuals. The no-faster-than-light-influence condition is expressed in terms of Lewis ‘would’ counterfactual conditionals. Objections to this procedure raised by certain philosophers of science are examined and answered. The theorem shows that the incompatibility between the predictions of quantum theory and the idea of no faster-than-light influence cannot be ascribed to any auxiliary or tacit assumption of either determinism or the related idea that outcomes of unperformed measurements are determinate within nature. In addition, the theorem provides an example of an application of Lewis's theory of counterfactuals in a rigorous scientific context.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 102 (1995), S. 235-266 
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    Notes: Abstract State-reduction and the notion of “actuality” are compared to “passage” through time and the notion of “the present”; already in classical relativity the latter give rise to difficulties. The solution proposed here is to treat both tense and value-definiteness as relational properties or “facts as relations”; likewise the notions of change and probability. In both cases “essential” characteristics are absent: temporal relations are tenselessly true; probabilistic relations are deterministically true. The basic ideas go back to Everett, although the technical development makes use of the decoherent histories theory of Griffiths, Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle. Alternative interpretations of the decoherent histories framework are also considered.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 102 (1995), S. 293-318 
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    Notes: Abstract The axiomatic approaches of quantum mechanics and relativity theory are compared with approaches in which the theories are thought to describe readings of certain measurement operations. The usual axioms are shown to correspond with classes of ideal measurements. The necessity is discussed of generalizing the formalisms of both quantum mechanics and relativity theory so as to encompass more realistic nonideal measurements. It is argued that this generalization favours an empiricist interpretation of the mathematical formalisms over a realist one.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 102 (1995), S. 319-361 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper develops some respects in which the philosophy of mathematics can fruitfully be informed by mathematical practice, through examining Frege'sGrundlagen in its historical setting. The first sections of the paper are devoted to elaborating some aspects of nineteenth century mathematics which informed Frege's early work. (These events are of considerable philosophical significance even apart from the connection with Frege.) In the middle sections, some minor themes ofGrundlagen are developed: the relationship Frege envisions between arithmetic and geometry and the way in which the study of reasoning is to illuminate this. In the final section, it is argued that the sorts of issues Frege attempted to address concerning the character of mathematical reasoning are still in need of a satisfying answer.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 102 (1995), S. 383-412 
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    Notes: Abstract The widely held assumption about what motivated “On Denoting” is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 103 (1995), S. 87-121 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper provides a description and analysis of Wilhelm Neurath's economics and theory of value. Otto Neurath's rejection of a distinct methodology for social science and his insistence on the political partisanship of scientific sociology, I argue, represent his attempt to both continue the practical orientation of his father's theorizing and answer the normative problem his father's theories faced.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 103 (1995), S. 327-354 
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    Notes: Abstract In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time is discrete, I then turn to some possible empirical evidence, which we do not yet have. This evidence is based on some slight differences between commonly occurring differential equations and their discrete analogs.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 103 (1995), S. 355-387 
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    Notes: Abstract In his recent article ‘On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future’ (1991), Howard Stein proves not only that one can define an objective becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime, but that there is only one possible definition available if one accepts certain natural assumptions about what it is for becoming to occur and for it to be objective. Stein uses the definition supplied by his proof to refute an argument due to Rietdijk (1966, 1976), Putnam (1967) and Maxwell (1985, 1988) that Minkowski spacetime leaves no room for objective becoming whatsoever. However, Stein's proof does not seem to go far enough. By considering only what events have become from the standpoint of any given event, Stein's uniqueness proof fails from the outset to allow for a more general kind of becoming whereby it is understood to occur from the standpoint of events on the particular worldlines followed by observers. This suggests that there may, after all, be more than one way to define objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime once each observer's worldline is allowed to figure in the definition. This suspicion is further aroused by two recent proposals for objective, worldline-dependent becoming due to Peacock (1992) and Muller (1992) who advocate ways of defining becoming that are not equivalent to the definition Stein's uniqueness proof delivers. Nevertheless, we show that Stein's uniqueness proofcan be extended in a natural way to cover this more general kind of becoming, provided one does not enrich standard Minkowski spacetime by privileging certain sets of worldlines over others in an unwarranted manner. Thus we aim to reinforce Stein's point that standard Minkowski spacetime does make room for objective becoming, but in essentially only one way, despite arguments and proposals to the contrary.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 104 (1995), S. 1-32 
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    Notes: Abstract Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for ‘externalism’ about perceptual content (content is distal) and ‘objectivism’ about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticised the ‘computational objectivist’ position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundamental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do not converge on the detection of any single type of environmental property. David R. Hilbert (1992) has recently defended computational objectivism against my ‘comparative argument’; his arguments are based on the externalist approach to perceptual content originally developed by Mohan Matthen (1988) and on the computationally inspired theory of the evolutionary basis for trichromacy developed by Roger N. Shepard (1990). The present article provides a reply to Hilbert with extensive criticism of both Matthen's and Shepard's theories. I argue that the biological function of colour vision is not to detect surface reflectance, but to provide a set of perceptual categories that can apply to objects in a stable way in a variety of conditions. Comparative research indicates that both the perceptual categories and the distal stimuli will differ according to the animal and its visual ecology, therefore externalism and objectivism must be rejected.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 104 (1995), S. 123-145 
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    Notes: Abstract It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms ‘theoretical’ and ‘belief’ are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of ‘theoretical’ that is of use to the eliminativist, and in this sense some kinds of “belief” (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed “theoretical” and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptualGestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 104 (1995), S. 217-244 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper is a reply to some of Scott Soames' comments on my colloquium paper “Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of the New Theory of Reference’. Except for the indicated parts added in May, 1995, this paper was written on December 16th–25th, 1994 as my reply to Soames for the APA colloquium in Boston, December 28, 1994. In this paper, I argue that Soames' contention that Marcus is not one of the “primary founders of contemporary nondescriptivist theories of reference” is false. Soames presents numerous arguments for his thesis that Marcus did not originate ideas later elaborated upon by Kripke, but his arguments are unsound; they are based in part on a misunderstanding of Marcus' theory and in part on an inadequate grasp of some of the key notions of the New Theory of Reference, such as the notion of a posteriori necessities and the notion of reference-fixing descriptions.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 104 (1995), S. 331-349 
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    Notes: Abstract Where the old “objectivity question” asked, “Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?”, the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, “How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects?” One response to this question is the “strong objectivity” program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing our ability to block “might makes right” in the sciences. It does so by delinking the neutrality ideal from standards for maximizing objectivity, since neutrality is now widely recognized as not only not necessary, not only not helpful, but, worst of all, an obstacle to maximizing objectivity when knowledge-distorting interests and values have constituted a research project. Strong objectivity provides a method for correcting this kind of situation. However, standpoint approaches have their own limitations which are quite different from the misreadings of them upon which most critics have tended to focus. Unfortunately, historically limited epistemologies and philosophies of science are all we get to choose from at this moment in history.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 104 (1995), S. 463-477 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 104 (1995), S. 441-461 
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    Notes: Abstract This essay delineates the contributions of feminist critiques of science to contemporary reconstructions of empiricism. I argue that three central tenets arise from feminist attention to the dynamics of gender and oppression in the theories and methods of science: 1) a rejection of the science/politics dichotomy; 2) an acknowledgement of the epistemic import of subjective components of knowledge; and 3) a reconfiguration of the subject of knowledge. These three tenets are illustrated and supported through examples from the history of science.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 105 (1995), S. 253-271 
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    Notes: Abstract The neural substrate of early visual processing in the macaque is used as a framework to discuss recent progress towards a precise anatomical localization and understanding of the functional implications of the syndromes of blindsight, achromatopsia and akinetopsia in humans. This review is mainly concerned with how these syndromes support the principles of organization of the visual system into parallel pathways and the functional hierarchy of visual mechanisms.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 105 (1995), S. 273-301 
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    Notes: Abstract In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 108 (1996), S. 1-10 
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    Notes: Abstract Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not “very unexpected” as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are “deductively independent” — but this means that ⌝ a ⊢ b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, is untenable. Finally, it is shown that Popper-Miller's claim that deductive relations determine probabilistic support is untrue. In general, probabilistic support can vary greatly with fixed deductive relations as determined by the relevant Lindenbaum algebra.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 109 (1996), S. 263-280 
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    Notes: Abstract How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 109 (1996), S. 291-291 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 109 (1996), S. 401-412 
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    Notes: Abstract Rationality postulates for preferences are developed from two basic decision theoretic principles, namely: (1) the logic of preference is determined by paradigmatic cases in which preferences are choice-guiding, and (2) excessive comparison costs should be avoided. It is shown how the logical requirements on preferences depend on the structure of comparison costs. The preference postulates necessary for choice guidance in a single decision problem are much weaker than completeness and transitivity. Stronger postulates, such as completeness and transitivity, can be derived under the further assumption that the original preference relation should also be capable of guiding choice after any restriction of the original set of alternatives.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 15-36 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 57-76 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 110 (1997), S. 399-417 
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    Notes: Abstract Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of ‘internal’ here? And of which conditions of which positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subject’s belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 111 (1997), S. 73-96 
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    Notes: Abstract Quine’s ontological relativity is related to Tarski’s theory of truth in two ways: Quine “repudiates term-by-term-correspondence”, as does Tarski’s rule of truth; and Quine’s proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarski’s truth definition. Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesn’t comply with the rule of truth (Tarski’s celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quine’s express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (T) requires. A possible adjustment is to drop (T), retain the satisfaction definition and proxy argument, and appeal to the theory of observation and indeterminacy of reference as grounds of relativity. But as we shall see Quine’s theories of assent to observation sentences and of reference-learning don’t square easily with his naturalism. The first attributes intentional attitudes to observers; and the second assumes a holistic context principle and a concept of individuation which do not withstand scrutiny as empirical notions. Both appear to violate Quine’s behavorist canon. A saving alternative is a theory of term-reference that appears in Roots of Reference and affords a return to behaviorism, and reinstatement of the proxy argument and relativity in a way compatible with Tarski’s (T).
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 111 (1997), S. 197-210 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 111 (1997), S. 171-182 
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    Notes: Abstract It has been observed that whereas painters and musicians are likely to be embarrassed by references to the beauty in their work, mathematicians instead like to engage in discussions of the beauty of mathematics. Professional artists are more likely to stress the technical rather than the aesthetic aspects of their work. Mathematicians, instead, are fond of passing judgment on the beauty of their favored pieces of mathematics. Even a cursory observation shows that the characteristics of mathematical beauty are at variance with those of artistic beauty. For example, courses in “art appreciation” are fairly common; it is however unthinkable to find any “mathematical beauty appreciation” courses taught anywhere. The purpose of the present paper is to try to uncover the sense of the term “beauty” as it is currently used by mathematicians.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 111 (1997), S. 253-282 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 113 (1997), S. 43-70 
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    Notes: Abstract Charles Peirce is often credited for being among the first, perhaps even the first, to develop a scientific metaphysics of indeterminism. After rejecting the received view that Peirce developed his views from Darwin and Maxwell, I argue that Peirce's view results from his synthesis of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and George Boole's contributions to formal logic. Specifically, I claim that Kant's conception of the laws of logic as the basis for his architectonic, when combined with Boole's view of probability, yields Peirce's metaphysics of probabilistic laws. Indeterminism provides, therefore, an excellent illustration of how Peirce attempted to use logic to clarify metaphysical problems.“Since everyone must have conceptions of things in general, it is most important that they should be carefully constructed. I shall enter into no criticism of the different methods of metaphysical research, but shall merely say that in the opinions of several great thinkers, the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our logic as our metaphysics”. (W1: 490, 1866)2
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 113 (1997), S. 265-284 
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    Notes: Abstract Certain anti-realisms about mathematics are distinguished by their taking proof rather than truth as the central concept in the account of the meaning of mathematical statements. This notion of proof which is meaning determining or canonical must be distinguished from a notion of demonstration as more generally conceived. This paper raises a set of objections to Dummett's characterisation of the notion via the notion of a normalised natural deduction proof. The main complaint is that Dummett's use of normalised natural deduction proofs relies on formalisation playing a role for which it is unfit. Instead I offer an alternative account which does not rely on formalisation and go on to examine the relation of proof to canonical proof, arguing that rather than requiring an explicit characterisation of canonical proofs we need to be more aware of the complexities of that relation.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 113 (1997), S. 445-445 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 114 (1998), S. 49-98 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 114 (1998), S. 99-160 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 114 (1998), S. 169-202 
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    Notes: Abstract A conceptual theory of the referential and predicable concepts used in basic speech and mental acts is described in which singular and general, complex and simple, and pronominal and nonpronominal, referential concepts are given a uniform account. The theory includes an intensional realism in which the intensional contents of predicable and referential concepts are represented through nominalized forms of the predicate and quantifier phrases that stand for those concepts. A central part of the theory distinguishes between active and deactivated referential concepts, where the latter are represented by nominalized quantifier phrases that occur as parts of complex predicates. Peter Geach's arguments against theories of general reference in Reference and Generality are used as a foil to test the adequacy of the theory. Geach's arguments are shown to either beg the question of general as opposed to singular reference or to be inapplicable because of the distinction between active and deactivated referential concepts.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 114 (1998), S. 463-495 
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    Notes: Abstract I sketch an explanatory framework that fits a variety of contemporary research programs in cognitive science. I then investigate the scope and the implications of this framework. The framework emphasizes (a) the explanatory role played by the semantic content of cognitive representations, and (b) the important “mechanistic”, non-intentional dimension of cognitive explanations. I show how both of these features are present simultaneously in certain varieties of cognitive explanation. I also consider the explanatory role played by grounded representational content, that is, content evaluated by appeal to its truth, falsity, accuracy, inaccuracy and other relational properties.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 115 (1998), S. 71-98 
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    Notes: Abstract Husserl claimed that all theoretical scientific concepts originate in and are valid in reference to 'life-world' experience and that scientific traditions preserve the sense and validity of such concepts through unitary and cumulative change. Each of these claims will, in turn, be sympathetically laid out and assessed in comparison with more standard characterizations of scientific method and conceptual change as well as the history of physics, concerning particularly the challenge they may pose for scientific realism. The Husserlian phenomenological framework is accepted here without defense, and hence the present project is limited to the task of asking what can and cannot be accommodated within that framework on its own terms.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 115 (1998), S. 171-198 
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    Notes: Abstract Natural properties are those that carve reality at the joints. The notion of carving reality at the joints, however, is somewhat obscure, and is often understood in terms of making for similarity, conferring causal powers, or figuring in the laws of nature. I develop and assess an account of the third sort according to which carving reality at the joints is understood as having the right level of determinacy relative to nomic roles. The account has the attraction of involving very weak metaphysical presuppositions, but fails to capture several features that natural properties are presumed to have.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 115 (1998), S. 229-258 
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    Notes: Abstract I re-examine Coherence Arguments (Dutch Book Arguments, No Arbitrage Arguments) for diachronic constraints on Bayesian reasoning. I suggest to replace the usual game–theoretic coherence condition with a new decision–theoretic condition ('Diachronic Sure Thing Principle'). The new condition meets a large part of the standard objections against the Coherence Argument and frees it, in particular, from a commitment to additive utilities. It also facilitates the proof of the Converse Dutch Book Theorem. I first apply the improved Coherence Argument to van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle. I then point out the failure of a Coherence Argument that is intended to support Conditionalization as a naive, universal, update rule. I also point out that Reflection is incompatible with the universal use of Conditionalization thus interpreted. The Coherence Argument therefore defeats the naive view on Bayesian learning that it was originally designed to justify.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 115 (1998), S. 355-373 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a diagnosis of where the backwards induction argument, which “proves” that no surprise exam is possible, is mistaken.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 115 (1998), S. 303-331 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper presents a new account of Hume’s “probability of causes”. There are two main results attained in this investigation. The first, and perhaps the most significant, is that Hume developed – albeit informally – an essentially sound system of probabilistic inductive logic that turns out to be a powerful forerunner of Carnap’s systems. The Humean set of principles include, along with rules that turn out to be new for us, well known Carnapian principles, such as the axioms of semiregularity, symmetry with respect to individuals (exchangeability), predictive irrelevance and positive instantial relevance. The second result is that Hume developed an original conception of probability, which is subjective in character, although it differs from contemporary personalistic views because it includes constraints that are additional to simple consistency and do not vary between different persons. The final section is a response to Gower’s thesis, by which Hume’s probability of causes is essentially non-Bayesian in character. It is argued that, on closer examination, Gower’s reading of the relevant passages is untenable and that, on the contrary, they are in accordance with the Bayesian reconstruction presented in this paper.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 1-1 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 21-47 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 3-20 
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    Notes: Abstract This paper examines Descartes's third primary notion and the distinction between different kinds of knowledge based on different and mutually irreducible primary notions. It discusses the application of the notions of clearness and distinctness to the domain of knowledge based on that of mind-body union. It argues that the consequences of the distinctions Descartes is making with regard to our knowledge of the human mind and nature are rather different from those that have been attributed to Descartes due to the influential Rylean picture of Cartesian mind-body dualism.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 117 (1998), S. 355-374 
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    Notes: Abstract First, language and axioms of Church's paper 'Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski' are slightly modified and a version of the Liar paradox tentatively reconstructed. An obvious natural solution of the paradox leads to a hierarchy of truth predicates which is of a different kind from the one defined by Church: it depends on the enlargement of the semantical vocabulary and its levels do not differ in the ramified-type-theoretical sense. Second, two attempts are made in order to justify the Russellian, and perhaps Churchian, idea that language should not be fragmented beyond what is required by type distinctions. After all, because of reducibility, which seems to allow a semantics without propositions, this comes out to be possible only at the cost of resorting to two disputable theses.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 67-101 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 113-138 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 103-112 
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    Notes: Abstract The modal primitivist who takes a sentential possibility operator ‘◊’ as her only modal resource can provide adequate representations of the familiar concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience. The primitivist representations of these concepts can be applied to provide adequate interpretations of speciflc supervenience theses which will be considered. Moreover the modal primitivist is no better and no worse placed than the genuine modal realist to present supervenience as a simple and unifled notion. Therefore, Lewis is unjustified in claiming that a genuine modal realist approach to the analysis of the concept of supervenience is superior to a modal primitivist approach.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 139-166 
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    Notes: Abstract Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of ‘verification-transcendent’ truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called “realist semantics”, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to a certain conception of linguistic knowledge. This paper examines closely the appeal to speakers' knowledge of linguistic meaning, its force and limitations.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 167-203 
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    Notes: Abstract A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere. I argue that there is simply no fact of the matter as to which of these remaining options is correct. I blame this indeterminacy on the fact that color vision exhibits several of the hallmarks of a modular input system, as described by Jerry Fodor in The Modularity of Mind. Finally, I speculate that the range of live options falling within the scope of the indeterminacy may be even broader than initially indicated.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 205-226 
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    Notes: Abstract In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 227-240 
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    Notes: Abstract In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 241-251 
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    Notes: Abstract David Albert and Barry Loewer have proposed a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which they call the Many Minds interpretation, according to which there are infinitely many minds associated with a given (physical) state of a brain. This interpretation is related to the family of many worlds interpretations insofar as it assumes strictly unitary (Schrödinger) time-evolution of quantum-mechanical systems (no “reduction of the wave-packet”). The Many Minds interpretation itself is principally motivated by an argument which purports to show that the assumption of unitary evolution, along with some common sense assumptions about mental states (specifically, beliefs) leads to a certain nonphysicalism, in which there is a many-to-one correspondence between minds and brains. In this paper, I critically examine this motivating argument, and show that it depends on a mistaken assumption regarding the correspondence between projection operators and “yes/no” questions.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 299-299 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 253-297 
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    Notes: Abstract Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience is a relation between different discourses which has all the advantages of reduction, but without its disadvantages. I apply the more abstract considerations to two concrete cases: schizophrenia and colour. Usually an interlevel or interdiscourse relation is seen as asymmetrical: the overlaying discourse depends on the underlying discourse (and not vice versa), where the out- or un-spoken assumption is that the ultimate underlying discourse is physical. Instead I argue that scientific categories referred to in interdiscourse relations are, ultimately, dependent on common sense categories and common sense normative criteria. It is the manifest categories and common sense ideas about what is reasonable and what is right that determine the relevant categorisations at the deeper, underlying levels. I suggest that the implications of this are not merely methodological or epistemological.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 301-322 
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    Notes: Abstract Charles S. Peirce, polymath, philosopher, logician, lived a life of often wild extremes and, when he died in 1914, had earned a vile reputation as a debauched genius. Yet he created a unified, profound and brilliant work, both published and unpublished, a fact difficult to explain. In my 1993 biography, I proposed three hypotheses to account for his “Jekyll-Hyde” character: his obsession with the puzzle of meaning, two neurological pathologies, trigeminal neuralgia and left-handedness, and the powerful influence of his father. After publication, further research has led me to propose two additional hypotheses to explain his extraordinary life: manic-depressive illness and mystical experience, the last greatly influencing the development of his doctrine of semeiotic, of which his logic of science is a part.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 106 (1996), S. 323-372 
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    Notes: Abstract In this paper I synthesize a unified system out of Peirce's life work, and name it “Peirce's Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism”. Peirce developed this philosophy in four stages: (I) His 1868–69 theory that cognition is a continuous and infinite social semiotic process, in which Man is a sign. (II) His Popular Science Monthly pragmatism and frequency theory of probabilistic induction. (III) His 1891–93 cosmic evolutionism of Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism. (IV) Pragmaticism: The doctrine of real potentialities (“would-be's”), and Peirce's pragmatic program for developing concrete reasonableness. Peirce's evolutionary conception of the cosmos is pantheistic, and he constructed it to reconcile religion with Darwinian evolution.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 119 (1999), S. 203-232 
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    Notes: Abstract Boltzmann’s lectures on natural philosophy point out how the principles of mathematics are both an improvement on traditional philosophy and also serve as a necessary foundation of physics or what the English call “Natura Philosophy”, a title which he will retain for his own lectures. We start with lecture #3 and the mathematical contents of his lectures plus a few philosophical comments. Because of the length of the lectures as a whole we can only give the main points of each but organized into a coherent study. Behind his mathematics stands his support of Darwinian evolution interpreted in a partly Lamarckian way. He also supported non-Euclidean geometry. Much of Boltzmann’s analysis of mathematics is an attempt to refute Kant’s static a priori categories and his identification of space with “non-sensuous intuition”. Boltzmann’s strong attention toward discreteness in mathematics can be seen throughout the lectures. Part II of this paper will touch on the historical background of atomism and focus on the discrete way of thinking with which Boltzmann approaches problems in mathematics and beyond. Part III briefly points out how Boltzmann related mathematics and discreteness to music.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 119 (1999), S. 287-298 
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    Notes: Abstract A definition is proposed to give precise meaning to the counterfactual statements that often appear in discussions of the implications of quantum mechanics. Of particular interest are counterfactual statements which involve events occurring at space-like separated points, which do not have an absolute time ordering. Some consequences of this definition are discussed.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 151-191 
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    Notes: Abstract There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins, and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ordinary language’ view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a major motivation for the development of his own theory. In this paper I shall review Chomsky’s long-standing criticisms. I shall show that (1)Chomsky’s argument does not constitute a dismissal of the ‘ordinarylanguage’ view of language, (2) Chomsky’s conclusions about language do not follow from his argument, and (3) the ‘ordinary language’ view actually points to a promising way for us to understand the true nature of language and mind.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 137-149 
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    Notes: Abstract Scientific explanations arc subject to the occurrence of inconsistencies. To rule them out in many cases demands the construction of new theories. As the examples of complementary explanations show, that may take a while. Furthermore, even if possible in principle, it is not always reasonable to eliminate inconsistencies immediately, e.g., by bringing in a more sophisticated formal language. After all, under some circumstances a provisional, not fully coherent explanation may be better than none. In any case, we need a logically controlled approach to such inconsistencies. Modern logic provides the tools which are necessary to solve this task. We will mention two alternative approaches.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 229-263 
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    Notes: Abstract Those inclined to believe in the existence of propositions as traditionally conceived might seek to reduce them to some other type of entity. However, parsimonious propositionalists of this type are confronted with a choice of competing candidates – for example, sets of possible worlds, and various neo-Russellian and neo-Fregean constructions. It is argued that this choice is an arbitrary one, and that it closely resembles the type of problematic choice that, as Benacerraf pointed out, bedevils the attempt to reduce numbers to sets – should the number 2 be identified with the set Ø or with the set Ø, Ø? An “argument from arbitrary identification” is formulated with the conclusion that propositions (and perhaps numbers) cannot be reduced away. Various responses to this argument are considered, but ultimately rejected. The paper concludes that the argument is sound: propositions, at least, are sui generis entities.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 120 (1999), S. 375-394 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 121 (1999), S. 3-27 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 121 (1999), S. 55-78 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 121 (1999), S. 93-149 
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    Notes: Abstract According to common judicial standard, judgment in favor ofplaintiff should be made if and only if it is “more probable than not” thatthe defendant's action was the cause for the plaintiff's damage (or death). This paper provides formal semantics, based on structural models ofcounterfactuals, for the probability that event x was a necessary orsufficient cause (or both) of another event y. The paper then explicates conditions under which the probability of necessary (or sufficient)causation can be learned from statistical data, and shows how data fromboth experimental and nonexperimental studies can be combined to yieldinformation that neither study alone can provide. Finally, we show thatnecessity and sufficiency are two independent aspects of causation, andthat both should be invoked in the construction of causal explanations for specific scenarios.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 121 (1999), S. 249-289 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 121 (1999), S. 329-356 
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    Notes: Abstract In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to (among others) Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitiveword-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the context-sensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. On my view, by contrast, Frege stuck by the view which he held in his unpublished 1897 ‘Logic’, namely that the senses expressed by the combination of context-sensitive word-meaning and context could just as well be expressed by means of non-context-sensitive expressions: being first person, present tense and so on are properties, in Frege's view, only of language, not of thought. Given the irreducibility of indexicals – a phenomenon noticed by Castañeda, Perry and others – Frege's treatment of indexicals thus turns out to be inconsistent with the Intuitive Criterion. I argue that Frege was not aware of the inconsistency because he was not aware of the irreducibility of indexicals. This oversight was possible because the source of Frege's interest in indexicals, as inother context-sensitive expressions, differed from that of contemporary theorists. Whereas contemporary theorists are most often interested in indexicals (and in Frege's treatment of them) because they are interested in the indexical versions of Frege's Puzzle and their relation to psychological explanation, Frege himself was interested in them because they pose a prima facie threat to his general conception of thoughts. The only indexical expression Frege's view of which the above account does not cover is ‘I’ insofar as it is associated with ‘special and primitive’ senses, but Frege did not introduce such senses with a view to explaining theirreducibility of ‘I’ his real reason for introducing them remains obscure.
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 35 (1997), S. 3-40 
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    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 35 (1997), S. 41-78 
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