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  • Articles  (7)
  • cooperation  (7)
  • Springer  (7)
  • American Geophysical Union (AGU)
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  • Oxford University Press
  • 2000-2004  (7)
  • 1980-1984
  • 1935-1939
  • Economics  (7)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Annals of operations research 97 (2000), S. 203-212 
    ISSN: 1572-9338
    Keywords: conflict ; cooperation ; energy economics ; environmental control ; game theory ; resource allocation ; system dynamics ; 90-99 ; 90A16 ; 90A30 ; 90D50 ; 93C55 ; 93C95
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) demands reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by the industrialized countries, while developing countries are still permitted to expand their energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. To identify, assess and compare options for avoiding and minimizing anthropogenic climate change, the framework of dynamic-game models (the SCX conflict model and the problem-specific TEM model) is applied to analyze the interaction between energy technologies, emission reductions and economic output with regard to energy use and the relationship between conflict and cooperation in climate policy. Basic variables are energy production, emissions into the enviroment, the energy price and the economic output. Major control parameters are the allocation of funding with regard to various energy options and the degree of international cooperation through technology transfer and capital flow. In particular, the impact of cooperation between industrialized and developing countries is evaluated to understand the role of governments in the transition to sustainable market economies. Simulations and numerical results are presented which can be used in a constructive way to implement a Joint-Implementation Program as an advanced market institution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Marketing letters 11 (2000), S. 81-95 
    ISSN: 1573-059X
    Keywords: interorganizational relationships ; trust ; cooperation ; alliances
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Over the past decade, trust has emerged as the central means of achieving cooperation in interorganizational relationships. Past empirical inquiries have largely focused on the role of trust within the context of vertical relations between channel members or service providers and their clients. Thus, little is known about the nature or the role of trust in horizontal relations. A number of interorganizational scholars suggest that the nature and the effect of behavioral norms such as trust may be widely different in horizontal versus vertical relationships. This study examines the effect of relationship form on organizational trust using data from a survey of 106 U.S. firms who have recently participated in either horizontal or vertical R&D alliances. The results of this survey indicate that participants in vertical alliances display higher levels of organizational trust than participants in horizontal alliances. In addition, while organizational trust enhances cooperation in vertical alliances, trust is unrelated to cooperation in horizontal alliances.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 71 (2000), S. 1-30 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: evolution ; local interaction ; cooperation ; prisoner's dilemma ; Markov processes ; C78
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We study local interaction within a population located on a connected graph. Subjects engage in several bilateral interactions during each round in a generalized Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). In each round of play one randomly selected player gets the possibility to update the action he plays in this PD. All individuals use the update rule “Win Cooperate, Lose Defect,” a multi-player variant of Tit-for-Tat. Theoretical results on the set of stable states of the associated dynamics are provided for the cases with and without rare mutations. Simulations provide insight into the probability distribution over these stable states. In both cases a rather high probability is assigned to stable states with a moderate level of cooperation implying that dominated strategies are used. Furthermore, the probability of reaching the stable state with Nash equilibrium play is small.
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 72 (2000), S. 295-308 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: R&D ; subsidies ; cooperation ; technological spillovers ; L43 ; O32
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In an earlier article in this journal I compared two R&D-stimulating policies: allowing for R&D cooperatives and providing direct R&D subsidies (see Hinloopen, 1997:Journal of Economics 66: 151–175). I also considered the implementation of both policies simultaneously. Since then Amir (1998: Discussion Paper 1/1998, Odense University) has shown that the model I used as a starting point (i.e., that of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988:American Economic Review 78: 1133–1137) is not well-defined with respect to a crucial parameter (the technological spillover) and subsequently proposes an augmentation of the model. Replicating then my original analysis with this augmented model reveals that all results stated before remain valid. In addition I correct a minor error in Hinloopen (1997) related to the comparison of optimal R&D subsidies.
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 227-238 
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: experiments ; cooperation ; strategy method ; C92
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 227-238 
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: experiments ; cooperation ; strategy method
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of bioeconomics 2 (2000), S. 25-39 
    ISSN: 1573-6989
    Keywords: cooperation ; maximization ; firm governance ; incentive alignment ; firm objectives ; property rights ; residual claimancy ; residual control ; theory of the firm
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.
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