Abstract
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) demands reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by the industrialized countries, while developing countries are still permitted to expand their energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. To identify, assess and compare options for avoiding and minimizing anthropogenic climate change, the framework of dynamic-game models (the SCX conflict model and the problem-specific TEM model) is applied to analyze the interaction between energy technologies, emission reductions and economic output with regard to energy use and the relationship between conflict and cooperation in climate policy.
Basic variables are energy production, emissions into the enviroment, the energy price and the economic output. Major control parameters are the allocation of funding with regard to various energy options and the degree of international cooperation through technology transfer and capital flow. In particular, the impact of cooperation between industrialized and developing countries is evaluated to understand the role of governments in the transition to sustainable market economies.
Simulations and numerical results are presented which can be used in a constructive way to implement a Joint-Implementation Program as an advanced market institution.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
J. Scheffran, Modelling environmental conflicts and international stability, in: Models for Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, eds. R.K. Huber and R. Avenhaus (Nomos, Baden-Baden) pp. 201–220.
J. Scheffran and M. Jathe, Modelling the impact of the greenhouse effect on international stability, in: Supplemental Ways for Improving International Stability, ed. P. Kopacek (Pergamon, Amsterdam, 1996).
T. Jones, Operational criteria for joint implementation, in: The Economics of Climate Change, Proceedings of an OECD/IEA Conference, Paris (1994) pp. 109–125.
A. Michaelowa, Internationale Kompensationsm¨oglichkeiten zur CO2-Reduktion unter Ber¨ucksichtigung steuerlicher Anreize und ordnungsrechtlicher Massnahmen, HWWA-Institut f¨ur Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg, Report No. 152 (1995).
R. R¨osch and W. Br¨auer, M¨oglichkeiten und Grenzen von Joint Implementation im Bereich fossiler Kraftwerke am Beispiel der VR China, Zentrum f¨ur Europ¨aische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim, Dok. No. 97–03 (1997).
M. Jathe, W. Krabs and J. Scheffran, Control and Game-Theoretical Treatment of a Cost-Security Model for Disarmament, Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences, Vol. 20 (1997) pp. 653–666.
W. Krabs and S. Pickl, Time-discrete dynamical games, Working Paper of the Interdisciplinary Research Group Science, Technology and Security, No. 1 (1997).
S.H. Tijs, Bounds for the core and the _-value, in: Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, eds. O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke (North-Holland, 1981).
S. Pickl, The _-value as a control parameter in a joint-implementation-model, Internationales Kolloquium ¨uber Anwendung der Mathematik zum Ged¨achtnis an Lothar Collatz, Hamburg (1997).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Scheffran, J., Pickl, S. Control and game-theoretic assessment of climate change: Options for Joint Implementation. Annals of Operations Research 97, 203–212 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018940627463
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018940627463