ALBERT

Notes: The paper defines entrepreneurship as about ‘self-competition’, the quest to test self-ability: Can a future self achieve greater goals than what has been so far achieved? Self-competition involves the development of ability and, hence, ex post assessment of ability is uncertain. Such uncertainty occasions either immobilizing anxiety (Buridan's ass) or entrepreneurial action. No such uncertainty surrounds the assessment of risk probability characterizing events such as floods and stock market crashes. An observable prediction of the proposed uncertainty/risk dichotomy is that insurance, which concerns risk, cannot crowd out religion and other belief systems which appeal to uncertainty.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn diesem Papier wird Unternehmertum im Sinne von ‘Selbst-Konkurrenz’ deftniert, als Streben, die eigenen Fähigkeiten unter Beweis zu stellen: Kann das zukünftige Ich höhere Ziele als bisher erreichen?Selbst-Konkurrenz beinhaltet die Entwicklung von Fähigkeiten, und daher ist deren ex post Einschätzung unsicher. Diese Unsicherheit führt entweder zu einer lähmenden Angst (Burdians Esel) oder zu unternehmerischer Aktivität. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die Einschätzung der Risikowahrscheinlichkeit von Überschwemmungen oder Kursschwankungen an der Börse nicht von einer solchen Unsicherheit geprägt. Als beobachtbare Voraussage aus der vorgeschlagenen Unsicher-heit/Risiko-Dichotomie heraus ergibt sich, dass eine dieses Risiko betreffende Versicherung nicht in der Lage ist, Religion und andere Glaubenssysteme, die sich auf Unsicherheit bezichen, zu verdrängen.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉCe papier définit ľesprit entrepreneur comrne ‘une concurrence de soi’, la quete d'éprouver la capacityé de soi: Est-ce possible qu'un futur-soi puisse achever de plus grands buts qu'il a déjà accomplis? Une concurrence de soi consiste du développcinent de sa capacityé, done, ľévaluation ex past de cette capacityé n'est pas certaine.Une telle incertitude mène à une anxiété paralysante (ľǎne de Buridan) ou àľ action entreprenante. Une incertitude de la sorte n'entoure pas ľévaluation de la probabilityé de risque qui caractérisent les événements tels comme ľ inondation ou la chute de la Bourse. Une prédiction qu'on petit observer de la dichotomie proposée incertitude/risque, c'est que ľ assurance, qui concerne le risque, doit laisser de place aux réligions et aux autres systèmes de croyance qui invoquent ľ incertitude.

Notes: The paper results from interviews held among economists from Central and Eastern Europe. It tries to get an inside view on the profession under communist rule. As expected, the results depend upon period and country under analysis. Poland and Hungary did not lose contact with Western developments, while the Soviet Union and the GDR and also Czechoslovakia after 1968 isolated themselves completely. In Russia there was an own development in the sphere of optimal planning theory. In the GDR strict political control and adherence to dogmatism led to sterility. Reform thinking became stronger in the 1980s, with the exception of the GDR and Russia. The results are corroborated by the personal situation of the individual economist. Asked where they see the lasting contribution of economics under communism, most respondents are rather pessimistic: it is more the abortive practice of Soviet-type central planning which taught a lesson than the theoretical developments of the period.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDie Studie ist das Ergebnis von Interviews, die unter Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern aus Mittel- und Osteuropa gehalten wurden. Sie sucht einen Blick von innen auf die Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft unter kommunistischer Herrschaft zu gewinnen. Das Resultat hängt von der jeweiligen Periode und dem jeweiligen Land ab. Polen und Ungarn haben den Kontakt zum Westen nicht verloren. Russland und die DDR, ebenso die CSSR nach 1968, haben sich dagegen vollständig isoliert. Russland kannte eine eigene Entwicklung in der Planungstheorie. In der DDR führten dagegen politische Kontrolle und Dogmatismus zur Sterilität. Mit Ausnahme dieserbeiden Länder wuchs das Reformdenken in den 80er Jahren stetig an. Die Ergebnisse spiegeln sich auch in der persönlichen Situation der einzelnen Wissenschaftler wider. Nach dem bleibenden Beitrag der Ökonomie unter dem Kommunismus befragt, zeigen sich die Antworten eher pessimistisch: nicht die theoretischen Errungenschaften der Periode sind lehrreich, vielmehr aber das abschreckende Beispiel des sowjetischen Zentralplansystems.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉL' article rend compte des résultats d'interviews réalisés auprès d'économistes des pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale. II présente une vision de l'intérieur sur le développement de la science économique sous le régime communiste. Les résultats dépendent de la période et du pays analyses. La Pologne et la Hongrie n'ont jamais perdu le contact avec la science économique occidentale, tandis que la Russie, l'Allemagne de l'Est et, après 1968, la Tchécoslovaquie s'en sont isolés complètement. Avec la théorie de la planification optimale, la Russie a connu son propre développement. En RDA, le contrǒle politique et le dogmatisme ont abouti à une stérilité théorique. À l'éxception de ces deux derniers pays, la pensée réformiste s'est renforcée continument au cours des années 80. Ces résultats se reflètent aussi dans la situation personnelle faite aux économistes. Quant a la contribution durable de la science économique sous le communisme, les réponses sont peu optimistes: ce ne sont pas tellement les développements théoriques qui survivront à la periode soviétique, mais plutöt (‘experience avortée de la planification centrale de type soviétique.

Notes: This paper presents the results of an overlapping-generations experiment on the individual choice between intergenerational transfers and savings. One dominant finding of our experiment is that if savings are possible individuals choose to (gradually) opt out of the intergenerational transfer system. In that case the average individual pay-offs are lower but their distribution among individuals is less volatile. This suggests that risk aversion is a driving force behind the decline of intergenerational transfers. The willingness to give to previous generations does not disappear completely, however. Moreover, the degree of cohesion between successive generations, measured by (lie correlation between current and past transfers does not diminish significantly after the introduction of (he savings option.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMIENEASSUNGDicser Artikcl präsentierl die ErgebnisseeinesOvcrlapping-Generations-Experitnents, indent sich die Tcilnehmer zwisehen tnlergenerationalcn Transfers und Sparen entscheiden mussten. Eines der Hauptergcbnisse besteht darin, dass die Einführung der Mögliehkeit zur individuellen Zukunfts-vorsorge durch Sparen zu einer (allmählichen) Zurückdrängung von intergencrationalen Transfers führt. Im Fall des Sparens isl die durehschnittliche individuclle Auszahlung zwar geringer, dafür aber weniger unsieher. Die Zurückdrangung intergenerationaler Transfers lässt sich dahcr durch Risikoaversion erklären. Dennoch verschwindct die Bereitschaft, an die vorausgehende Generation abzugeben, nicht völlig. Ausserdein vennindert sich die Stärke des Zusatnnienhalts zwisehen aufcinanderlolgcnden Generalionen, getnessen durch die Korrelation zwisehen gegenwärtigen und früheren Transfers, nicht wesentlich durch die Einführung der Mögliehkeit des Sparens.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉLe papier présente des résultats expérimentaux sur les choix individuels entre transferts inter-génération et épargnc. Un des résultats principaux est que s'il est possible d'épargncr, alors (progressivement) les agents passent du système de transfer! inter-générationnelausystème d'épargne. Dans de cas le payoff moyen des agents est plus faible mais la distribution des payoffs est inoins volatile. Ceei suggère que l'aversion pour le risque est l'une des prineipales causes du déclin des transferts intergénération. Cependant, les transferts inter-génération ne disparaissent pas totalement. De plus, le degré de cohesion entre les génération successives, mesuré par la corrélation entre les transferts présents et passés, ne diminue pas significativemenl apres l'introduction de la possibilityé d'épargncr.

Notes: This paper investigates spatial disparities in unemployment in three Member States of the EU. It attempts to identify the factors responsible for the persistence of regional unemployment disparities in Germany, Italy and the UK during 1984-94. The empirical results indicate that a substantial proportion of the variation in unemployment rates between NUTS2 level regions can be explained by regional disparities in three key variables: unit labour costs, the industry mix and employment density. The findings are consistent with the view that regional unemployment disparities are explained primarily by regional disparities in economic competitiveness.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNODieser Artikel untersucht die räumlichen Unterschiede in der Höhe der Arbeitslosigkeit in drei Mitgliedsstaaten der EU. Er basiert auf dem Versuch, die Faktoren zu bestimmen, die im Zeitraum zwischen 1984 und 1994 für die Persistenz von regionalen Unterschieden der Höhe der Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland, Italien und Grossbritannien verantwortlich waren. Die empirischen Ergeb-nisse zeigen, dass ein wesentlicher Teil der Unterschiede in der Höhe der Arbeitslosigkeit zwischen NUTS2 Regionen durch eine regional unterschiedliche Ausprägung von drei wichtigen Variablen erklärt werden kann: Lohnstückkosten, Wirtschaftsstruktur und Zahl der Arbeitsplätze pro Quadratkilometer. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die Ansicht, dass die regional unterschiedlich hohe Arbeitslosigkeit hauptsächlich durch Unterschiede der regionalen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu cr-klüren ist.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉCe document examine les disparités géographiques du chǒmage dans trois États membres de l'Union Européenne. Nous essayerons d'identifier les facteurs responsables de la persistance des disparités en chǒmage régional en Ailemagne, en Italie el au Royaume-Uni pendant la période 1984-94. Les résultats empiriques indiquent qu'une proportion importante de la variation du taux de chǒmage entre les régions de la catégorie NUTS2 peut s'expliquer par des disparités régionales en trois variables prépondérantes: le coǔt unitaire d'emploi, la structure industrielle et la densité d'emploi. Les résultats coïncident avec l'avis que les disparités du chǒmage régional s'expliquent surtout par les disparités régionales en compétitivitééconomique.

Notes: Austrian business cycle policy was unconventional but rather successful in the last three decades and especially since the oil crisis. The unconventional conception was developed by trial and error, only ex post it got the name Austro-Keynesianism. Nevertheless it has a theoretical basis, a rather radical interpretation of KEYNES, which bases economic instability on a deep-rooted uncertainty of entrepreneurs. According to this interpretation economic policy tried to stabilize the data most important for entrepreneurial decisions, especially wage increase, exchange rates and investment promotion. This lightened the burden of the traditional instruments of stabilization policy. In addition these instruments were assigned differently: Exchange rate policy was primarily used to stabilize prices in the short run, incomes policy to equilibrate the current account in the medium and longer run, fiscal policy to stabilize employment. While the new assignation proved useful for stabilization policy, some structural problems remained unsolved.

Notes: In many settings, economic efficiency in law enforcement appears to require differential enforcement of the law. For example, as shown in the paper, crime prone populations warrant stronger sanctions than less crime prone populations if costly sanctions are to be meted out in an efficient manner. However, narrow economic analysis of efficient sanctions attributes an efficiency to modern democratic governments which can not be easily justified by analysis or experience. This paper demonstrates that constraining majority coalitions to write laws consistent with the principle of equal protection generally yields more desirable outcomes than obtained when majority coalitions are permitted to discriminate in an arbitrary manner. The efficiency case for equality before the law is based on political considerations rather than economic ones per se.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDas Kriterium der ökonomischen Effizienz bei der Durchsetzung von Recht scheint in vielen Situationen eine differenzierende Durchsetzung des Rechts zu erfordern. Wie in diesem Artikel ge-zeigt werden kann, können beispielsweise für mehr zu Verbrechen neigende Bevölkerungsteile härtere Strafen gerechtfertigt sein, als für weniger zu Verbrechen neigende Bevölkerungsteile, wenn die mit hohen Kosten verbundene Bestrafung von Verbrechen effizient eingesetzt werden soil. Allerdings schreibt die ökonomische Analyse von effzienten Strafen modernen demokratischen Regierungen eine Effizienz zu, die durch Analyse oder Erfahrung nur schwer zu bestätigen ist. Dieses Papier zeigt nämlich, dass wünschenswertere Ergebnisse zu erzielen sind, wenn man Mehrheitskoalitionen dazu zwingt, Gesetze zu schreiben, die mit dem Prinzip der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz übereinstimmen, als wenn man Mehrheitskoalitionen erlaubt, auf willkürliche Weise zu diskriminieren. Im Ergebnis lasst sich daher feststellen, dass die Effizienzargumente im Hinblick auf die Gleichheit bzw. Ungleicheit vor dem Gesetz lediglich auf politischen Überlegungen beruhen, aber nicht auf ökonomischen.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉDans beaucoup de situations, l'éfficience économique de l'application de la loi semble exiger une application différenciée. Par exemple, comme il est expliqué dans l'article, des lois plus restrictives peuvent ětre appliqués pour une partie de la population étant plus incliné a la criminalité que pour des parties moins inclinées, si les coǔts élevés de l'application de la loi doivent ětre utilisés avec éfficience. Pourtant, l'analyse économique sur la punition éfficiente attribue aux gouvernements démocratiques modernes une éfficience qui ne peut pas ětre justifyé aisément par l'analyse et l'expérience. Cet article montre que des résultats meilleures peuvent ětre atteints si des coalitions majoritaires peuvent ětre contraintes à concevoir des lois qui sont consistents avec le principe de la protection égale devant la loi, que si une coalition majoritaire permet de discriminer une partie de la population de manière arbitraire. L'éfficience du principe de l'égalité devant la loi est basé sur des considérations politiques, et non sur des considérations économiques.

Notes: Argy, Victor and Leslie Stein (1997). The Japanese Economy. Basingsto-ke/London: Macmillan. 379 pp. £47.50. ISBN 0-333-6756-5. £17.50. ISBN 0-333-67566-5.Balasubramanyam, V. N. and D. Greenaway (eds.) (1996). Trade and Development. Essays in Honour of Jagdish Bhagwati. Basingstoke/London: Macmillan. 217 pp. £45.00. ISBN 0-333-65616-4.Blejer, Mario I. and Teresa Ter-Minassian (eds.) (1997). Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance. Essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi. London/New York: Routledge. 506 pp. £65.00. ISBN 0-415-14111-7.Blejer, Mario I. and Teresa Ter-Minassian (eds.) (1997). Fiscal Policy and Economic Reform. Essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi. London/New York: Rout-ledge. 305 pp. £60.00. ISBN 0-415-13739-X.Brömmelhörster, Jörn and John Frankenstein (eds.) (1997). Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes. Defense Conversion in China. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 275 pp. $ 55.00. ISBN 1-555-87710-9.Constanza, Robert, Charles Perrings and Cutler J. Cleveland (eds.) (1997). The Development of Ecological Economics. Cheltenham, UK/Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar. 777 pp. £160.00. ISBN 1-85898-386-X.Craig, Lee A. and Douglas Fisher (1997). The Integration of the European Economy, 1850-1913. Basingstoke/London: MacMillan Press. 327 pp. ISBN 0-333-58036-2.Davies, Stephen and Bruce Lyons (1996). Industrial Organization in the European Union. Structure, Strategy and the Competitive Mechanism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 287 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0-19-828973-1.Fratianni, Michele and Franco Spinelli (1997). A Monetary History of Italy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 305 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0-521 -44315-6.Gandolfo, Giancarlo (1996). Economic Dynamics, 3rd ed. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York/London: Springer. 610 pp. DM 178.-. ISBN 3-540-60988-1.Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Stergios Skaperdas (eds.) (1996). The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation. Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 182 pp. $ 49.95. ISBN 0-521-56063-2.Kemp, René (1997). Environmental Policy and Technical Change. A Comparison of the Technological Impact of Policy Instruments. Cheltenham, UK/Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar. 360 pp. £55.00. ISBN 1-85898-506-4.Klamer, Arjo (ed.) (1996). The Value of Culture. On the Relationship between Economics and Arts. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 243 pp. £21.95. ISBN 90-5356-218-4.Llau, Pierre (1996). Economie financeère publique. Paris: Presses Universitai-res de France. 546 pp. 168 FF. ISBN 2-13-047774-7.Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.) (1997). Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 672 pp. $79.95. ISBN 0-521-55377-6 (he.). $ 29.95. ISBN 0-521-55654-6 (pbk.).Pritzl, Rupert F.J. (1997). Korruption und Rent-Seeking in Lateinamerika. Zur Politischen Ökonomie autoritärer politischer Systeme. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 318 S. ISBN 3-7890-4692-2.Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg (1996). Die Logikkollektiven Handelns bei Delegation. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 293 S. ISBN 3-16-146607-1.Xepapadeas, Anastasios (ed.) (1996). Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources. Techniques for the management and Control of Pollution. Cheltenham, UK/Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar. 245 pp. £59.95. ISBN 1-85898-413-0.

Notes: After overall entry deregulation, regulation of market power can only be justified in local telecommunication networks as long as they constitute monopolistic bottlenecks. Technical progress leads to a gradual disappearance of monopolistic bottlenecks, pointing out the large potential for economically efficient phasing out of sector-specific regulation. In contrast, all forms of asymmetric regulation containing an intrinsic bias towards some firms or technologies have a strong tendency towards overregulation. The new telecommunications laws in Germany and Switzerland are shown to be prominent examples of asymmetric regulatory frameworks. Since the new telecommunications law in Switzerland is less restrictive and more transparant than its German counterpart, it seems to be more suitable to tackle the potential for phasing out sector specific regulation in telecommunications.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGNach einer umfassenden Marktoffnung ist eine Marktmachtregulierung in der Zukunft lediglich noch in Ortsnetzen gerechtfertigt, solange diese monopolistische Engpassbereiche darstellen. Der technische Fortschritt in Ortsnetzen führt allerdings allmahlich zu einer Auflösung dieser Engpassbereiche und schafft dadurch ein zunehmendes Potential für die Abschaffung sektorspezifischer Regulierungseingriffe. Demgegenüber beinhalten alle Formen asymmetrischer Regulierung eine immanente Verzerrung zugunsten spezieller Firmen oder Technologien und damit einhergehend eine starke Tendenz zur Uberregulierung. Die neuen Telekommunikationsgesetze in Deutschland und in der Schweiz stellen bedeutende Beispiele für asymmetrische Regulierungsrahmen dar. Allerdings erweist sich das neue schweizerische Telekommunikationsgesetz als weniger restriktiv und transparenter als sein deutsches Gegenstück. Es ist daher zu erwarten, daß das zunehmende Potential für ein ‘phasing out' sektorspezifischer Regulierungseingriffe in der Schweiz rascher ausgeschöpft wird als in Deutschland.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉA près une ouverture entière du marché de télécommunication une régularisation de la domination du marché ne sera justifiée à l'avenir que dans les réseaux locaux aussi longtemps qu'ils constituent des goulots d'étranglement monopolistiques. Le progrès technique dans les réseaux locaux mène peu à peu à la disparition des ces goulots détranglement en créant ainsi un potentiel croissant de suppression de la régularisation sécteur-spécifique. Par contre, toutes les formes de régularisation asymétrique contenant une distorsion immanente au profit de certaines firmes ou de certaines technologies ont une forte tendance à la sur-régularisation. Les nouvelles lois de télécommunication en Allemagne et en Suisse sont des exemples importants d'encadrements asymétriques de régularisation. Cependant, la nouvelle lot de télécommunication suisse se montre moins restrictive et plus transparente que la loi respective en Allemagne. Par conséquent, l'on peut s'attendre à ce que le potentiel croissant de suppression de régularisations sécteur-spécifiques sera épuisé plus vite en Suisse qu'en Allemagne.

Notes: Tax evasion has been mainly studied as a problem of choice under uncertainty; like any portfolio manager, the taxpayer has to allocate her/his fixed gross income between two assets a risky asset, tax evasion, and a safe asset (with a zero return), tax payment. As suggested by the portfolio theory, the taxpayer's choice will be affected by her/his preferences — mainly by her/his attitude towards risk-taking — and by the return on the risky asset determined by the tax structure, which includes both the tax rate and the penalties in the case of evasion However, the pure gamble model appears unsatisfactory on various grounds. Among these and most importantly for our purpose, it neglects the psychological aspects of the decision to evade tax because it rules out any feeling of shame about evading or being detected and punished, and it ignores any intrinsic pleasure from successful evasion In other words, the pure gamble model does not take full account of the moral constraints involved in the tax evasion decision. The main objective of the experiment presented here was therefore to investigate the role played by moral constraints in determining the decision to evade taxes. The experimental evidence supports the thesis that the taxpayer's decisional process involves not only monetary elements but also psychological and moral factors.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDie Steuerhinterziehung wurde bisher überwiegend als Problem von Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit untersucht Wie jeder Portfoliomanager muss auch der Steuerzahler sein Bruttoeinkommen zwischen zwei Anlageformen verteilen eine risikoreiche Anlageform. Steuerhinterziehung, und eine sichere Anlageform (ohne Gewinn), Steuerzahlung. Nach der Portfoliotheorie wird die Entscheidung des Steuerzahlers von seinen Praferenzen beeinflusst — vor allem von seiner Risiko-bereitschaft — und von der Gewinnaussicht der risikoreichen Anlageform, die vom Steuersystem abhangt, d.h. vom Steuersatz und den Strafen bei Steuerhinterziehung. Dieses Lotteriemodell ist jedoch aus mehreren Grunden unbefriedigend: es vernachlässigt die psycholgischen Aspekte der Steuerhinterziehung, weil es jegliches Schamgefühl bei der Steuerhinterziehung bzw. der Entdeckung und Bestrafung ausschliesst und ein intrinsisches Vergnugen bei erfolgreicher Steuerhinterziehung ignoriert. Das Lotteriemodell zieht also nicht in Betracht, dass moralische Restriktionen die Entscheidung zur Steuerhinterziehung beeinflussen konnten Das hier vorgestellte Experiment wollte daher in erster Linie untersuchen, welche Rolle moralische Restriktionen bei der Entscheidung zur Steuerhinterziehung spielen. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments bestatigen die Hypothese, dass der Entscheidungsprozess des Steuerzahlers nicht nur durch monetare Elemente beeinflusst wird, sondern auch durch psychologische und moralische Faktoren.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉL'évasion fiscale a été principalement étudiée en tant qu'un problème de choix dans des conditions d'incertitude, comme n'importe quel gestionnaire de portfolio, le contribuable doit répartir son revenu brut fixe entre deux actifs un actif risqué, l'évasion fiscale, et un actif sǔr (avec un taux d'intérét zéro), le payement des taxes. Comme suggéré par la théorie du portfolio, le choix du contribuable sera affecté par ses préférences — principalement par son attitude vis-à-vis du risque — et par le bénéfice déterminé par la structure fiscale qui inclut à la fois le taux de taxation et les pénalités prévues en cas d'évasion Cependant, le modèle pur de jeu apparait insatisfaisant pour plusieurs rasisons Parmi celles-ci, le modèle néglige les aspects psychologiques de la décision, limitation spécialement importante pour notre objectif, puisqu'il écarte tout sentiment de honte associé à la découverte de l'évasion et à la punition ou encore il ignore le plaisir découlant d'une évasion fiscale réussie. En résumé, le modèle pur de jeu ne prend pas pleinement en compte les contraintes morales qui influencent la décision. L'objectif principal de l'expérimentation présentée ici était d'analyser le rǒle joué par les contraintes morales dans la prise de décision d'évasion fiscale. Les résultats confirment l'hypothèse que le processus décisionel du contribuable dépend non seulement des aspects financiers mais également des facteurs psychologiques et moraux.

Notes: This paper shows two points: (1) there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the real value of the agricultural minimum wage and the level of agricultural output in Morocco, for eight important crops; (ii) the latter may be explained using a theoretical model where the productivity of the laborers depends on their consumption level, and where wage incomes are shared among family members to fund consumption. The Nash equilibrium is then inefficient.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDieser Artikel zeigt zweierlei: a) Für acht Feldfnichte existiert eine statistisch sigrufikante Beziehung zwischen realem Mindestlohn und Produktionsniveau in der marokkanischen Landwirtschaft; b) Diese Beziehung lasst sich mit einem theoretischen Modell erklären. Darin hangt die Produktivitat der Arbeiter von ihrem Lebensstandard ab. Zur Konsumfinanzierung werden die Lohneinkunfte zwischen den Mitgliedern der Familie aufgeteilt. Das Nash-Gleichgeèicht ist somit ineffizient.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉCet article montre deux choses: (a) il y a une relation statistiquement significative entre la valeur réelle du salaire minimum agricole et le niveau de la production agricole au Maroc, pour huit cultures importantes; (b) celle-ci peut s'expliquer au moyen d'un modèle théorique où la productivité des travailleurs dépend de leur niveau de consommation, et où les revenus salariaux sont partagés entre les membres de la famille pour financer la consommation. L'équilibre de Nash est alors inefficient.

Notes: This paper reports the results of a comparison of employment adjustment in Japan, the United States and four major EC countries. Output and real wages are used in explaining the optimal employment level and change in employment. Short- and long run responses to alterations of the exogenous variables are estimated and compared. Surprisingly, Germany has a quite rapid adjustment of labor while France and Italy show a much slower adjustment pattern. Even in comparison with the United States. Great Britain demonstrates the fastest adjustment to changes in the economic environment. By far the slowest adjustment pattern is realized in Japan. Overall the difference between the US and Europe seems not to be too large and European labor markets are not as sclerotic as occasionally assumed.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASUNGDieser Artikel gibt die Ergebnisse eines Vergleichs der Beschäftigungsanpassung in Japan, den Vereinigten Staaten und den vier wichtigsten EU-Landern wieder. Das Produktionsniveau und der Reallohn sind die erklarenden Variablen für das optimale Beschaftigungsniveau wie auch Veranderungen der Beschäftigung. Es werden kurz- und langfnstige Beziehungen zwischen den exogenen und der endogenen Vanablen geschatzt und verglichen Uberraschenderweise hat Deutschland eine relativ rasche Beschaftigungsanpassung, während Frankreich und Italien eine viel langsamere Anpassung aufweisen. Großbntannien hat auch im Vergleich zu den USA die schnellste Reaktion auf Veränderungen der ökonomischen Umwelt. Das bei weitem inflexibelste Anpassungsverhalten wird für Japan registriert. Zusammenfassend scheinen die Unterschiede zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Europa nicht so groß und der europaische Arbeitsmarkt nicht so sklerotisch zu sein wie erwartet.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉCet article présente les résultats d'une comparaison de la vitesse d'adaptation de l'emploi au Japon, aux Etats-Unis et dans les quatre pays les plus importants de l'UE. Le niveau de l'emploi optimal ***ainsi que les variations de l'emploi sont expliquées par le niveau de production et les salaires réels. Les variations à court et long terme des changements des variables exogènes ont été estimés et comparés. Étonnamment, l'Allemagne a une vitesse d'adaptation de l'emploi relativement rapide par rapport à celles de la France et de l'Italie. L'Angleterre montre měme, en comparaison avec les Etats-Unis, une plus grande flexibilité envers les modifications de l'environnement économique. L'adaptation la plus lente est observée au Japon. Pour conclure les différences concernant la vitesse d'adaptation de l'emploi entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe ne semblent pas si grandes et les marchés de travail européens sont moins sclérosés que ce que l'on attendait.

Notes: Implications of inefficiency in theories of market failure reveal a flawed methodology. Behavior which is apparently inefficient is actually the symptom of an inappropriate analytical model. The standard examples of market failure, monopoly power and external effects, are forthcoming only from models which omit transactions costs as explanatory variables. The unfortunate consequence of this conclusion is that complete and appropriate economic models, which incorporate all relevant variables, will always certify any behavior as efficient. This poses the ‘Panglossian dilemma’, that whatever is, is optimal. This dilemma is resolved by an analytical approach which compares behavior under alternative economic institutions. This analysis depends on two propositions: that transactions costs are affected by alternative institutional environments; and that institutions are themselves responses to the existence of transactions costs. These propositions are used to predict behavior under alternative institutions, and to explain the long run evolution of the institutions.

Notes: Empirical evidence does not agree with the investment-model of the demand for education: out of pocket costs have another impact than earnings foregone. This difference can be explained by consumption motives. The demand for education is then greater, the full price of education exceeds discounted future incremental earnings, net discounted wealth is not maximum and the rate of return to marginal investments in education is smaller than the interest rate.

Notes: At the turn of this century WESLEY C. MITCHELL argued that the velocity of money could be influenced by a noneconomic variable that he called ‘confidence’; but the idea has received little attention since then. This study uses events in the long Vietnam war for statistically demonstrating the MITCHELL hypothesis. U. S. troop presence in South Vietnam boosted the peoples' confidence in their country's future thereby stabilizing the demand for fiat money and income velocity. Only two variables - the previous year's rate of inflation and U. S. troop strength, which serves as a proxy for battlefield victories - are needed to explain movements in velocity.

Notes: Ahmad Jaleel: Import Substitution, Trade and Development.Berendsen B. S. M.: Regional Models of Trade and Development.Binswanger Hans P., Ruttan Vernon W., and others: Induced Innovation.Arndt Helmut: Irrwege der Politischen Ökonomie.Barry Thomas and Deaton David: Labour Shortage and Economic Analysis.BÉziade Monique: La monnaie.Coulbois Paul: Finance Internationale.Deiss Joseph: Monnaie et Prix internationaux.Brooks John and Evans Robert W.: Macroeconomic Policy in Theory and Practice.Cook S. T. and Jackson P. M. (Eds.): Current Issues in Fiscal Policy.Eckstein Otto: The Great Recession.Fraenkel Gioachino: Elementi di teoria e di politica monetaria.Freeman A. Myrick, III: The Benefits of Environmental Improvement.Guindey Guillaume: Mythes et Réaltiés de la Crise Monétaire Internationale.Hazari Bharat R.: The Pure Theory of International Trade and Distortions.Hettlage Robert: Genossenschaftstheorie und Partizipationsdiskussion.Hicks John: Economic Perspectives.Johansen Leif: Lectures on Macroeconomic Planning.Major Robin (Ed.): Britain's Trade and Exchange-Rate Policy.Passet RenÉ: L'économique et le vivant.Roll Eric (Ed.): The Uses and Abuses of EconomicsRostow W. W.: Getting from Here to There.Teighmann Ulrich: Wirtschaftspolitik.Vane Howard R. and Thompson John L.: Monetarism.Williams Ph. L.: The Emergence of the Theory of the Firm.Woll Artur (Hrsg.): Inflation.

Notes: An otherwise conventional Keynesian macro model is modified to include inventories of final goods by (1) drawing a distinction between production and final sales, and (2) allowing for a negative effect of the level of inventories on production. Two models are presented: one in which the labor market clears and one in which it does not. Both models are stable only if the negative effect of inventories on production is ‘large enough’. Both models also imply that real wages move procyclically - in direct contrast to the usual implication of Keynesian models. Detailed analysis of the market-clearing model shows that there should be negative correlation between the levels of inventories and output, and between changes in inventories and changes in output, over the business cycle. However, inventory change should be positively correlated with the level of output.

Notes: This paper examines the effects of rising oil prices and dependence upon imported oil on inflation. For the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Australia, it is found that the price of imported oil is a significant cause of inflation. Dependence upon imported oil also is an important cause of inflation in Japan, the United States, and West Germany.

Notes: Für drei zentrale Ansätze der ökonomischen Theorie, den der walrasianischen Gleichgewichtstheorie, den der walrasianischen Unglcichgewichtstheorie und den der Neuen Mikroökonomie, werden die Komponenten der disziplinären Matrix, wie sie in dem von T. S. KUHN entwickelten wissenschaftstheoretischen Raster definiert sind, identifiziert. Ein exakter Vergleich dieser einzelnen Komponenten (das heisst der symbolischen Verallgemeinerungen, der metaphysischen Bestandteile, der Wertvorstellungen und der Beispiele) zeigt, dass sie sich so grundsatzlich unterscheiden, dass man von drei verschiedenen Paradigmata sprechen muss. In KuHNscher Terminologie zeichnen sich die Wirtschaftswissenschaften also (noch?) aus durch verschiedene Schulen, wie dies charakteristisch ist fur eine relativ friihe Phase der wissenschaftlichen Entwicklung.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉SUMMARYFor three central branches of economic theory, the walrasian equilibrium theory, the walrasian disequilibrium theory and the New Microeconomics, the components of the disciplinary matrix, as they have been defined by the epistemological screen developed hy T. S. KUHN, are identified. An exact comparison of these specific components (i.e. the symbolic generalizations, the metaphysicaI parts, the values and the exemplars) shows that they differ so fundamentally that we must speak of three different paradigms. In KuHNian terminology, economics (still?) is featured by distinct schools, as it is characteristic for a relatively early staze of scientific development.

Notes: Allen T. Harrell: New Methods in Social Science Research.Bawa Vijay S., Brown Stephen J., and Klein Roger W.: Estimation Risk and Optimal Portfolio Choice.Bigksler James L. (Ed.): Handbook of Financial Economics.BlÜmle Gerold: Wirtschaftskreislauf, Beschäftigung und Inflation.Buomberger Peter : Theorie und Strategic der Geldpolitik in einer kleinen offenen Volkswirtschaft.Cipolla C. M. und Borchardt K. (Hrsg.): Sechzehntes und Siebzehnles Jahrhundert.CsikÓs-Nagy B.: Towards a New Price Revolution.Fine Ben and Harris Laurence: Rereading Marx.Hey John D.: Uncertainty in Microeconomics.Hunt E. K.: History of Economic Thought: A Critical Perspective.Lavigne Marie: Les relations économiquesMÜller JÜrgen und Vogelsang Ingo: Staatliche Regulierung.Mulvey Charles : The Economic Analysis of Trade Unions.Negishi Takashi : Microeconornic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics.Paul Ellen Frankelm:Mo ral Revolution and Economic Science.Sargent Thomas J.: Macroeconomic Theory.SchÖnbÄck Wilfried : Subjektive Unsicherheit als Gegenstand staatlicher Intervention.Schrenk Martin, Ardalan Cyrus, and EL Tataway NawaL A.: Yugoslavia—Self-Management Socialism and the Challenge of Development.Siebert Horst: Ökonomische Theorie der Umwelt.Spatz Heinrich: Die Allgemeine Gleichgewichtstheorie.Whynes David K.: The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure.Wolfson Dirk J.: Public Finance and Development Strategy.

Notes: This paper is a survey of the most important contributions to the development of a theory of ‘long waves’ in capitalist development. From the early forerunners of the discussion, via Kondratieff and Schumpeter, to the economists of today, the debate on the long-wave phenomenon is being surveyed and assessed. The result is rather negative. No one has been able to empirically verify the existence of the long waves. Secular wave-like fluctuations in prices and certain related time series have been found - but these are quite compatible with explanations based exclusively on exogenous factors. In physical time series of production or other time series that are not directly correlated with prices, there has been no evidence of long waves. Nor has anyone been able to give a satisfying explanation of why the secular rate of growth or level of economic activity would fluctuate in a self-generating cyclical pattern. Therefore, we must draw the conclusion that those turning-points and successive trend periods which undeniably exist in the development of capitalism cannot be regarded as manifestations of some kind of long wave or cycle; instead, they are specific, historical occurrences, each one characterized by its own specific features. The task of the social scientist is, thus, to study the actual historical dynamics of the economic system - without trying to squeeze it into a general pattern of secular cyclical swings.

Notes: The starting point is the model of individual behaviour used by modern economic theory. The individualistically oriented branch of modern sociological theory is based on the same behavioural model, but stresses different aspects than economic theory does. While economic theory holds preferences constant and investigates how changes in the restrictions placed on individuals produce changes in their behaviour, sociological theory investigates how different social conditions give rise to different preferences (‘attitudes’) which then result in different ways of behaving. The theory of voting behaviour is given as an example to show how economic and sociological theory can gain from supplement each other. While sociological theory explains mainly long-term developments in voting behaviour as reactions to long-term changes in the society's basic social structure, economic theory mainly explains short-term variations in voting behaviour resulting from changes in economic and political factors. We conclude by discussing some misunderstandings held by sociologists concerning the economic approach. It is shown that once these misunderstandings are cleared up, economics not only can learn from sociology, but sociology can learn from economics as well.

Notes: This paper examines the Friedman-Phelps‘expectational (dis)equilibrium’ and the Clower-Leijonhufvud‘non-market-clearing’ paradigms as alternative disequilibrium theories, and draws their respective policy implications. Then, these paradigms are taken as complementary to each other, as containing necessary ingredients for a synthetic disequilibrium theory, whose policy implications can only tentatively be explored. A general disequilibrium theory is founded on the notion of ‘disequilibrium consciousness’ and on a detailed characterization of ‘conjectural’ price and/or quantity responses to non-market-clearing, whose quasi-equilibrium outcome is conditioned by both expectations and the intra-market spillover effect.

Notes: The paper identifies the disturbances in the balance of payments of the non-oil less developed countries responsible for the rapid growth in their external debt between 1972 and 1977. It also examines prospects for the future. It finds that the sharp growth in the current account deficits in the years 1974 and 1975 was due primarily to adverse movements in the terms of trade. But trade terms were reversed in 1976 and 1977 and the deficit was reduced. Still overall inflation, slow export growth, and large interest payments kept the deficit substantially above the 1972 and earlier levels. In part II the paper examines how the debt to GNP ratio of the LDC's could be affected by four factors: export growth, changes in real interest rates, terms of trade, and credit rationing. A model is developed which shows that certain combinations of the four factors could lead to rapid accumulation of debt relative to GNP.

Notes: Agénor, Pierre-Richard and Peter J. Montiel (1996). Development Macroeconomics.Baldwin, John R. (1995). The Dynamics of Industrial Competition.Barnet, William A., Hervé Moulin. Maurice Salles and Norman J. Schoficld (eds.) (1995). Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics.Benassi, Corrado, Alessandra Chirco, Caterina Colombo (1994). The New Keynesian Economics.Eatwell, John et al. (1995). Transformation and Integration.Führer, Karl Christian (1995). Mieter, Hausbesitzer, Staat und Wohnungs-markt.Haq. Mahbuh ul (1995). Reflections on Human Development.Hartwig, Karl-Hans und Ingo Pies (1995). Rationale Drogenpolitik in der Demokratie.Hausman, Daniel M. and Michael S. McPhcrson (1996). Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy.Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Carol Gabyzon (1996). Fundamental Tax Reform and Border Tax Adjustments.Judge, Paramjit S. (1994). A study of Formation of an Ethnic Community.Kleindorfer, Paul L., Howard C. Kunreuther and David S. Hong (eds.) (1996). Energy, Environment and the Economy.Lombardini, Siro (1996). Growth and Economic Development.Penz, Reinhard und Holger Wilkop (Hrsg.) (1996). Thorstein Veblens evoluto-rische Ökonomik.World Bank (1996). World Development Report 1996.

Notes: A discrete time, discounted utility model with a finite horizon is analyzed. Utility is separable and additive in the natural logarithms of the choice variables, consumption and leisure, and an exogenous ‘memory' series. Happiness is defined as the discounted value of the utility over the remaining lifespan. Simulations of the model show how happiness grows as the high consumption years get closer, peaks, then declines in later life as the remaining lifespan shortens, even though year by year utility may continue to rise. Simulations also show how the peak year for happiness depends on the subjective, personal discount rate, the rate of wage growth, the effect of a liquidity constraint, the effect of memories, and other parameters in the model. The model also illustrates those aspects of the life cycle characterized by the ‘slackers’, the ‘mid-life crisis’, and the ‘golden years’.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGEin diskretes, abdiskontiertes Nutzenmodell mit einem endlichen Zeithorizont wird analysiert. Nutzen wird als zerlegbar und additiv in den natürlichen Logarithmen der Wahlvanablen Konsum und Freizeit und in den exogenen Zeitreihen für ‘Erinnerungen’ angenommen. Gluck ist definiert als abdiskontierter Wert des Nutzens der verbleibenden Lebenszeit. Simulationen zeigen, wie das Glück bei der Annäherung an die Jahre erhöhten Konsums ansteigt, einen Hohepunkt erreicht, um dann in der verbleibenden Lebenszeit wieder abzunehmen, obwohl der Nutzen Jahr fur Jahr weiterhin zunehmen kann. Die Simulationen zeigen auch, wie der Höhepunkt des Glücks vom persönlichen Diskontsatz, der Zuwachsrate des Einkommens, Liquiditatsbeschrankungen, Erinnerungen und anderen Parametern abhangt. Das Modell veranschaulicht aber auch jene Aspekte der Lebenszeit, die üblicherweise als ‘Slackers’, ‘Mid-life Crisis' und ‘Goldene Jahre’ bezeichnet werden〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉAnalyse d'un modèle d'utilité d'escompte à temps discret et à horizon limité. L'utilité est séparable et additive dans les logarithmes naturels des variables de choix, la consomption et les loisirs, et une série exogène de ‘mémoire’. On définit le bonheur comme la valeur d'escompte de l'utilité pendant la durée de la vie qui reste. Des simulations du modèle montrent comment le bonheur s'augmente au fur et à mesure que les année de grande consomption s'approchent, atteint son comble, puis baisse dans la dernière partie de la vie pendant que la durée de la vie qui reste se réduit, quoique, année par année, l'utilité puisse continuer à s'augmenter. Les simulations montrent aussi comment l'année du point culminant de bonheur dépend du taux d'escompte subjectif et personnel, du taux d'augmentation de salaire, de l'effet d'une contrainte de liquidité, de l'effet des souvenirs, et d'autres paramètres du modèle. Le modèle illustre aussi les aspects du cycle de vie caractérisés par les fainéants, la crise de ‘mid-life’ et les années ‘dorées’.

Notes: The paper studies the impact on international capital movements of the accelerated tax depreciation scheme introduced in the U. S. A. under the REAGAN administration. It is argued on theoretical grounds that, contrary to most other potential tax reforms, this depreciation scheme calls for a substantial restructuring in the world-wide capital stock in favor of the U. S. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the scheme may induce severe sectoral changes within national economies. Countries that do not take countervailing actions against the U. S. policy are likely to experience a rise in their labour intensive industries at the expense of losing their capital intensive industries. A tentative estimate based on stylized economic facts indicates the necessity of a capital import into the U. S. of at least 7% of the OECD capital stock, which means that even with a doubling of the 1983 U. S. current account deficit of $40 billion more than a decade would have to pass in order for the required structural changes to be accomplished.

Notes: The growing leniency and generosity of public income support systems has been hypothesized to negatively affect work effort. The magnitude of this effect is estimated for the U. S. and the Netherlands in the 1970s, using a three-stage Probit-OLS model employed on micro data sets. Individuals are viewed as choosing the number of hours worked on the basis of expected labor income, expected transfer income, labor market and demographic characteristics and health. The elasticity of annual hours worked with respect to expected transfer income was estimated to be -0.22 for U. S. and -0.82 (1980) for the Netherlands. Combining these elasticities with the annual percentage increases in transfer generosity yields a yearly reduction in the number of hours worked of 0.65% for the U. S. and 2.7% for the Netherlands during the 1970s. These results suggest that growing transfers have had a substantial and negative impact on desired work effort and thus on production and economic performance, especially in the Netherlands.

Notes: The objective of this study is to present some preliminary estimates of regional long run benefits and costs due to the CO2 greenhouse effect within an economic framework that permits an appraisal of CO2 policy control costs. We utilize a mathematical programming framework to solve for growth paths for North and South America both for CO2 constrained (by an optimal emissions tax rate) and unconstrained scenarios. The possible losses to North America and gains to South America suggest international cooperation on CO2 control policy may be very difficult. Cooperative adjustments to increased CO2 may prove more feasible.

Notes: BADE, KLAUS J. (Hrsg.): Auswanderer - Wanderarbeiter - Gastarbeiter.CARLSTEIN, TOMMY: Time Resources, Society and Economy.CAVES, RICHARD E.: Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis.CIMPA, FRANZ: Arbeitslehre für Entwicklungshilfeprojekte.ECKSTEIN, OTTO: The DRI Model of the U. S. EconomyELIASSON, GUNNAR; SHAREFKIN, MARK and YSANDER, BENGT-CHRISTER (eds.): Policy Making in a Disorderly World EconomyFRIEDMAN, JAMES: Oligopoly TheoryGARNAUT, ROSS and CLUNIES-ROSS, ANTHONY: Taxation of Mineral RentsHICKS, JOHN: Money, Interest and Wages.KALECKI, MICHA: Theorie des Wachstums und der Planung in der sozialistischen VolkswirtschaftKILLINGSWORTH, MARK R.: Labor SupplyKLEIN, LAWRENCE R.: Lectures in EconometricsLAVERGNE, RÉAL P.: The Political Economy of U. S. Tariffs: An Empirical AnalysisLEISINGER, KLAUS M.: Health Policy for Least Developed CountriesMCKENZIE, GEORGE W.: Measuring Economic Welfare: New MethodsMELMAN, SEYMOUR: Profits without ProductionMOHR, JENS-UWE: Soziologische Aspekte der Anpassung an die Industria-lisierung in einem Entwicklungsland, dargestellt am Beispiel von NigeriaPREMCHAND, A.: Government Budgeting and Expenditure Controls.QUADRIO-CURZIO, ALBERTO (ed.): The Gold Problem: Economic Perspectives.REICH, UTZ-PETER und STAHMER, CARSTEN (Hrsg.): Gesamtwirtschaftliche Wohlfahrtsmessung und Umweltqualität.REITER, KLAUS: Regionale wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit von Staaten der Dritten WeltRIEBEL, VOLKER: Die Schwarzarbeit als Problem der ZeitallokationRIKER, WILLIAM H.: Liberalism Against Populism.SCHARPF, FRITZ W. und BROCKMANN, MARLENE (Hrsg.): Institutionelle Bedingungen der Arbeitsmarkt - und Beschäftigungspolitik.SCHMIDBERGER, WOLF-DIETER: Fiskalpolitik in kleinen offenen Volkswirtschaften.SPRAOS, JOHN: Inequalising Trade?STIGUM, BERNT P. and WENSTØP, FRED (eds.): Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with ApplicationsSTREETEN, PAUL: First Things First.STRØM, STEINAR (ed.): Measurement in Public ChoiceWELLS, LOUIS T. Jr.: Third World Multinationals.WILLIAMSON, JOHN (ed.): IMF ConditionalityWORSWICK, DAVID and TREVITHICK, JAMES(eds.): Keynes and the Modern World

Notes: This paper examines the causal links between intra-industry trade and economic integration, and considers whether these can be expected to differ systematically between customs unions involving developed market economies and those involving centrally planned economies. Intra-industry trade is measured for members of the E. E. C. and compared with indices for various members of CMEA (as well as several non-E. E. C. European countries). It is found that average levels of intra-industry trade are indeed higher for E. E. C. countries and various explantations for this finding are discussed.

Notes: Aoki, Masanao: Notes on Economic Time Series Analysis: System Theoretic PerspectivesBéeateille, Andréea: The Idea of Natural Inequality and Other EssaysBianchi, Patrizio: Public and Private Control in Mass Product Industry: The Cement Industry CasesBinmore, K. G.: Calculus.Biørn, Erik and Jansen, Eilev S.: Econometrics of Incomplete Cross-Section/Time-Series DataBoltho, Andrea (ed.): The European Economy.Brems, Hans: Fiscal TheoryCooper, Richard N.; Kenen, Peter B.; Braga DE Macedo, Jorge and Van Ypersele, Jacques (eds.): The International Monetary System Under Flexible Exchange Rates: Global, Regional and NationalEarl, Peter D.: The Economic Imagination. Towards a Behavioral Analysis of ChoiceFaber, Malte; Niemes, Horst und Stephan, Gunter: Entropie, Umwelt-schutz und Rohstoffproduktion. de Fontenay, Patrick et al.: Hungary: An Economic SurveyVon Furstenberg, George M. (ed.): International Money and Credit: The Policy RolesHahn, Frank: Money and InflationHart, Jeffrey A.: The New International Economic OrderHeusgen, Christoph: Ludwig Erhards Lehre von der Sozialen Marktwirt-schaft.Hooke, A. W. (ed.): The Fund and China in the International Monetary System,Kaldor, Nicholas: Grenzen der ≫General Theory.Koslowski, Peter: Gesellschaft und Staat.Möller, Rudolf: Interpersonelle Nutzenvergleiche.Novak, Michael: The Spirit of Democratic CapitalismPattanaik, Prasanta K. and Salles, Maurice (eds.): Social Choice and WelfarePegoretti, Giovanni: Capitate finanziario, profttto, interessePütz, Paul und Meyerhöfer, Walter: Hemmnisse und Hilfen für UnternehmensgründungenRecktenwald, Horst Claus: Lexikon der Staats- und Geldwirtschaft.Schmähl, Winfried (Hrsg.): Ansätze der LebenseinkommensanalyseSertel, Murat R.: Workers and IncentivesSinclair, P. J. N.: The Foundations of Macroeconomic and Monetary TheorySkidelsky, Robert: John Maynard Keynes, Hopes Betrayed 1883-1920Sommer, Jürg H.: Kostenkontrolleim Gesundheitswesen.Tuchtfeldt, Egon (HRSG): Bauteine zur Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik

Notes: U. S. monetary impulses may be transmitted to foreign unemployment through two channels: in the first (Keynesian) channel U. S. monetary expansion boosts the U. S. demand for domestic and foreign production. This leads to an export led recovery in foreign countries. The second (monetarist) channel depends on the usual balance of payments adjustment: U. S. monetary expansion which increases foreign money supplies initiates real recovery provided foreign business cycles respond to the monetary adjustment. The spectral analysis of individual time series for U. S. and foreign unemployment over the period 1960(2) to 1980(2) reveal dominant cycles in each series coinciding with the periodicity of the business cycle. The main arguments of the study are tested in ten separate cross spectral studies of the U. S. money stock and foreign unemployment. The following general conclusion emerges: U. S. monetary expansion promises to reduce unemployment in some foreign states, but has no effect in others. This conclusion does not support the case for U. S. monetary expansion, as the effect on world unemployment is not universal, but the potential costs in the form of higher inflation remain.

Notes: In this exploratory paper, the notion of (strong) discontinuity is introduced into the theory of international labour migration. It is suggested that inter-country wage differentials alone may fail to induce international migration at the level of the decision making entity. However, three factors - risk aversion, relative deprivation and asymmetric information - in conjunction with these wage differentials, may account for international migration.

Notes: This paper suggests a way of incorporating the important concepts of optimism and pessimism into the accepted model of decision-making under uncertainty. We exploit the primitive notion that an optimist is someone who over-estimates (underestimates) the likelihood of favourable (unfavourable) outcomes. We show that this incorporation enables us to explain several commonly observed apparent violations of Subjective Expected Utility Theory. Several illustrations and economic applications are presented, and we show that attitude to ‘fate’ (as evidenced in optimism and pessimism) is a different dimension of personality than attitude to risk. We conclude by relating our extension of SEU theory to other recent extensions.

Notes: Aufgrund verschiedener Anzeichen ist zu schliessen, dass bei der ökonomischen Forschung an den deutschsprachigen staatlichen Universitäten ein deutlicher Rückstand besteht gegenüber der internationalen, weitgehend durch amerikanische Wissenschafter geprägten Spitze. Eine Analyse der für die Hochschulprofessoren massgebenden institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen zeigt, dass dies auf eine ungünstige Anreizstruktur zurückzuführen ist. Diese Regelungen wirken sich nämlich im Endeffekt dahingehend aus, dass andere Tätigkeiten (sogenannte ≪Dienstleistungen≫) im Regelfall wesentlich mehr zum Nutzen eines Professors beitragen als die Forschungsarbeit. Dies trifft auch dann zu, wenn bei den nutzenstiftenden Faktoren nicht nur das Einkommen, sondern auch Anerkennung und Befriedigung an der Tätigkeit berücksichtigt werden. Wenn der Staat an seinen Universitäten mehr und bessere Forschung wollte, müsste er demzufolge dafür sorgen, dass wissenschaftliche Arbeit relativ zu anderen Tätigkeiten wieder attraktiver würde. Zur Erreichung dieses Ziels sind grundsätzlich verschiedene Massnahmen denkbar. Bei einer vergleichenden Beurteilung schält sich jedoch als einziger vom Staat tatsächlich steuerbarer und gleichzeitig auch wirkungsvoller Aktionsparameter die Besoldungsregelung heraus: die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen müssten demnach so umgestaltet werden, dass sich zusätzliche Forschungsarbeit in irgend einer Form auch in zusätzlichem Einkommen niederschlägt.

Notes: According to Malthusian growth theory the wage rate may be maintained constant on the path to the stationary state, at a level above ‘subsistence’ by appropriate reductions in the population growth rate. In this paper we document J. S. MILL'S version of the Malthusian model and various applications thereof.

Notes: Die Frage der Realität ≪langer Wellen≫ in der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts ist bis heute umstritten. Nicht selten wird das Vorhandensein dieser sogenannten KONDRATIEFF-Zyklen zwar für Wertreihen bejaht, für Produktionsreihen dagegen verneint. Mit Hilfe neuer statistischer Verfahren der Zeitreihenanalyse, die auf der Filtertheorie basieren, kann man zeigen, dass für eine gegenstandsneutrale Untersuchung dieser Frage das traditionelle Instrumentarium der Zeitreihenanalyse völlig ungeeignet ist. Das Grundproblem jeder statistischen Analyse ≪langer Wellen≫, nämlich Bestimmung und Ausschaltung des Trend als der nicht-zyklischen Bewegungskomponente einer Zeitreihe, wird in diesem Artikel mit einem völlig neu entwickelten Filterverfahren gelöst. Die Ergebnisse zeigen sehr deutlich sowohl die fundamentale Bedingtheit von Trend und Zyklus, als auch das Vorhandensein langfristiger zyklischer Schwingungskomponenten in Produktionsreihen. Während die Ergebnisse die gängige Datierung der KONDRATIEFF-Zyklen bis etwa 1913 annähernd bestätigen, zeigen die Zyklen in ihrem gesamten Verlauf starke Variationen in Form und Dauer und erfordern damit eine partielle Revision tradierter Vorstellungen.

Notes: Andel, Norbert: FinunzwissenschuftBéteille, André (ed.): Equality and Inequality: Theory and PracticeBinswanger, H. C.; Frisch, H.; Nutzinger, H. G. u. a.: Arbeit ohne Umweltzerstörung.Bowles, Roger: Law and the EconomyBrams, Steven J. and Fishburn, Peter C.: Approval VotingThe Brandt Commission: Common Crisis: North South: Cooperation for World RecoveryBroome, John: The Microeconomics of Capitalism de Cecco, Marcello (ed.): International Economic Adjustment.Chick, Victoria: Macroeconomics after Keynes.Chow, Gregory C. and Corsi, Paolo (eds.): Evaluating the Reliability of Macro-economic ModelsCoddington, Alan: Keynesian Economics.Culyer, A. J. (ed.): Health Indicators.Feldstein, Martin (ed.): Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy AnalysisFolkers, Cay: Begrenzungen von Steuern und Staatsausgaben in den USA.Giersch, Herbert (ed.): Emerging TechnologiesInternational Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook.John, J.; Schwefel, D. and Zöllner, H. (eds.): Influence of Economic Instability on Health.Johns, Richard Anthony: Tax Havens and Offshore Finance.Jones, R. J. Barry (ed.): Perspectives on Political Economy. Alternatives to the Economics of DepressionJöreskog, K. G. and Wold, H. (eds.): Systems under Indirect Observations.Orlowski, Dieter: Die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit einer Volkswirtschuft.Page, Bernd: Methoden der Modellbildung in der GesundheitssystemforschungRöpke, Jochen: Die unterentwickelte Freiheit.Rosner, Peter: Arbeit und Reichtum.Sabel, Charles F.: Work and politics.Schäfer, Hans-Bernd: Landwirtschaftliche Akkumulationslasten und industrielle Entwicklung.Sen, Amartya: Choice, Welfare and MeasurementSen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (eds.): Utilitarianism and beyondShirley, Mary et al.: World Development ReportStubblebine, Wm. Craig and Willett, Thomas D. (eds.): Reaganomics, A Midterm ReportUrsprung, Heinrich W.: Die elementare Katastrophentheorie: Eine Darstellung aus der Sicht der ÖkonomieUtton, M. A. and Morgan, A. D.: Concentration and Foreign TradeWilson, Thomas and Wilson, Dorothy J.: The Political Economy of the Welfare State

Notes: The paper analyses the growth and profitability of the world's largest firms by reference to their size, degree of multinationality, main industry of operation, nationality of ownership and research intensity. The influence of size of firm on growth is stable but weak, its influence on profitability is negligible. Industry of operation has generally strongly influenced growth but the effect on profitability is not consistent amongst different time periods and samples. Division by research intensities of firms is significant in analysing growth, less in the analysis of profitability. Degree of multinationality does not contribute consistently to the explanatory power of the full equation for either dependent variable but nationality of ownership is a consistently powerful explanatory factor.

Notes: Does externality theory provide a basis for the government's monopoly in the production of base money? Money, as has been shown, is not a public good because it does not satisfy the non-rivalness criterion (nor the non-excludability criterion). Like any public decision, political agreement on a common money or unit of account (i. e., exchange rate fixity) passes the non-rivalness test. However, whether the imposition of a common money or monetary unit is a public good or a public bad depends on whether money is a natural-monopoly good or not. Hence, there is no independent public-good justification for the government's money monopoly. The public good argument is redundant. Whether money is a natural monopoly good cannot be determined a priori, but only on the basis of experience. If governments are natural money monopolists, they should have gained their monopoly position by prevailing in the market. Historically, this is not the case. The only valid test of the natural monopoly argument is to abolish all barriers to entry and to admit free currency competition from private issuers on equal terms. An international cross-section estimate of money demand functions reveals only weak evidence of social economies of scale in the use of money. By contrast, choice among currencies is shown to be strongly affected by restrictions of convertibility.

Notes: Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der Bereitstellung von Gütern und Dienstleistungen durch ≪Freiwilligengruppen≫, die als ≪Klubs≫ im Sinne der Public Choice-Theorie aufgefasst werden. Es wird eine theoretische Erklärung vorgeschlagen, warum Individuen eine Freiwilligengruppe gründen und sich nicht für eine institutionelie Alternative, zum Beispiel ein gewinnorientiertes Unternehmen, entscheiden. Haupterklärungsgründe für diese Wahl sind der Nutzen, den Mitglieder von Freiwilligengruppen infolge ihrer Wahlentscheidung zusätzlich zu jenem aus dem Konsum des Klubguts ziehen, Transaktionskostengesichtspunkte, Vertrauensaspekte im Zusammenhang mit asymmetrischer Information und qualitative Unterschiede, die mit der institutionellen Form der Erbringung einer Leistung verbunden sind. Für manche Formen von Freiwilligengruppen werden altruistische Präferenzen in die Erkläng miteinbezogen.

Notes: Voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs) have emerged as a popular alternative to traditional protectionist devices, whose use is severely limited by trade agreements. Aimed at ‘disruptive’ suppliers, VERs tend to shift the source of imports away from the most efficient producers. Yet such negotiated agreements are attractive to exporters because they are preferable to the alternative of unilateral import barriers, especially since they allow exporters to control the trade restriction and thereby raise the export price. In fact all effective participants gain from the VER agreement, while consumers and others hurt by it are excluded from the negotiating process. Among the inherent problems of VERs, however, is their tendency to divert exports towards third markets, spreading protectionism worldwide and destabilizing trade relations. Continuing protectionist pressure in such an environment encourages the development of more sophisticated and comprehensive methods of induced export restraint.

Notes: Abele, Hanns; Nowotny, Ewald; Schleicher, Stefan und Winckler, Georg (Hrsg.): Handbuch der österreichischen WirtschaftspolitikBalassa, Bela and Associates: Development strategies in semi-industrial economiesBaumol, William J.; Panzar, John C. and Willig, Robert D.: Contestable Markets and The Theory of Industry Structure.Begg, David K. H.: The Rational Expectations Revolution in Macroeconomics.Ben-Porath, Yoram (ed.): Income Distribution and the Family.Bennett, James T. and Di Lorenzo, Thomas J.: Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public SectorBrandt, A.; Horisberger, B. and Von Wartburg, W. P.(eds.): Cost-Sharing in Health Care. van Duijn, J. J.: The Long Wave in Economic LifeFrisch, Helmut (ed.): Schumpeterian EconomicsFujimori, Y.: Modern Analysis of Value TheoryIngram, James C.: International EconomicssJones, Leroy P. (ed.): Public enterprise in less-developed countriesKindleberger, Charles and Di Tella, G. (eds.): Economics in the Long View.Kirzner, Israel M. (ed.): Method, Process and Austrian Economics: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von MisesKornai, János: Growth, Shortage and Efficiency.Kozma, Ferenc: Economic Integration and Economic StrategyKrueger, Anne O.: Exchange-Rate DeterminationKülp, Bernhard: FreizeitökonomieMüller-Godeffroy, H. et al.: Der neue Protektionismus.Nezeys, Bertrand: Les relations économiques extérieures de la France.Ordeshook, Peter C. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (eds.): Political EquilibriumPatinkin, Don: Anticipations of the General Theory?Rugman, Alan M. (ed.): New Theories of the Multinational EnterpriseRydén, Bengt and Bergström, Villy (eds.): Sweden: Choices for Economic and Social Policy in the 1980sSeurot, François: Inflation et emploi duns les pays socialistesSheffrin, Steven M.: Rational ExpectationsStegmuller, W.; Balzer, W. and Spohn, W. (eds.): Philosophy of Economics.Stewart, Frances and Sengupta, Arjun: International Financial Cooperation.Sundrum, R. M.: Development Economics.Tullock, Gordon: Economics of Income RedistributionU. S. Gold Commission: Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary System

Notes: Everyday, in real life, the past is irrevocable and the future predicted with a margin of uncertainty. In a theoretical model, time can be frozen but it is a common error to confuse a comparison of static positions with a movement between them. E. H. Carr claims that historians and natural scientist are alike in having given up the search for grand ‘laws’ and are now content to try to learn ‘how things happen’. To improve the status of economics it is necessary to get rid of logical contradictions, which involves eliminating the concept of static equilibrium; to guard against conception by ideological prejudice and to use the study of history, as it unfolds, to check up on the hypotheses that theory suggests.

Notes: This paper considers one aspect of the potential conflict between efficiency and politics. It analyzes the conditions under which a reelection-seeking politician will find it in his interest to make efficient choices. The paper first presents a very unrealistic model in which there is no conflict between efficiency and the objectives of the government's chief executive. Under the more realistic assumptions developed in the rest of the paper, the politician can no longer be expected to be efficient. Even with no interjurisdictional spillovers and a single budget category, inefficiency arises from the basic political incentives generated by democratic institutions. There are two fundamental sources of inefficiency. First, the service may not be a pure public good so that particular individuals or firms may be favored more than others. The incumbent can then use state resources to maximize his probability of reelection at the expense of efficient tax and spending choices. Second, voters may have poor information about what the government is doing. The incumbent may then choose especially obvious ways of spending money or skew public decisions to favor campaign contributors.

Notes: Let consumers decide whether the public sector shall be extended by progressive taxation or by fees. A majority for the fee case will be found (a) if tax financed public supply deviates from the allocative optimum to a too high extent; especially in case of public oversupply; (b) if the preferences for the public supply and thus the sensitivity to allocational questions increase. This may lead to a dilemma for Social democratic parties that influence their voters in favour of increasing preferences for public supply and may loose the majority in favour of further redistributive policy; (c) if the voters believe that there is already too much redistribution. In such a case the majority is more sensitive with respect to further redistribution and with respect to deviations from the allocative optimum. (If on the other hand the present situation of the public sector is characterized by a too high deviation from the allocative optimum the majority is more sensitive with respect to further deviations from the allocative optimum only; not with respect to further redistribution! This is an interesting asymmetry between allocation and distribution as far as the extension of the public sector is concerned.)

Notes: Arrow Kenneth J. and Hurwigz Leonid (Eds.): Studies in Resource Allocation Processes.Dornbusch Rudiger and Frenkel Jacob A. (Eds.): International Economic Policy - Theory and Evidence.Dubbelman G.: Disturbances in the linear model, estimation and hypothesis testing.DÜrr Ernst (Hrsg.): Wachstumstheorie.Hutchison T. W.: On Revolutions and Progress in Economic Knowledge.Johnson Elizabeth S. and Johnson Harry G.: The Shadow of Keynes: Understanding Keynes, Cambridge and Keynesian Economics.Kreuzer Arthur: Jugend - Rauschdrogen - Kriminalität.Kuyvenhoven Arie : Planning with the semi-input-output method.Lampert Heinz (Hrsg.): Arbeitsmarktpolitik.Lipp Ernst-Moritz : Parallelwährung für Europa.Miller Ervin with Lonie Alasdair : Microeconomic Effects of Monetary Policy.Mitchell Bridger M., Manning Willard G., Jr., and Acton Jan Paul: Peak-Load Pricing.MÜller Johann Baptist : Liberalismus und Demokratie.Oates W. E. (Ed.): The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism.Pearson Charles (Hauptverfasser) und Pryor Anthony : Environment: North and South.Ribhegge Hermann: Rationale Einkommenspolitik aus der Sicht der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie.Roncaglia Alessandro : Sraffa and the Theory of Prices.Rose-Ackerman Susan: Corruption.Sahlins Marshall : The Use and Abuse of Biology - An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology.Spengler Joseph J.: Facing Zero Population Growth: Reactions and Interpretations, Past and Present.Streit Max : Ökonomische Modelle für Ausbildung und Arbeitsmarkt.Thomson J. Michael: Grundlagen der Verkehrspolitik.

Notes: Assuming a radicalized Weberian position, religious beliefs and their structuring dogmas are construed as independent variables. Within that frame Calvinism (Puritanism) is ‘ideal-typically’ compared with Catholicism, sketchily also with Lutheranism and Marxism. The dependent variables arc productivity, propensity to save and invest, a profit-making and calculating orientation, the perceived legitimacy of manipulating consumer choices. Though there are references to other national cultures the principal target is the American economy; its meteoric rise to wealth and economic predominance. Applying Weber's hypothesis as to the invariable bureaucratization of charismatic systems to the decreasing rate of economic progress of the American and other calvinistically influenced economies some macro- and micro problems are singled out for further analysis.

Notes: This study represents an econometric investigation into the role played by exports in the process of economic development of the major oil producers in North Africa and the Middle-East over the past two decades. Single as well as simultaneous equation models were tested using aggregate and disaggregate data. Aggregate real analysis suggests that there is little evidence of spread effects of oil exports to the rest of the economy. Sectoral analysis indicates that the expansion in oil exports was not fully exploited in stimulating the manufacturing sector. Aggregate and disaggregate investment analysis clearly suggests that gross fixed capital formation, limited as may be, is extremely sensitive to growth in oil exports in all countries considered with the exception of Kuwait and Libya. The statistical results of the simultaneous relationships suggest the absence of feedback effects.

Notes: Armstrong Harvey and Taylor Jim : Regional Economic Policy and its Analysis.Benett R. J., Martin R. L., and Thrift N. J. (Eds.): Towards the Dynamic Analysis of Spatial Systems.Fujita Masahisa: Spatial Development Planning.Maclennan Duncan and Parr John B. (Eds.): Regional Policy.Sulzer JÜrg: Stadtentwicklung: Koordination von Raum- und Investitionsplanung.Backhaus JÜrgen, Eger Thomas und Nutzinger Hans G. (Hrsg.): Partizipation in Betrieb und Gesellschaft.Destler, I. M., Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato: The Textile Wrangle - Conflict in Japanese American Relations, 1969-1971.Hanabusa Masamichi: Trade Problems between Japan and Western Europe.Young Alexander K.: The Sogo Shosha: Japan's Multinational Trading Companies.Dreyer Jacob S., Haberler Gottfried, and Willett Thomas D. (Eds.): Exchange Rate Flexibility.Horowitz Irving Louis (Ed.): Equity, Income, and Policy.James D. E., Jansen H. M. A., and Opschoor, J. B.: Economic Approaches to Environmental Problems.James Simon and Nobes Christopher: The Economics of Taxation. Workbook for The Economics of Taxation.Janssen Martin und Hummler Konrad : Bundesverfassung und Verfassungsentwurf:Krauss Melvyn B.: A Geometric Approach to International Trade.Mayrzedt Hans: Multilaterale Wirtschaftsdiplomatie zwischm westlichen Industriestaaten.Nowotny Ewald (Hrsg.): Öffentliche Verschuldung.Ordeshook Peter G.: Game Theory and Political Science.Pejovich Svetozar (Ed.): The Codetermination Movement in the West.Pekkarinen Jukka: On the Generality of Keynesian Economics.Riechel Klaus-Walter: Economic Effects of Exchange-Rate Changes.Robinson Austin (Ed.): Appropriate Technologiesfor Third World Development.Schwarz Peter : Morphologie von Kooperationen und Verbänden.Smith V. Kerry (Ed.) Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered.Throsby C. D. and Withers G. A.: The Economics of the Performing Arts.Trzeciakowski Witold: Indirect Management in a Centrally Planned Economy.Ward Benjamin: The Ideal Worlds of Economics.Weise Peteret al.: Neue Mikroökonomie.Willke Gerhard: Globalsteuerung und gespaltene Konjunktur.Wong Stanley : The Foundations of Paul Samuelson's Revealed Preference Theory.

Notes: Interindustrial wage differences in West Germany are explained by trade unions’ pressure (unionism, strike intensity), sellers’ market power (concentration, profits, vertical integration, cartels, and international trade), and fluctuations among labour force. The inverse relationship between concentration and wages can, theoretically, be traced back to monopoly and it is suggested that concentration should primarily be considered as an indicator of monopoly power. Vertical integration of successive stages of production within a single firm appears to entail efficiency gains on balance whereas in the case of cartels of the kind permitted in West Germany, monopolizing and efficiency raising effects appear to just cancel.

Notes: In recent years female participation rates in the labour force have increased considerably in most developed countries. This is partly due to generally changed attitudes among women, partly to changing proportions among women with different attitudes towards labour force participation. The article focuses on this latter idea and tries to present a typology of different groups and their ‘typical’ labour supply attitudes. Using the traditional model of choice between (paid) working time and ‘leisure’ (including unpaid work) some typical attitudes are illustrated for single women (primary workers), married women with children, the ‘target-oriented’ additional worker, and the ‘emancipated’ woman. Certain conclusions are drawn under the additional assumptions that working hours cannot be freely chosen and that (desired) part-time work or overtime may not be available.

Notes: This paper reports on technical studies of the determinants of inflation which were undertaken for the seven major industrial countries and Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in two distinct expectational frameworks. Both are designed to account for the empirical fact that changes in the rate of growth of the money supply (M2) affect both actual and expected inflation with a lag distributed over several years. It is found that M2 velocity is strongly procyclical. Furthermore, the underlying course of inflation since 1960 was influenced not only by money supply growth, but also by the changed longrun behavior of velocity and potential output imparting additional inflationary bias in most countries.