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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Quality of Government Services and the Civic Duty to Pay Taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other Transition Countries (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 57 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: This paper analyses a 2002 survey of the Czech and Slovak Republics, and more limited surveys of Hungary and Poland to conclude that tax evasion is lowest among those who believe that they are getting good quality government services for the taxes they pay. A 20% increase in perceived quality of government services could lead to a 13% drop in the frequency of tax evasion. The present analysis is the first of this sort to indicate that quality of government services influences the willingness to pay taxes. Governments in transition countries who suffer from weak tax collection apparatus may wish to transmit clear information on the quality of their services in order to cut down on evasion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00252.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Fiscal Churning and Political Efficiency (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 50 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00010
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  • 3
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    The Determinants of Campaign Spending: The Role of the Government Jackpot (1992)
    Oxford : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Economic Inquiry. 30:4 (1992:Oct.) 627 
    Details
    ISSN: 0095-2583
    Topics: Economics
    URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pao:&rft_dat=xri:pao:article:b097-1992-030-04-000004
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the French legislative elections of 1993 (1998)
    Springer
    Public choice 94 (1998), S. 157-174 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the French legislative assembly. Incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1.01% of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district. Challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this. Simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved, incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals. The regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals. These results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition, and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004942118179
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can repressive regimes be moderated through foreign aid? (1993)
    Springer
    Public choice 77 (1993), S. 535-550 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In what circumstances should foreign aid be given to less developed countries with repressive rulers? Repressive rulers are assumed to control the national income and to trade it against the probability of staying in office which is assumed in turn to depend positively on popular wealth and repression. A foreign donor aware of this process of optimization will pursue his international objectives by attaching conditions to his aid that alter the relative price of repression and popular wealth in the calculations of the tyrant. The effectiveness of direct and in-kind aid and the desirability of a “carrot an stick” aid policy depend on the direct and the interactive effects that popular wealth, repression, and the parameters of economic growth exert on the regime's stability and its level of income.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01047859
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Downsian voter meets the ecological fallacy (1993)
    Springer
    Public choice 77 (1993), S. 855-878 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper presents evidence that voter participation does not depend on the probability that one vote is decisive. An extensive summary of the empirical participation literature is provided which shows that most but not all studies have found that turnout in an electoral district is higher when the race is closer. Individual-level vote regressions for the 1979 and 1980 Canadian national elections are estimated using objective measures of closeness (as opposed to self-reported measures). The main finding is that a citizen is no more likely to vote in a close election than in a lands-lide election. District-level turnout regressions for the same elections are also estimated, and a significant relation between closeness and turnout is observed. This suggests that aggregation bias may generate a spurious closeness-turnout relation in district-level regressions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01047999
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Voter turnout: How much can we explain? (1999)
    Springer
    Public choice 98 (1999), S. 431-446 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper evaluates the ability of common explanatory variables to predict who votes. Logit voting regressions are estimated with more than three dozen explanatory variables using survey and aggregate data for the 1979, 1980, 1984, and 1988 Canadian national elections. We find that the usual demographic variables such as age and education, and contextual variables such as campaign spending have significant effects on the probability of voting, but the models have low R2's and cannot predict who votes more accurately than random guessing. We also estimate regressions using past voting behavior as a predictor of current behavior, and find that although the explanatory power rises it remains low. This suggests that the difficulty in explaining turnout arises primarily from omitted time- varying variables. In some sense, then, it appears that whether or not a person votes is to a large degree random. The evidence provides support for the rational voter theory, and is problematic for psycho/sociological approaches.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018328621580
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Property rights vs. redistribution: Which path to national wealth? (1999)
    Springer
    Public choice 101 (1999), S. 129-145 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Recent empirical and theoretical research suggests that egalitarian income distribution may spur economic growth. Another different strand of research suggests that property rights are important. These two results are not at odds. A model of switching between a career of rent-seeking and wealth producing shows that for redistribution to boost national income, property rights need to be secure. A more equal distribution of earned income can induce rent-seekers to switch to wealth making, but only if they can be assured that their earned income will be protected from other rent-seekers. The model suggests new directions for empirical testing.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018360316035
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest (2000)
    Springer
    Public choice 105 (2000), S. 291-301 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The resources two rival businesses spend to raise their own chanceof getting a unique monopoly license are a cost of rent-seeking.When those businesses differ in the costs of producing themonopoly good there is an additional cost of rent-seeking that hasnot been sufficiently studied in the literature. If the high cost producer winsthe license, the difference between his cost and the costs of hismore efficient rival is a social loss from improper selection ofproducers by the political process. The loss becomes more severewhen the ability to lobby of the inefficient producer outstripsthat of the efficient producer. This may help to explain whyspecialized lobbying evolved. Specialized lobbying reduces thesocial cost from improper selection of firms by allowing efficientproducers to hire expert rent-seekers and so to raise theirchances of gaining monopoly concessions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005271023086
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