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  • Articles  (57,069)
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  • 2010-2014
  • 2005-2009
  • 1995-1999  (30,187)
  • 1980-1984  (16,479)
  • 1975-1979  (7,165)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00529.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Shareholder Activism, “Voluntary” Restructuring, and Internal Labor Markets (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder “voice.” We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this “slack,” activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or “helping” between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to “pay” for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and “flat” pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of management entrenchment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00591.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The literature on the incentives for R & D cooperation with spillovers typically deals only with the factors affecting cooperative profits. This paper focuses on the incentives to cheat and the stability of such cooperative agreements in a repeated game framework. It is shown that the stability of cooperation is influenced by the nature and magnitude of spillovers, relative to the nature and degree of product market competition. While cooperative profits are higher with large positive (exogenous, unintended) know-how spillovers, such as in fundamental research, our anslysis shows that it may be easier to sustain cooperation in areas with lower spillovers, such as applied research, because of the smaller incenfives to cheat on the initial agreement, at least when firms produce substitutes. Alternatively, the possibility of technology sharing (i.e., intended or endogenous spillovers), besides R&D coordination, not only increases cooperative profits but also reduces the incentives to defect from a cooperative equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00651.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00427.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Reimbursement systems for health-care providers are very complex, like the production systems that they regulate. This complexity has led to some important misperceptions about the incentive consequences of major reimbursement reforms. One example is the prospective payment system (PPS), developed to provide “high-powered” incentives through fixed prices for hospital admissions for the US elderly. In fact, various features of the DRG system allow reimbursement to vary with actual treatment decisions during an admission, and so are not prospective. This paper develops a general method for measuring actual reimbursement incentives in complex regulated price systems. The method uses regression techniques with variance decompositions to quantify the effects of particular features of the payment system on prospective and retrospective cost sharing, as well as overall generosity of payments. I apply this method to microdata on 20 percent of Medicare hospital admissions in 1987 and 1990 to summarize the incentives created by PPS in practice, and how the incentives are evolving over time. I show that PPS involves limited and decreasing cost sharing with hospitals, most of which is not prospective. The reimbursement incentives vary substantially across diagnoses, demographic groups, and types of intensive treatments, possibly with important implications for hospital behavior and medical expenditure growth. The techniques developed here can be used to analyze a broad range of provider reimbursement mechanisms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00091.x
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In a health insurance market, a large employer or an organized “buyer alliance” is in a position to influence the design of plans offered to its members. We study how the sponsors of buyer alliances manage competition among insurance firms by focusing on their choices of the format of competition, the number of firms allowed to compete, and the quality of care offered by the firms. We find deviations from optimality in all three dimensions. Specifically, we find a tendency toward too many firms and too much quality, and a bias toward a format involving the prescreening of insurance plans by the sponsor.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00175.x
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Profitability under an Open versus a Closed System (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper explores the conditions under which a monopolist selling a system consisting of a main component and differentiated secondary components can increase profits by allowing competition in the aftermarket for the secondary components. Opening the system in this fashion can increase profits by giving consumers an added incentive to incur the setup cost of purchasing the main component. This paper extends the second-sourcing literature by showing the explicit effects of various parameters of demand on the decision to open the system. The results show that an open system is likely to be more profitable than a closed one when demand for the system is more elastic, when secondary-component variety is more valued, and when the share of the main component in the total system budget of the consumer is high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00307.x
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Task Shifts vs. Termination as Devices for Eliciting Optimal Effort Supply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper contrasts assignments to punitive tasks and terminations as alternative incentive devices. The basic question we ask here is: does the threat of assigning employees to a punitive task allow one to attain higher effort levels than termination threats? The answer critically depends on whether employers are able or not to commit themselves not to fire. We show that in the no-commitment case the only relevant incentive device is termination threats. In contrast, when employers commit themselves not to fire, by threatening punitive task reassignments there obtain effort levels that are not implementable by termination. The implementation results are then applied to the study of incentive problems arising when investment infirm-specific human capital is unverifiable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00033.x
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper empirically examines the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the length of time required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and approve new-drug applications between 1990 and 1992. The approach treats regulatory decisions as endogenous and explains the variation in regulatory behavior as a function of differences that exist between firms and drugs. Results show that, controlling for drug-specific characteristics, regulators respond to firm-specific characteristics when evaluating new drug applications. For instance, firms that are less diversified and more R&D-inten-sive receive shorter review times for their new-drug applications than more diversified and less R&D-intensive firms. The reason is that most firm characteristics signal information to reviewers about either firm reputation or application quality. This information reduces reviewers' uncertainty about approving a dangerous or ineffective drug and leads to faster review times. The results suggest that regulators respond to the heterogeneities among firms in the pharmaceutical market in systematic ways.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00377.x
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00133.x
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  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Executive Forum Restructuring the Wireless Industry and the Information Skyway (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00139.x
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  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Tacit Collusion Under regulation in the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Analysis of seven wholesale and retail markets for long-distance telephone services since the AT & T divestiture indicates that service provider concentration declined in the later 1980s and then stabilized in the 2990–1993 period. In addition to this stability in market shares, a number of other conditions established since 1990 have been conducive to the development of market sharing rather than significant price competition. The most important of these conditions has been the tarifing process of the Federal Communications Commission by which MCI and Sprint replicate ATGT's price announcements. As market shares stabilized and became more equal, and as regulation formalized the price-setting process, the price-cost margins of the three large carriers increased and became more nearly identical. These results are consistent not with price competition but rather with emerging tacit collusion among AT&T, MCI, and Sprint.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00147.x
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  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Money Out of Thin Air: The nationwide Narrowband pcs Auction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple-round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of allocating scarce resources.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00267.x
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  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effect of Incentive regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital Technology (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This study examines the investment patterns of all large local exchange telephone companies in the United States over time. It identifies how different regulatoy environments have influenced the recent historical pattern of investment in modern infrastructure equipment. It focuses exclusively on the postdivestiture experience of local telephone exchange companies (LECs). It examines the growth of fiber-optic deployment and of complementary equipment associated with the modernization of today's information infrastructure. The study estimates the influence of different regulatory structures on infrastructure deployment by LECs. The study is unique in that if relates individual LEC investment patterns to LEC-specific regulatory, demographic, and economic characteristics. Thus, it isolates the contribution of state regulatory policies from that of other demographic and economic factors in the determination of infrastructure deployment at the state LEC rather than at the corporate level. Its main findings are as follows: First, price regulation (and, in particular, price caps) is a more potent regulatory mechanism than the standard earnings sharing scheme. Second, when associated with an earnings sharing scheme, price regulation is less effective in triggering infrastructure deployment than when it is implemented by itself. These results raise questions about the effectiveness of a popular regulatory instrument-earnings sharing schemes-and highlight the effectiveness of generic price-cap regulation. These results have implications for the design of regulatory policy at both the state and federal levels. In particular, given the importance currently being placed on the development of the information superhighway, regulatory emphasis should be focused more on price regulation than on regulating profits.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00187.x
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  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00345.x
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  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Are Royalty Rates Higher in Service-type Franchises? (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Royalty payments from a franchisee to a franchisor serve as incentive for the franchisor to provide appropriate levels of quality and brand, name investment. However, since they also distort the service provided by the franchisee, we should expect relatively lower royalty rates in franchises that are primarily service-oriented. Casual examination of royalty rates across product-oriented and service-oriented franchises shows that the opposite is true, with service-type franchises enjoying higher royalty rates. We resolve this apparent puzzle. The basic argument we put forth is that in product-type franchises, a franchisor can charge a wholesale price on goods transferred to the franchisee, thus using an alternative instrument that also serves as an incentive for the franchisor. Moreover, in general, a franchisor will use both wholesale price and royalty to minimize distortions in retail price and service at the retail level. We then test the predictions of our model on different industries and find confirmation for the same.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00007.x
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  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Corporate Control Through Board Dismissals and Takeovers (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines some policy issues related to the interaction between internal and external corporate control mechanisms—board dismissals and takeovers—by focusing on the information aggregation and other effects related to this interaction. We model the functioning of corporate control mechanisms as an example of a multilayered principal-agent relationship in which shareholders delegate the task of monitoring management quality to the board and rely on the external takeover market to provide additional disciplining of the manager as well as of the board. This gives rise to two effects: (1) a substitution effect, whereby the takeover market partially substitutes for board dismissal of the manager, leading to greater lenience toward the manager by a board acting in the shareholders' best interest, and (2) a kick-in-the-pants effect, whereby the board is stricter with the manager because it may be dismissed by a successful acquirer who views it as lax. The interaction of these two effects leads to various implications about the behavior of boards and potential acquirers. In particular, a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not obviate the need for external control (takeovers). Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively, there may be a greater incidence of takeovers when the internal control mechanism is working well than when it is not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00489.x
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  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00615.x
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  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimum Advertised Price (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines minimum advertised price (MAP), a vertical restraint that is observed in manufacturer-retailer interactions. Under MAP, the manufacturer announces that it will reimburse retailers for a fraction of their advertising expenditures if retailers do not advertise the product at below a specified price. MAP can be considered a combination of resale price maintenance (RPM) and a cooperative advertising subsidy. Current antitrust law treats RPM as illegal per se, whereas MAP is judged according to a rule of reason. A framework is presented within with neither a minimum retail price nor a cooperative advertising subsidy is individually sufficient to enable maximization of profits in the complete manufacturer-retailer structure, but the two instruments together are. MAP is therefore a sufficient instrument for the maximization of joint profits. We argue that MAP can also be designed as a second-best instrument that replicates RPM.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00647.x
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  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The average chief executive at one of Britain's twelve regional electricity distribution companies experienced nearly a threefold salary increase in the two years following the industry privatization in 1990. It is hard to account for the tremendous pay raises with conventional explanations for executive compensation rates. They are not attributable to increases in managerial talent, because privatization brought virtually no changes in personnel at the top rank. In addition, the salary increases did not coincide with dramatic changes in firm scale, and cross-firm differences in the raises are uncorrelated with stock-market returns and other measures of firm performance. By contrast, salary increases are highly correlated with firms' potential profits (as measured by the administratively assigned price cap). The findings presented here thus provide new perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00327.x
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  • 21
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Seller Financing of Consumer Durables (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Sellers of consumer durables often provide financing to customers. This paper shows that when customers desire consumption smoothing and when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred-payment plans. A monopolist seller price discriminates among customers with different intertemporal income profiles by making such menu offers, and the interest rate on the seller credit can be significantly lower than the market borrowing rate. Seller financing can be an equilibrium outcome in a game where sellers and banks with market power choose payment plans and interest rates strategically.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00435.x
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  • 22
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effectiveness and Targeting of Television Advertising (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Television networks spend about 16% of their revenues on tune-ins, which are previews or advertisements for their own shows. In this paper, we examine two questions. First, what is the informational content in advertising? Second, is this level of expenditures consistent with profit maximization? To answer these questions, we use a new and unique micro-level panel dataset on the television viewing decisions of a large sample of individuals, matched with data on show tune-in advertisements. The difference in effectiveness of advertisements between “regular” shows (about which viewers are assumed to have substantial information a priori) and “specials” (about which they have very little) reveals the value of information in advertisements and the different roles that information can play. The number of exposures for each individual is likely to be correlated with their preferences, since networks target their audiences. We address this endogeneity problem by controlling for observed, and integrating the unobserved, characteristics of individuals, and find that the estimated effects of tune-ins are still large. Finally, we find that actual expenditures on tune-ins closely match the predicted optimal levels of spending.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00363.x
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  • 23
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We discuss two contrasting styles of vertical organization of complementary activities or components in an industry: systems competition versus component competition. When firms' competencies differ, systems competition is not a perfect substitute for component competition, even with Bertmnd behavior. Costs, prices, industry profits, and the distribution of those profits among firms all differ between the two styles of organization. Moreover, firms' profit incentives do not generally guide them towards the socially efficient form of vertical organization. In duopoly, there is a bias towards open organization (component competition), but with enough firms (three or more, in an exponential example) this bias is reversed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00143.x
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  • 24
    Electronic Resource
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    Statistical Causality and Strategic Behavior in Industrial Markets (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper proposes a simple test of the leader-follower model of strategic behavior. This test relates the temporal notions of leadership central to such models to the empirical methods of statistical causality. This test is performed using data from the US softwood plywood industry of the last three decades. Others have productively explored the spatial pricing practices of this industry by applying a leader-follower model. Similarly, we find that a leader-follower model explains well the temporal relations between key strategic variables (prices) in the industry. We conclude that the leader-follower model imposes meaningful restrictions on observable time-series data and that statistical causality is a useful method for testing these restrictions.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00183.x
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    Influence Costs, Structural Inertia, and Organizational Change (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper builds an economic model of the relationship between influence activity and resistance to change in organizations. I show that influence activity can create harmful barriers to change and that the influence costs of change are positively related to the firm's prospects. The model rationalizes the widely held view that firms often must endure a survival-threatening crisis before meaningful change can be achieved. I show that employees' choices of whether to engage in influence activity can depend on their beliefs as to whether the firm will choose to change its organizational form. If employees expect change, their best response is to try to affect the form of the change in their favor.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00237.x
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    Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other's products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.
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    Oligopoly, Financial Structure, and Resolution of Uncertainty (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination gains to acquiring and sharing perfect information are sufficient to break Brander and Lewis's (1986) result wherein both firms issue debt to their mutual disadvantage. However, more interesting may be the robustness of that result when uncertainty is low or when information is imperfect. The key insight is that the consequences of issuing debt are invariant to the level of uncertainty, given that firms can recalibrate the terms of debt to achieve the Stackelberg solution.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00067.x
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    Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I examine the outcomes of cases of entry by merchant shipping lines into established markets around the turn of the century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will encounter a price war conditional on entering. I find that weaker entrants are fought, where “weaker” means having fewer financial resources, less experience, smaller size, or poor trade conditions. The empirical results provide most support for the long-purse theory of predation. Due to the small number of observations available, 47, I discuss qualitative evidence (such as predatory intent expressed in correspondence between cartel members) that supports the empirical results. The results are also found to be robust to misclassification of the dependent variable, which is a particular concern when dealing with historical data.
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    Incentive Contracting Under Limited Liability (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine the nature of incentive schemes between the principal and the risk-neutral agent in the presence of the agent's limited liability and ex ante action choice. We consider alternative schemes when a simple rental contract is infeasible due to the limited liability of the agent and study the effectiveness of a performance bonus scheme in achieving the first-best outcome. We also discuss some implications of such schemes in real practices.
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    Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments. We assume that there are a finite number of potential input suppliers with private information about their costs. We first show that a monopoly buyer of such inputs will often prefer to own the seller's assets even though it would be more efficient for the seller's assets not to be so owned. We then show that an increase in the number of potential partners on either side of the market reduces this inclination towards vertical integration. With perfect competition on either side of the market, the make-buy decision will reflect only efficiency considerations.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00491.x
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    Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00787.x
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    The Regulation of Predatory Firms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This article investigates the issue ofpredation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a “target” firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00849.x
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    Limited Liability and Bonus Contracts (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent under the constraint that the agent's liability is limited. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the existence of a first-best contract under this constraint, and a bonus-based contract is shown to be the most efficient contractual form. Implications of bonus contracts are also discussed.
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    Why Retailers Sell Private Labels (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper interprets private label marketing as a retailer instrument for overcoming the double-marginalization problem inherent in the distribution of well-known manufacturer brands. Retailers with some degree of market power carry private label substitutes for popular national brands in order to capture more profit from the vertical structures they share with brand manufacturers. The net effect of private label marketing is to improve the performance of distribution channels. After presenting a formal model and deriving analytical results, the paper gathers some empirical evidence that supports these results.
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    Introduction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
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    Horizontal integration for bargaining Power: Evidence from the Cable Television Industry (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the hypothesis that large firms have more bargaining power with suppliers than do small firms, using data from the cable television industry. Employing techniques from the “new empirical lo,” the effect of owner size on marginal costs is inferred from the effect of owner size on observable product market choices. In the cable industry, the downstream firms decide how many subscriptions of cable to sell and how many channels to offer in the cable package. lf large firms have lower costs than small firms, then large firms should be willing to supply more than small firms, at all prices. The effects of bargaining power are identified separately from the effects of scale economies by exploiting the structure of the cable industry. Scale economies, in the cable industry, are likely to stem from regional size, while bargaining power is likely to stem from national size. By controlling for regional size, estimates of the effect of owner national size on the willingness to supply cable subscriptions and to offer channels indicate that large downstream firms offer significantly more subscriptions and channels at all prices than do small downstream firms. These results provide some of the first systematic, industry-specific, evidence consistent with the bargaining-power hypothesis.
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    Usage Heterogeneity and Extended Warranties (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The role of product warranty in segmentation of consumer durable product markets is highlighted. I demonstrate that consumer moral hazard and heterogeneity in product usage create variation in the valuation of product warranties by the different segments in the market. In this context, the firm, by offering a self-selecting menu of base warranty and extended warranties, satisfies the warranty demands of the various segments of the population. The consumer choice behavior prediction of the theory with regard to extended warranty is empirically validated with data from a survey of new car buyers.
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    Marketing Channels and the Durable Goods Monopolist: Renting versus Selling Reconsidered (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.
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    Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed.
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    Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and program profile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of program profile and time schedule, as perceived by the viewers, determines the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, we find that there is a first-mover disadvantage in a sequential game where one channel sets its two choice variables before its rival does, and a first-mover advantage in a semise-quential game where the channels set time schedules sequentially and thereafter set program profiles simultaneously. The results are applied to the Norwegian and Danish markets for TV news, where number-two channels have challenged the incumbents.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00209.x
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    Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a disciplinary explanation for some seemingly paradoxical stylized facts from the takeover literature. Most notable among these are: (1) hostile takeovers are predicted better by industry-wide than by firm-specific performance failures; and (2) gains from a successful bid for a specific firm extend to other firms in the same industry. Our explanation is based on the idea that managerial incentives based on relative performance evaluation may induce an inefficient industry-wide equilibrium in which all firms underperform with respect to a value-maximizing firm, but no firm underperforms with respect to the industry average. A takeover can serve as a means to destroy such an inefficient industry-wide incentive equilibrium.
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    The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the effect of the MFC rules adopted by Medicaid on both price dispersion and price levels in the wholesale pharmaceutical market. Theory suggests that the regulations should reduce price dispersion and increase the average price for those products with a high initial level of price dispersion. Using data which can only measure some dimensions of price discrimination, I find that discrimination falls for products sold to hospitals, but not drugstores. Branded drugs facing generic competition have the most dispersion ex ante. Prices of these brands rise with dispersion at the implementation of the new rules. The last two results are consistent with Scott Morton (1997), where I look only at price changes due to the law. The results of this paper confirm that part of the mechanism of action for the price increase is the high level of price dispersion for some products combined with the MFC.
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    Organizational Diseconomies of scale (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Private information creates a cost of operating a hierarchy, which becomes larger as the hierarchical distance between the information source and the decision maker increases. When information about a firm's capabilities is dispersed among the individuals in the firm, production is inefficient even though everyone behaves rationally. Because hierarchies need rents in order to function, a firm with a long hierarchy may not be viable in a competitive industry.
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    Product Rivalry with multiple Strategic weapons: an Analysis of price and advertising Competition (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A dynamic model of product rivalry is developed for a market in which firms choose price and advertising intensity. The model, a state-space game, is implemented using data that consist of weekly price, sales, and promotional activity for four brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small town. A number of questions can be asked of this data. First, is advertising predatory (merely changing market shares) or cooperative (shifting out market demand)? Second, are price and advertising own and cross-strategic complements or substitutes? And finally, do investments in stocks of goodwill and in price reductions make firms tough and aggressive or soft and accommodating?
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    Division of Labor in Teams (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the incentive effects of division of labor on worker effort, in the absence of the scale effects studied by Adam Smith. The game-theoretic model gives two results. (1) Suppose workers are identical and risk-neutral, and there is stochastic observation of group output by the firm offering compensations subject to some worker-participation constraint. Then the firm can arrive at the same first-best outcome with or without division of labor. However, if workers are risk-averse, division of labor can give the firm strictly greater profit. (2) A deepening division of labor magnifies this positive incentive effect; but if workers are heterogeneous, or if there are certain informational imperfections in the production process, this incentive advantage of division of labor could be impaired or even reversed. The first result may help explain the emergence of division of labor in the early stages of industrialization without relying on the Smithian advantages, which are also present in some labor deployment schemes without division of labor. The second result throws light on some recent anecdotal evidence of a shallowing division of labor in some areas of modern manufacturing. These factors affecting the efficiency of division of labor are then further discussed in the light of recent empirical findings on division of labor and team work, such as those in Katzenbach and Smith (1993).
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    Must Sell (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better off.
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    Models of Competitive Price Promotions: Some Empirical Evidence from the Coffee and Saltine Crackers Markets (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I present tests of a competitive rationale for price promotions. In a model with a population of informed and uninformed customers, price competition yields a static equilibrium in which each seller draws a price from a specified density function. Price data on coffee and saltine crackers products are used to test whether the sample of prices on each product could have possibly come from the theoretically specified density function. The results suggest that some markets are indeed consistent with the marginal distributions of prices predicted by the model. Furthermore, in the process of testing this rationale for price promotions, estimates are obtained for the marginal cost of each product, the number of competing goods, and the percentage of informed consumers. The resulting excess variability of these estimates across competing brands can also raise questions with respect to the empirical validity of the model.
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    Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate the role of consumer switching costs in a three-stage model in which the entrant and the incumbent firm set prices sequentially and then the consumers decide from which firm to buy. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and find that even an entrant with a higher marginal cost may profitably invade part of the market due to the existence of switching costs. Switching costs benefit both firms but harm consumers. This model is used to understand pricing behavior in the US telecommunications industry.
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    Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes how firms' investment incentives are affected by yardstick competition in a situation in which the regulator is unable to commit himself to the regulatory contract before firms invest. Despite its rent-extracting property, yardstick competition does not necessarily reduce efficiency-improving investment. Considering firm-specific investment, yardstick competition is shown to increase investment incentives over individual regulation affirms. In this case, therefore, yardstick competition both reduces the regulator's informational problem ex post and strengthens the firms' investment incentives ex ante. If instead investment is industry-specific, incentives to invest are lowered by yardstick competition.
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    Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate why different states in the United States choose different regulatory plans in their telecommunications industry. We present a simple theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the issue. We find that a state is more likely to replace rate-of-return regulation with incentive regulation when: (1) residential basic local service rates have historically been relatively high; (2) allowed earnings under rate-of-return regulation in the state have been either particularly high or particularly low; (3) the state's leaders tend to come from both major political parties, rather than from a single party; (4) the state's urban population is growing relatively rapidly; and (5) the bypass activity of competitors in the state is less pronounced.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00237.x
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    Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00551.x
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    Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.
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    Hiring Risky Workers: Some Evidence (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Lazear recently suggested that firms that do not expect to live for a long time will hire only safe workers. Hence their worker turnover will be lower. In this paper we test this hypothesis using both the industry growth rate and industry-average age of establishments as measures of the horizon for a particular firm. We find mixed results, both at the industry level and at the establishment level. Establishments in growing industries do indeed exhibit higher churning flows, but a high average age of establishments reduces rather than increases churning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00669.x
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    Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper characterizes optimal renegotiation-proof rental contracts in a model with adverse selection and hidden information. It generalizes the work of Hart and Tirole (1988) to the case of time-varying valuations. The paper considers a durable-goods monopolist who serves a nonanonymous buyer with time-varying valuation for the seller's good. The buyer's valuation has a persistent and a transient component; both are private information. The paper shows that for some range of prior beliefs the seller strictly prefers leasing to selling.
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    Product Switching Cost and Strategic Flexibility (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the equilibrium degree of flexibility adopted by firms competing in oligopolistic product markets in which the value of flexibility arises from the initial presence of uncertainty over consumer preferences and its eventual resolution. The equilibrium choice of flexible mode depends on the following factors: (1) the cost of switching product design in response to revealed consumer preferences, (2) the difference in the acquisition costs of the flexible and dedicated modes, and (3) the precision of the ex ante information held by the firms regarding consumer preferences. The relationship between these factors and the equilibrium choice of modes is fully characterized.
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    Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovation that leads to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogenously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low-quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high-quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the “incumbency inertia” hypothesis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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    Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments: How are They Enforced? (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper addresses the strategic commitment value of various price and nonprice vertical contracts. Assuming contract offers are sufficiently public to have strategic importance, we focus on commitment as a necessary and separable condition to be met. The analysis has two components. First, considering the relationship between a monopolist manufacturer and his imperfectly competing retailers, enforcement conditions necessary for alternative vertical contracts to have commitment value are identified in the static (reputation-free) context. It is shown that external help (i.e., enforcement by nonsignatories) is necessary for bilateral minimum resale price maintenance (price floors) and exclusive territory contracts to have commitment value, whereas maximum resale price maintenance (price ceilings) do not require such help (i.e., they are internally enforcing). Second, the paper provides an analysis of the U.S. case law and discusses the empirical validity of the “external enforcement” assumption that is shown to underlie recent proposals to make certain vertical restraints illegal.
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    Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We show how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations (both simultaneous and sequential duopoly) depend on six industry characteristics. Low market volatility combined with intermediate market size favors inflexible technologies; large values of either volatility or size favor flexible technologies; low or intermediate values of both favor the coexistence of flexible and inflexible technologies. The possibility of a flexibility trap exists in industries of low volatility and intermediate size. Entry prevention can sometimes be achieved by inflexible technologies or flexible technologies, depending on the industry characteristics.
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    Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect efficiency in the product market, when a manager's effort is his/her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an improvement in efficiency in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager. Competition for managers might even eliminate the productive efficiency loss due to the asymmetry of information in the firm-manager relationship.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00089.x
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    Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x
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    Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer's perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Pareto-dominated equilibria are unlikely to arise, then the difference between our results and those of Mathewson and Winter (1987), who do not allow for nonlinear pricing, suggests an ironic twist on the notion that quantity discounts and other kinds of nonlinear pricing can provide an additional way for a manufacturer to foreclose a rival. By providing a manufacturer with increased flexibility (beyond linear pricing) to extract a retailer's surplus, nonlinear pricing may instead have the effect of reducing the incidence of observed market foreclosure.
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    Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Comment (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This note analyzes the incentives for cost reduction that different payment policies provide to profit-maximizing health-care providers. Ching-to Albert Ma (1994) proposes a reimbursement mechanism that seeks to induce first-best cost reduction by using a combination of cost reimbursement and prospective payment in a model where higher effort on the part of the health-care provider reduces treatment costs. This note shows that a mechanism of this type, generally, will not result in first-best cost reduction. However, such a mechanism is optimal when the payer has efficiency and distributional concerns.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00127.x
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    Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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    Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether and under what conditions managed competition or segmentation of the market between regulated monopolies achieves better results. In the spatial duopoly model analyzed here, unhindered competition generally results in an inefficient allocation. When the regulator knows the technologies, optimal managed competition results in distortions of the quality choice, but an optimal regulated-monopolies regime achieves the first best outcome. When the regulator is uncertain about the technologies, neither of these methods yields the first-best outcome. The regulated-monopolies regime still tends to produce better quality choices, but managed competition tends to be more effective at extracting rents from the firms. The overall comparison depends on some finer details of the environment.
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    Paying Customers to Switch (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the business practice of offering discounts to new customers in markets with switching costs. In a two-period homogeneous-good duopoly model, it is shown that the equilibrium amount of discounts increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer. In equilibrium, firms offer the same prices and discounts in a mature market even if they have different market shares, and the demands faced by these firms in a new market become more elastic. Firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while consumers need not necessarily benefit from it. There is costly equilibrium switching of consumers, which creates a dead-weight loss to the society.
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    Introduction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
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    The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices, and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
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    Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
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    Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.
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    Up in the Air: GTE's Experience in the MTA Auction for Personal Communication Services Licenses (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In late 1994, GTE, one of the largest telecommunications firms in the world, entered an auction for the rights to provide personal communications services (PCS) using the electromagnetic spectrum. The administering agency, the Federal Communications Commission, adopted a novel multiple-round format for the PCS auction. The format presented GTE with a complex bidding problem. This article describes how the GTE bidding team answered the following question: Given its budget and valuations and the information available about rival bidders, how should GTE bid to achieve the best attainable outcome?
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    Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper reviews the uses of laboratory experimental economics methods in the background research and implementation of the Personal Communication Systems auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission. The applications began during the rule making process with the testing of broad rules that might be implemented. Data from experiments were systematically used. The methods were used again in the software development process where several important contributions were made. Finally, experiences gained from the study of experimental auction processes were used in the actual management of the first auctions and in interpreting auction performance.
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    Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A series of two-player, second-price common-value auctions are reported. In symmetric auctions, bidders suffer from a winner's curse. In asymmetric auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage, the effect on bids and prices is proportional rather than explosive (the prediction of Nash equilibrium bidding theory). Although advantaged bidders are close to making best responses to disadvantaged bidders, the latter bid much more aggressively than in equilibrium, thereby earning negative average profits. Experienced bidders consistently bid closer to the Nash equilibrium than inexperienced bidders, although these adjustments towards equilibrium are small and at times uneven.
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    Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.
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    The Firm as a Multicontract Organization (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The firm is often considered as a nexus of contracts linking the management and its different stakeholders: claim-holders, workers, unions, customers, suppliers, and the state, among others. This paper surveys recent work in contract theory, the multiprincipal incentive theory, and the theory of side contracts, which provides some insights into the structure of those contracts and therefore into the structure of the firm. First, we discuss the incomplete contracting assumptions underlying these variations of the usual grand contract approach. Second, we explain how the theoretical lessons learned from this work—the distribution of contracting rights, the power of incentive schemes within organizations, and the design of communication channels—apply to the theory of the firm.
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    Introduction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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    Dynamic Equilibrium in the Hospital Industry (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We present a dynamic model of the hospital industry in which nonprofit and for-profit hospitals coexist and compete and are differentiated by their objective functions, investment technologies, and taxation rates. In our model, patients differ by income and type of insurance coverage, and choose admission to their preferred hospital, while hospitals choose investment, entry, exit, and pricing strategies. We estimate the parameters of the model with aggregate data and a GMM procedure. We then use the model to examine the effects of changes in the Medicare reimbursement system, universal health-care coverage, and taxation of nonprofits.
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    Exclusionary Equilibria in Health-Care Markets (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We have demonstrated that when providers of health insurance are perceived to be differentiated by consumers, circumstances may arise under which they find it advantageous to restrict the set of health-care providers that they approve to their customers. Even if all health-care providers are equally qualified and efficient, payers may choose to contract with a selected subset of them in order to secure more favorable contract terms. Moreover, in a concentrated health-care market that consists of two health insurance companies (payers) and two health-care providers (hospitals), both payers may choose to contract with only one of the hospitals while excluding the other completely from the market. When consumers' valuation of an extended choice of providers is small in comparison with the extent of differentiation that exists between the payers, such an exclusionary outcome is the unique equilibrium of the game.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00005.x
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    Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: During the 1980s the share of prescriptions sold by retail pharmacies that was accounted for by generic products roughly doubled. The price response to generic entry of brand-name products has been a source of controversy. In this paper we estimate models of price responses to generic entry in the market for brand-name and generic drugs. We study a sample of 32 drugs that lost patent protection during the early to mid-1980s. Our results provide evidence that brand-name prices increase after generic entry and are accompanied by large decreases in the price of generic drugs.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00075.x
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    Competition among Health Maintenance Organizations (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a model of competition among health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to analyze the effects of market power, scale economies, and asymmetric knowledge of health risk on market outcomes. We find that competition among HMOs may, but need not, ensure socially preferred outcomes. Market power or scale economies can sometimes admit socially preferred outcomes when they would otherwise not arise. Asymmetric knowledge of health risk may or may not be constraining. When it is constraining, a variety of patterns of incomplete health insurance can arise, along with excessive or insufficient treatment and preventive care for either high-risk or low-risk individuals.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00129.x
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    Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00235.x
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    Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In settings where the revelation principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision making, and at best achieve the same level of performance. This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract. For a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information, we compare centralized mechanisms where the principal retains sole responsibility for contracting and coordinating production, with delegation mechanisms where one agent (a manager) is delegated authority to contract with other agents and coordinate production. Relative to centralization, delegation entails a control loss, but allows decisions to be more sensitive to the manager's private information. We identify circumstances under which the flexibility gain outweighs the control loss, so that delegation emerges superior to centralized contracting.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00257.x
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    Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the integration of market and nonmarket strategies in a setting involving market competition and international trade policy where governments serve as bargaining agents for firms. In the case modeled, the Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) filed a Section 301 petition under US trade law against practices of Fuji Photo Film Company (Fujifilm) in the Japanese distribution system that Kodak alleges constitute trade barriers. The model has four components. The market model characterizes the competition between Fujifilm and Kodak, incorporating characteristics descriptive of the demand and market structure in Japan. Enforcement of an international trade agreement focusing on practices in a distribution system are problematic, so the second model characterizes the sustainability of concessions obtained through a trade agreement using a repeated game extension of the market model. The third model characterizes the bargaining between the US and Japanese governments using the preferences induced by the market model and the limits on sustainable concessions characterized in the second model. Using a common-agency framework, the fourth model represents the nonmarket competition between the two firms as they work to influence the bargaining positions of the governments. The result is a model in which market and nonmarket strategies are integrated in a formal theory of the resolution of trade disputes and the subsequent effects on market competition. The equilibrium characterized allows a comparative statics analysis of the synergies between market and nonmarket strategies.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00291.x
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    The Regulation of Predatory Firms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This article investigates the issue of predation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a “target” firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.jems0697_425.x
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    AN EXPLORATORY COMPARISON OF INCOME RISK IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Using longitudinal data, 1 estimate the impact of redistribution on the welfare cost of income risk in Germany and the United States. The estimates account fully for behavior because individuals in each country have responded optimally to that country's policy. The results indicate that the welfare cost of income risk is 5.4 percent of disposable income in Germany, 8.5 percent in the U.S. Redistribution has reduced these risks from their pre-tax, pre-transfer levels by 43 percent in Germany, 21 percent in the U.S. The political importance of income security is evident in both countries, as risk relief often eliminates the net burden of redistributive taxes among middle-class households. The conclusions are robust across several models of income expectations.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1995.tb00135.x
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    THE 1993 REVISED SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The 1993 System of National Accounts is a remarkable document, but the System also has some major imbalances and omissions. The present paper spells out four aspects of the SNA that require further development: (1) accounting for the costs of economic change; (2) delineation of information as an economic commodity; (3) overhaul of the methodology underlying input-output accounts; and, (4) consequences of the System's implicit use of compacted accounting. These developments can be incorporated in a Supplementary Document in the near future. We need not wait 25 years.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1995.tb00138.x
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    HISTORY AND MEASUREMENT IN THE SERVICE SECTOR: A REVIEW (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Economic Council of Canada, Employment in the Service SectorDelaunay, Jean-Claude, and Jean Gadrey, Services in Economic Thought: Three Centuries of DebateGriliches, Zvi (ed.), Output Measurement in the Service Sectors
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1995.tb00140.x
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    POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE 1980s (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: On average, poverty and income inequality increased in Latin America during the 1980s. Forty-six percent of the increase in poverty took place in the cities of Brazil alone, though part of this reflects the migration of poor rural inhabitants to urban areas. There is strong evidence that both income inequality and poverty mirrored the economic cycle, rising during recession and falling during recovery. Economies that grew (e.g. Colombia, Costa Rica) performed better with respect to poverty and income inequality than those that stagnated. In particular, countries that failed to stabilize effectively (e.g. Brazil, Peru) experienced substantial increases in poverty. Educational attainment has the greatest correlation with both income inequality and the probability of being poor. From a policy standpoint, there is a clear association between the provision of education, lessening of income inequality, and poverty reduction.
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    THE LOSS OF EARNINGS CAPABILITY FROM DISABILITY/HEALTH LIMITATIONS: TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL INDICATOR (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Health problems and physical and mental impairments can restrict the kind and amount of work that individuals can perform. Several studies have estimated the loss in earnings experienced by disabled/health-limited workers, but they do not examine the trend in this loss over time. The authors propose an alternative indicator of productivity loss that is more appropriate for inter temporal comparisons: “lost earnings capability”–the difference between the amount of money persons could potentially earn if they were free of disability/health limitations and the amount of money that they can actually earn given their limitations. The estimates indicate that the mean lost earnings capability per disabled/health-limited person grew over the period from 1973 to 1988, while the population with disabilities/health limitations fell. In 1973, lost earnings capacity totaled about 5.3 percent of Gross National Product (GNP); by 1988, the loss had fallen to about 4.5 percent of GNP as a consequence of the reduction in the number of people with limitations. Data are from the Current Population Surveys and the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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    INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Review Article on Industrial Efficiency in Six Nations
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1995.tb00110.x
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    THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURE IN PORTUGAL: 1980 AND 1990 (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: From 1980 to 1990 Portugal experienced a generalized liberalization of economic activity, due in large part to its 1986 integration in the European Union. This paper studies the changes in the Portuguese distribution of household income and expenditure during this period, using micro-data on household budgets and applying recent developments in statistical inference for Lorenz curves. We find a significant increase in six measures of welfare and an unambiguous decrease in the inequality of the respective distributions. Different explanations for the findings of decreased inequality are discussed.
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    PENSIONS AND THE ELDERLY (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 41 (1995), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Richard Burkhauser and Dallas Salisbury (Eds.), Pensions in a Changing EconomyJohn Williamson and Fred Pampel, Old Age in Comparative Perspective
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1995.tb00096.x
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    SPACE AND TIME COMPARISONS OF PURCHASING POWER PARITIES AND REAL VALUES (1984)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 30 (1984), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The calculation of purchasing power parities and quantity comparisons for a given year provides interesting information about the relative importance of countries. However, it is necessary to make these estimates annually in order to enable users to apply these parities for international comparison of annual data expressed in national currency. The paper deals with the problems related to merging spatial comparisons and temporal volume and price movements for the countries of the European Community. For these countries full information was collected in 1975 and in 1980, whereas in the intermediate years some price data were collected and price indices at a detailed level have also been collected. First the theoretical problems of consistency between the spatial results and temporal indices are discussed. Because no immediate consistency can be obtained, several methods are proposed to achieve consistency, by estimating one unique set of spatial and temporal indices. The available information for the period 1975-80 has been used in order to test the numerical differences between two sets of parities and price indices over time. Besides theoretical reasons for inconsistency, it is also necessary to take into account errors in the price observations or in the price indices. The results presented in the paper should be considered as provisional and further work will be undertaken to obtain better insights into the inconsistency between these sets of data.
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    THE HIDDEN ECONOMY: STATE AND PROSPECTS FOR MEASUREMENT (1984)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 30 (1984), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: To know the size and development of the hidden or underground economy is important for policy making, mainly because the measures undertaken may be misdirected if they are based on biased official statistics. The hidden economy can be measured by considering indicators. The direct methods are based on voluntary surveys and on tax auditing and other compliance methods. The indirect estimation methods rely on the identification of residuals with respect to income and expenditures, as well as in the labor and money markets. The strengths and weaknesses of each of these measurement approaches are discussed and the resulting estimates of the size of the hidden economy are compared. A different approach to measurement is to look at the determinants leading to the existence and growth of the hidden economy. Finally, the method of “unobserved variables” allows the combination of the two approaches by simultaneously considering the determinants and indicators of the under- ground economy. The results show a considerable range of sizes for a given country and year. Though there is a broad range of size estimates, there is general agreement that the hidden economy's size has been growing for all countries over recent decades. Further progress in quantitative knowledge about the hidden economy requires the development of a theoretical model which analyses the interdependencies between the official private sector, the hidden economy, and the public sector.
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    DECOMPOSING THEIL'S INCOME OF INCOME INEQUALITY INTO BETWEEN AND WITHIN COMPONENTS: A NOTE (1984)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 30 (1984), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1984.tb00479.x
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    THE TREATMENT OF PENSIONS AND INSURANCE IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS (1983)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 29 (1983), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In the course of the nearly two decades since the revised SNA was developed, the role of pensions and insurance in the developed western economies has been significantly altered. The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) is not fully consistent in its treatment of pension and insurance transactions. This paper examines whether, in view of the changed institutional context, a modification of the SNA treatment of this complex of flows would be desirable. It investigates the impact on household income and saving of adopting a somewhat more consistent transactor/transaction approach for all pension and insurance transactions. Four main topics are covered: (1) social security, (2) private pensions, (3) life insurance, and (4) casualty insurance. Each is considered in terms of the treatment of contributions, the treatment of benefits, and the handling of reserves and the income generated by them. The same sorts of problem arise in all four cases.
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    POSSIBLE SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND CORRESPONDING STATISTICAL REQUIREMENTS (1983)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 29 (1983), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Production maximization, together with an appropriate distribution of income and wealth, can no longer be considered as the exclusive objective of socio-economic policies. Economic and social life is accompanied by numerous hardships, constraints and damages which demand to be minimized. Combining these dual aims is not easy as no single model has yet been set up taking into account all these inter-relations. However, one may try to reduce the uncertainty about the statistical material that could be required for decision-making in this new context.
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    DIVIDING GOVERNMENT PRODUCT BETWEEN INTERMEDIATE AND FINAL USES: A COMMENT (1983)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 29 (1983), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1983.tb00649.x
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    COMITE DE LA CONFERENCE I.A.R.I.W./E.C.A. DE DOULA (Novembre 1982) (1983)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 29 (1983), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.1983.tb00652.x
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    THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN CANADA (1983)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 29 (1983), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: For estimates of the wealth distribution Canada depends on household surveys taken at 6–7 year intervals. The latest data from this source refer to household balance sheets in the spring of 1977. A comparison with 1970 shows that there is little change in the composition of wealth held by households but that inequality of the wealth distribution has been somewhat reduced. Wealth data by age of family head is presented in order to describe more fully the wealth distribution and composition in Canada.Weaknesses in the data are discussed as well as the difficulties of making appropriate adjustments to the data at the micro record level. For policy evaluation and formulation purposes the lack of comprehensive estimates inclusive of pension wealth as well as the small sample size (12,700 usable records) have been perceived as greater obstacles to utilizing the data than the underestimate in aggregate assets and debts which affects more the higher than the middle and lower ranges of the wealth distribution.
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    POVERTY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN BRAZIL (1983)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of income and wealth 29 (1983), S. 0 
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    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The article refutes the contention that Brazil's development has not benefited the poor and that rapid growth has had a polarizing effect on the distribution of income. It uses the National Household Expenditure Survey of 1974–75 to try to quantify the extent of poverty and concludes that the incòme levels of the poor have been underestimated in the past. The evidence suggests also that occupational and regional variables are powerful determinants of income stratification. Wage rate statistics convey information about long-term trends in income. The article notes considerable increases in rural wages during the 1970s as well as wage improvements in the urban informal sector. Shifts in the structure of employment have probably been the most powerful cause of economic improvement in Brazil. The enormous absorption of rural-urban migrants occurred without a flooding of the lower income urban categories. Social indicators and statistics referring to ownership of household durable consumer goods corroborate income and labor market evidence to the effect that there has been considerable progress for the poor during the 1970s. The article reviews statistical evidence bearing on distribution. There is little doubt that the distribution of income in Brazil is very skewed. It is not possible, however, to come to conclusions about changes that might have occurred in the degree of inequality over time. Finally, the article includes data on the “distribution of education” and the “distribution of life expectancy” and notes improvement over time in both.This article takes advantage of the Brazilian population census of 1980 to bring up to date some of the statistical material that bears on the issues of poverty and income distribution. First, the article describes the overall context of Brazilian development since 1960. The second part analyzes the extent of poverty in the mid-1970s. The third part deals with trends in wages, employment and selected welfare indicators. The last section briefly summarizes the information relating to income distribution: what is the extent of skewedness and how has it evolved over time?
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