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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The tragedy of the commons? (1993)
    Springer
    Economic theory 3 (1993), S. 413-426 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We provide a complete characterization of the set of Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of dynamic common-property resource games a la Levhari and Mirman (1980). We find that all MPE of such games exhibit remarkably regular dynamic behavior. Surprisingly, however, and despite their memoryless nature, MPE need not result in a “tragedy of the commons”, i.e., overexploitation of the resource relative to the first-best solutions. We show through an example that MPE could, in fact, lead to the reverse phenomenon of underexploitation of the resource. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that, in pay off space, MPE are always suboptimal.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01209694
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A theory of stopping time games with applications to product innovations and asset sales (1993)
    Springer
    Economic theory 3 (1993), S. 743-763 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In this paper, the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of a general class of stopping time games are studied. It is shown that there always exists a natural class of Markov Perfect Equilibria, called stopping equilibria. Such equilibria can be computed as a solution of a single agent stopping time problem, rather than of a fixed point problem. A complete characterization of stopping equilibria is presented. Conditions are given under which the outcomes of such equilibria span the set of all possible outcomes from perfect equilibria. Two economic applications of the theory, product innovations and the timing of asset sales, are discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01210269
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency (1994)
    Springer
    Economic theory 4 (1994), S. 483-503 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary In this paper we study a repeated principal-agent situation with moral hazard. We focus on a class of incentive schemes, calledbankruptcy contracts. The agent is “scored” in each period, and is paid a fixed wage per period until the current score falls to zero, at which time the agent is terminated and the principal hires a new agent. The agent's current score at any time equals an initial score, plus the total output up to that time, minus an amount that is proportional to the total time. With standard assumptions about the utility functions of the principal and agent, we characterize the second-best bankruptcy contracts and show that in such a contract, the principal pays the agent an efficiency wage. We also demonstrate that such contracts lead to approximately first-best (Pareto efficient) outcomes if the principal and agent are sufficiently patient (have small discount rates). Most importantly, if the two players have a common discount rateδ, then the loss of efficiency under the second-best bankruptcy contract goes to zero at least as fast asO(gd 1/2lnδ). In order to obtain increased precision, the analysis is carried out in a continuous-time framework.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213620
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models (1992)
    Springer
    Economic theory 2 (1992), S. 197-214 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We study a strategic version of the neoclassical growth model under possible production uncertainty. For a general specification of the problem, we establish (i) the existence of stationary Markov equilibria in pure strategies for the discounted game, and (ii) the convergence, under a boundedness condition, of discounted equilibrium strategies to a pure strategy stationary Markovian equilibrium of the undiscounted game as the discount factor tends to unity. The same techniques can be used to prove that such convergence also obtains in all finitestate, finite-action stochastic games satisfying a certain “full communicability” condition. These results are of special interest since there are well known examples in the literature in which the limit of discounted equilibria fails to be an equilibrium of the undiscounted game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01211440
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovation that leads to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogenously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low-quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high-quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the “incumbency inertia” hypothesis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00563.x
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