ISSN:
1617-7134
Keywords:
fiscal policy
;
monetary policy
;
time discount rate
;
inflation target
;
E52
;
E62
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This paper considers a closed macroeconomy where the monetary authority pursues an inflation target and policy outcomes are the consequence of a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities. The specification of the macroeconomic framework is characterized by nonlinearities which lead to multiple equilibria with differing stability properties. Employing a calibrated model and simulations derived using the Mathematica package, the stability properties of the economy and the likely choice of equilibrium are examined. Within this framework, the dynamic consequences of different time discount rates for the fiscal authority are investigated, both in a world of certainty and also in a world of uncertainty. It is shown that, in a world of certainty, it will be optimal to choose the fiscal authority's time discount rate equal to the market rate of interest. However, depending on the degree of uncertainty in evaluating the time discount rates of consumers and of the fiscal authority, it may be appropriate to bias the fiscal authority's discount rate above or below the expected interest rate.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01234646
Permalink
