ALBERT

Description: In this paper, the natural and induced space environment factors affecting materials performance on ISS are described in some detail. The emphasis will be on ISS flight experience and the more significant design and development issues of the last two years. The intent is to identify and document the set of space environment factors, affecting materials, that are producing the largest impacts on the ISS flight hardware verification and acceptance process and on ISS flight operations. Orbital inclination (S1.6 ) and altitude (nominal3S0 km to 400 km altitude) determine the set of natural environment factors affecting the functional life of materials and subsystems on ISS. ISS operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere in well-defined fluxes of atomic oxygen, other ionospheric plasma species, and solar UV, VUV, and x-ray radiation, as well as galactic cosmic rays, trapped radiation, and solar cosmic rays (1,2). The high latitude orbital environment also exposes external surfaces to significantly less well-defined or predictable fluxes of higher energy trapped electrons and auroral electrons (3 ,4). The micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment is an important determinant of spacecraft design and operations in any orbital inclination. Environment factors induced by ISS flight operations include ram-wake effects, magnetic induction voltages arising from flight through Earth's magnetic field, hypergolic thruster plume impingement from proximity operations of visiting vehicles, materials outgassing, venting and dumping of fluids, ISS thruster operations, as well as specific electrical power system interactions with the ionospheric plasma (S-7). ISS must fly in a very limited number of approved flight attitudes leading to location specific environmental exposures and extreme local thermal environments (8). ISS is a large vehicle and produces a deep wake structure from which both ionospheric plasma and neutrals (atomic oxygen) are largely excluded (9-11). At high latitude, the ISS wake may produce a spacecraft charging environment similar to that experienced by the DMSP and Freja satellites (800 to 100 km altitude polar orbits), especially during geo-magnetic disturbances (12-14). ISS is also subject to magnetic induction voltages (VxB L) on conducting structure, a result of high velocity flight through Earth's magnetic field. The magnitude of the magnetic induction voltage varies with location on ISS, as well as the relative orientation of the vehicle velocity vector and planetary magnetic field vector, leading to maximum induction voltages at high latitude (15). The space environment factors, natural and induced, that have had the largest impact on pre-launch ISS flight hardware verification and flight operations during the first two years of ISS flight operations are listed below and grouped according to the physical and chemical processes driving their interaction with ISS materials.

Description: An independent twelve degree-of-freedom simulation of the X-43A separation trajectory was created with the Program to Optimize Simulated trajectories (POST II). This simulation modeled the multi-body dynamics of the X-43A and its booster and included the effect of two pyrotechnically actuated pistons used to push the vehicles apart as well as aerodynamic interaction forces and moments between the two vehicles. The simulation was developed to validate trajectory studies conducted with a 14 degree-of-freedom simulation created early in the program using the Automatic Dynamic Analysis of Mechanics Systems (ADAMS) simulation software. The POST simulation was less detailed than the official ADAMS-based simulation used by the Project, but was simpler, more concise and ran faster, while providing similar results. The increase in speed provided by the POST simulation provided the Project with an alternate analysis tool. This tool was ideal for performing separation control logic trade studies that required the running of numerous Monte Carlo trajectories.

Description: On occasion, seemingly normal operations can have significant effects upon the closed environment of the International Space Station (ISS). An example of such a case occurred on February 20, 2002 when a nominal Metal Oxide (MetOx) canister regeneration operation onboard the ISS resulted in an unexpected, foul odor that affected the crew and station operations. A case study summarizing the root cause for the event and steps taken to ensure that future MetOx regeneration operations proceed safely is presented. Included in the summary are engineering analyses and environmental monitoring results supporting the root cause assessment as well as testing conducted and flight operations changes implemented to ensure safe operations.

Description: An advanced concept in in-space transportation currently being studied is the Momentum-Exchange/Electrodynamic Reboost Tether System (MXER). The system acts as a large momentum wheel, imparting a Av to a payload in low earth orbit (LEO) at the expense of its own orbital energy. After throwing a payload, the system reboosts itself using an electrodynamic tether to push against Earth's magnetic field and brings itself back up to an operational orbit to prepare for the next payload. The ability to reboost itself allows for continued reuse of the system without the expenditure of propellants. Considering the cost of lifting propellant from the ,ground to LEO to do the same Av boost at $10000 per pound, the system cuts the launch cost of the payload dramatically, and subsequently, the MXER system pays for itself after a small number of missions.1 One of the technical hurdles to be overcome with the MXER concept is the rendezvous maneuver. The rendezvous window for the capture of the payload is on the order of a few seconds, as opposed to traditional docking maneuvers, which can take as long ets necessary to complete a precise docking. The payload, therefore, must be able to match its orbit to meet up with the capture device on the end of the tether at a specific time and location in the future. In order to be able to determine that location, the MXER system must be numerically propagated forward in time to predict where the capture device will be at that instant. It should be kept in mind that the propagation computation must be done faster than real-time. This study focuses on the efforts to find and/or build the tools necessary to numerically propagate the motion of the MXER system as accurately as possible.

Description: An inflatable structural system to deploy a space system such as a solar shield, an antenna or another similar instrument, requires a stiffening element after it is extended by the inflated gas pressure. The stiffening element has to be packaged in a folded configuration before the deployment. It must be relatively small, lightweight, non-damaging to the inflated system, and be able to become stiff in a short time. One stiffening method is to use a flexible material inserted in the deployable system, which, upon a temperature curing, can become stiff and is capable to support the entire structure. There are two conditions during the space operations when the inflated volume could be damaged: during the transonic region of the launch phase and when the curing of the rigidizing element occurs. In both cases, an excess of pressure within the volume containing the rigid element could burst the walls of the low-pressure gas inflated portion of the system. This paper investigates those two conditions and indicates the vents, which will prevent those damaging overpressures. Vent openings at the non-inflated volumes have been calculated for the conditions existing during the launch. Those vents allow the initially folded volume to exhaust the trapped atmospheric gas at approximately the same rate as the ambient pressure drops. That will prevent pressure gradients across the container walls which otherwise could be as high as 14.7 psi. The other condition occurring during the curing of the stiffening element has been investigated. This has required the testing of the element to obtain the gas generation during the curing and the transformation from a pliable material to a rigid one. The tested material is a composite graphite/epoxy weave. The outgassing of the uncured sample at 121C was carried with the Cahn Microbalance and with other outgassing facilities including the micro-CVCM ASTM E-595 facility. The tests provided the mass of gas evolved during the test. That data, including the chemical nature of the evolved gas, provided the data for the calculation of the pressure produced within the volume. The evaluation of the areas of the vents that would prevent excessive pressures and provide a rapid release of the gas away from contamination sensitive surfaces has been carried out. The pressure decay with time has been indicated.

Description: An independent assessment team (IAT) was formed and met on April 2, 2001, at Lockheed Martin in Denver, Colorado, to aid in understanding a technical issue for the Mars Odyssey spacecraft scheduled for launch on April 7, 2001. An RP1280A field-programmable gate array (FPGA) from a lot of parts common to the SIRTF, Odyssey, and Genesis missions had failed on a SIRTF printed circuit board. A second FPGA from an earlier Odyssey circuit board was also known to have failed and was also included in the analysis by the IAT. Observations indicated an abnormally high failure rate for flight RP1280A devices (the first flight lot produced using this flow) at Lockheed Martin and the causes of these failures were not determined. Standard failure analysis techniques were applied to these parts, however, additional diagnostic techniques unique for devices of this class were not used, and the parts were prematurely submitted to a destructive physical analysis, making a determination of the root cause of failure difficult. Any of several potential failure scenarios may have caused these failures, including electrostatic discharge, electrical overstress, manufacturing defects, board design errors, board manufacturing errors, FPGA design errors, or programmer errors. Several of these mechanisms would have relatively benign consequences for disposition of the parts currently installed on boards in the Odyssey spacecraft if established as the root cause of failure. However, other potential failure mechanisms could have more dire consequences. As there is no simple way to determine the likely failure mechanisms with reasonable confidence before Odyssey launch, it is not possible for the IAT to recommend a disposition for the other parts on boards in the Odyssey spacecraft based on sound engineering principles.

Description: The trouble was that the shuttle was still under development when that schedule was set. As time went on, the Shuttle had problems with its high pressure turbines, thermal protection tiles, engines, and more. The early launch dates had to be scrapped. NASA Headquarters told us, "We re going to delay your launch two years to allow more time for the Shuttle development to take place. You can slow your development accordingly." Right off the bat, we looked into the celestial mechanics and how they would affect us. The difficulty in launching a spacecraft to Jupiter changes on a year-to- year basis, in a cyclical pattern that repeats about every ten or twelve years. In order to achieve the velocity needed to get from low earth orbit to Jupiter, an upper stage is required in the Shuttle. For the 1982 launch the upper stage was adequate, but it could not provide the velocity we would need in 1984. This meant we would have to separate the Galileo probe from the Galileo orbiter before launch and put each of them on separate Shuttles with separate upper stages. When we told the folks at Headquarters this, they told us, "Okay we'll give you two Shuttle launches."

Description: There are a number of approaches to advanced guidance and control that have the potential for achieving the goals of significantly increasing reusable launch vehicle (or any space vehicle that enters an atmosphere) safety and reliability, and reducing the cost. This paper examines some approaches to entry guidance. An effort called Integration and Testing of Advanced Guidance and Control Technologies has recently completed a rigorous testing phase where these algorithms faced high-fidelity vehicle models and were required to perform a variety of representative tests. The algorithm developers spent substantial effort improving the algorithm performance in the testing. This paper lists the test cases used to demonstrate that the desired results are achieved, shows an automated test scoring method that greatly reduces the evaluation effort required, and displays results of the tests. Results show a significant improvement over previous guidance approaches. The two best-scoring algorithm approaches show roughly equivalent results and are ready to be applied to future vehicle concepts.

Description: The end-to-end test would verify the complex sequence of events from lander separation to landing. Due to the large distances involved and the significant delay time in sending a command and receiving verification, the lander needed to operate autonomously after it separated from the orbiter. It had to sense conditions, make decisions, and act accordingly. We were flying into a relatively unknown set of conditions-a Martian atmosphere of unknown pressure, density, and consistency to land on a surface of unknown altitude, and one which had an unknown bearing strength.

Description: Mars missions often employ aerobraking upon arrival at Mars as a low-mass method to gradually reduce the orbit period from a high-altitude, highly elliptical insertion orbit to the final science orbit. Two recent missions that made use of aerobraking were Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) and Mars Odyssey. Both spacecraft had solar arrays as the main aerobraking surface area. Aerobraking produces a high heat load on the solar arrays, which have a large surface area exposed to the airflow and relatively low mass. To accurately model the complex behavior during aerobraking, the thermal analysis must be tightly coupled to the flight mechanics, aerodynamics, and atmospheric modeling efforts being performed during operations. To properly represent the temperatures prior to and during the drag pass, the model must include the orbital solar and planetary heat fluxes. The correlation of the thermal model to flight data allows a validation of the modeling process, as well as information on what processes dominate the thermal behavior. This paper describes the thermal modeling method that was developed for this purpose, as well as correlation for two flight missions, and a discussion of improvements to the methodology.