Publication Date:
2016-11-01
Description:
Climate damage and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation cost plays important roles in a region’s willingness and incentives to join the global climate coalition. Negotiation of climate treaty can be modeled as a cooperative bargaining game of externality provision. The core of this game is a good representation of incentives of the participants. In this paper, we examine the relationship between the shocks of mitigation cost/climate damage and the shifts of the core of cooperative bargaining game of climate negotiation within the framework of RICE [Nordhaus and Yang, 1996. A regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies. American Economic Review, 86, 741–765], a widely used integrated assessment model (IAM) of climate change. Constructing a method that maps the core allocations onto a convex hull on the simplex of social welfare weights, we describe the scope of the core in simple metrics and capture the shifts of the core representation on the simplex in response to the shocks of mitigation cost and climate damage. A series of simulations are conducted in RICE to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach explored here. In addition, policy implications of methodological results are indicated.
Print ISSN:
2010-0078
Electronic ISSN:
2010-0086
Topics:
Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
,
Geosciences
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