Call number:
PIK N 076-09-0146
Description / Table of Contents:
Contents: 1 Introduction ; 1.1 Integrated Assessment of Climate Change ; 1.2 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Environmental Issues ; 1.3 Motivation and Scope of This Research ; 2 Modeling Global Environmental Issues as a Cooperative Game of Stock Externality Provisions ; 2.1 Introduction ; 2.2 Efficient Provision of Detrimental Externality and the Incentives ; 2.3 The Game of Stock Externality Provisions ; 2.4 The Solution Concepts of the Cooperative Game ; 2.5 Efficiency and Game-Theoretic Solutions ; 3 The RICE Model ; 3.1 An Overview ; 3.2 Model Description and Calibration ; 3.3 Solution Concepts in the RICE Model ; 3.4 Solution Algorithms ; 4 Cooperative Game Solutions and Other Solutions in the RICE Model ; 4.1 Two Benchmarks: BaU and Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium Scenarios ; 4.2 Why Conventional Solutions Are Unfit for Analyzing International Cooperation ; 4.3 Cooperative Game Solutions of the RICE Model ; 4.4 Synthesis ; 4.5 Side Payments toward Equalization of Mitigation Costs ; 5 Analysis of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE ; 5.1 Stability of the Grand Coalition ; 5.2 Sensitivity Analysis from a Strategic Perspective ; 6 Policy Applications of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE ; 6.1 Incentive Compatibilities of Unilateral Actions ; 6.2 Renegotiation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) ; 6.3 Distribution Analysis of GHG Mitigation Policies from Strategic Perspectives ; 6.4 The Second-Best Subcoalitions of GHG Mitigations ; Epilogue: Further Research Directions ; Appendixes ; 1. The Description of the RICE Model ; 2. GAMS Code of the Example in Section 2.1 ; 3. GAMS Codes of the RICE Model (Core Part) ; Notes ; References ; Index
Type of Medium:
Monograph available for loan
Pages:
X, 191 S. : graph. Darst.
ISBN:
9780262240543
Location:
A 18 - must be ordered
Branch Library:
PIK Library
