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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 511-523 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: Aumann-Shapley pricing ; cost allocation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Cost allocation problems arise in many contexts in economics and management science. In a typical problem that we have in mind, a decision maker must decide how to allocate the joint cost of production among several commodities using prices. Furthermore, these prices must satisfy certain reasonable postulates among which is the requirement that total revenue associated with these prices must cover total cost. In this paper, we investigate a generalization of Aumann-Shapley pricing, called Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing, that allows for asymmetric pricing of commodities even when those commodities affect costs in a symmetric fashion. Weighted AS pricing is a natural extension of (symmetric) Aumann-Shapley pricing, and may be considered a non-atomic analogue of Owen's modified diagonal formula (with respect to the multilinear extension) for the weighted TU Shapley Value.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of regulatory economics 1 (1989), S. 319-339 
    ISSN: 1573-0468
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper has two objectives. The first is to reappraise the potential competitiveness of local exchange telecommunications markets, in light of recent arguments in favor of deregulation. The second objective is to discuss regulatory reform strategies. We conclude that local telecommunications markets retain the essential characteristics of a natural monopoly, but that many of the regulatory reforms are nevertheless desirable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Telecommunication systems 2 (1993), S. 159-184 
    ISSN: 1572-9451
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Electrical Engineering, Measurement and Control Technology
    Notes: Abstract In this paper, we describe two cost allocation methodologies which may be used to determine prices for a regulated telecommunications supplier offering heterogeneous services on a broadband network. Both methodologies can be characterized by sets of plausible axioms that one could argue should be satisfied by any pricing rule. One of the approaches leads to the Aumann-Shapley pricing rule, which is well known in the literature. The other approach leads to a pricing rule based on the Shapley value of a related cooperative game. While these approaches are similar in motivation, they differ in the technical requirements which must be imposed on the underlying cost function, and we argue that Shapley value pricing is more appropriate in a telecommunications context. We are able to explicitly determine Shapley value prices for customers who differ from one another in terms of their arrival rates, service rates, costs of lost work, and the number of simultaneous channels which they require.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Mathematical methods of operations research 43 (1996), S. 73-95 
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper we consider the class of probabilistic value pricing mechanisms for cost allocation problems, which are related to probabilistic values for finite games with transferable utility. We characterize probabilistic value pricing axiomatically, as well as several related pricing mechanisms, including semivalue pricing (symmetric pricing without cost sharing), quasivalue pricing (cost sharing pricing without symmetry), and weighted Shapley value pricing. We also describe a class of problems in which (symmetric) Shapley value pricing coincides with Aumann-Shapley pricing, and a class of problems for which every quasivalue pricing mechanism is supportable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Publication Date: 1996-02-01
    Print ISSN: 1432-2994
    Electronic ISSN: 1432-5217
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Published by Springer
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