Abstract
In this paper we consider the class of probabilistic value pricing mechanisms for cost allocation problems, which are related to probabilistic values for finite games with transferable utility. We characterize probabilistic value pricing axiomatically, as well as several related pricing mechanisms, including semivalue pricing (symmetric pricing without cost sharing), quasivalue pricing (cost sharing pricing without symmetry), and weighted Shapley value pricing. We also describe a class of problems in which (symmetric) Shapley value pricing coincides with Aumann-Shapley pricing, and a class of problems for which every quasivalue pricing mechanism is supportable.
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McLean, R.P., Sharkey, W.W. Probabilistic value pricing. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 43, 73–95 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01303435
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01303435