ISSN:
1573-7136
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This paper investigatesinvestment decisions in a divisionalized firm, in which an upstreamdivision supplies an intermediate product to a downstream division.The upstream division's investment includes two simultaneousdecisions. First, the division determines its capacity level,and second, it invests in a firm specific production technologythat lowers the marginal cost of production. Both the capacityand the specificity decision must be made before the actual demandfor the intermediate product is observable. Since the terms ofinternal trade are negotiated between the divisions, the upstreamdivision faces the well-known holdup problem and thus has incentivesto underinvest. It turns out that a simple contract stipulatinga minimum quantity and a transfer price for excessive quantitiesis sufficient to induce the efficient capacity and specificitydecisions.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009604809480
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