ALBERT — All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

Hits per page

hits 1 - 2 | 2 hits

Sorting

Electronic Resource

Changes in Germany's Bank-Based Financial System: implications for corporate governance (2005)

Vitols, Sigurt

Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Corporate governance 13 (2005), S. 0

add to mindlist on the mindlist

Details

ISSN: 1467-8683

Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005

Topics: Political Science , Economics

Notes: Throughout the 20th century, banks have dominated Germany's financial system and also played a key role in corporate governance. Recently, however, a number of efforts have been made to increase the role of markets within this bank-based financial system, including regulatory innovations and a reform of the pension system. This article finds that, despite these changes, there are a surprising number of continuities in the structure of the financial system. The German financial system can therefore still be characterised as bank-based. Furthermore, banks have only partially withdrawn from the stakeholder system of corporate governance, and to some extent been replaced by insurance companies. An explanation for these continuities is advanced which emphasises stability in household investment behaviour and in patterns of company sector demand for finance.

Type of Medium: Electronic Resource

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00433.x

Permalink

	Location	Call Number	Expected	Availability

Others were also interested in ...

Paper (German National Licenses)

Fulltext

Electronic Resource

Are German Banks Different? (1998)

Vitols, Sigurt

Springer

Small business economics 10 (1998), S. 79-91

add to mindlist on the mindlist

Details

ISSN: 1573-0913

Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Topics: Economics

Notes: Abstract In recent years there has been a vigorous revival of the long-standing debate about the “uniqueness” of German banks. To date little consensus has been reached; while some see few differences between the role of banks in Germany and in other countries, others claim that universal banks' equity shareholdings in and nomination of representatives to the boards of nonfinancial firms are the key institutional features driving the rest of the “German model” of long-term investment in high-quality, internationally competitive manufacturing. This article argues that the uniqueness of the German banking system lies (1) in its unusually high capacity to provide industrial finance in the form of long-term debt capital, and (2) in its avoidance of the “speculative boom-credit crunch” cycle experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in the 1980s and early 1990s. These two key characteristics are attributable to a regulatory framework which involves strict prudential regulation, access to long-term refinancing sources, and a federalist form of corporatism. Furthermore, the behavior of German banks must be analyzed within a broader institutional system of economic governance which includes corporatist labor market institutions and a relatively large and modern SME sector.