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    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contracts, the Spot Market Wage and Unemployment Benefits (2003)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Metroeconomica 54 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-999X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a model of the labour market with a contract and a spot market sector. Contracts are binding and enforceable, but unemployed contract workers are free to work in the spot market. The contracting wage is shown to be constant across states. A non-trivial result shows that the spot market wage is increasing with product price. An increase in product price has an ambiguous effect on contract employment. An increase in unemployment benefits increases the contracting sector wage whilst stabilizing the spot market wage, and may have ambiguous effects on unemployment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-999X.00176
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Delegation, Union Leaders and Capital Allocation (1997)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    Labour 11 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9914
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. Strong union members precommit by hiring a weak leader, whilst weak union members hire a strong union leader. Governments can increase the efficiency of capital by reducing the intrinsic union strength, but could reduce the efficiency of capital if intrinsic internal union leader strength is reduced.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9914.00036
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