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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 389-403 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data. When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Nash equilibrium, Bayesian learning, Experimental. ; JEL Classification Numbers:C72, C91, D83.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Recent experiments on mixed-strategy play in experimental games reject the hypothesis that subjects play a mixed strategy even when that strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium prediction. However, in a three-person matching-pennies game played with perfect monitoring and complete payoff information, we cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Given this support for mixed-strategy play, we then consider two qualitatively different learning theories (sophisticated Bayesian and naive Bayesian) which predict that the amount of information given to subjects will determine whether they can learn to play the predicted mixed strategies. We reject the hypothesis that subjects play the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium when they do not have complete payoff information. This finding suggests that players did not use sophisticated Bayesian learning to reach the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 6 (1995), S. 389-403 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
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    Menasha, Wis. : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    The Accounting Review. 69:4 (1994:Oct.) 593 
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination gains to acquiring and sharing perfect information are sufficient to break Brander and Lewis's (1986) result wherein both firms issue debt to their mutual disadvantage. However, more interesting may be the robustness of that result when uncertainty is low or when information is imperfect. The key insight is that the consequences of issuing debt are invariant to the level of uncertainty, given that firms can recalibrate the terms of debt to achieve the Stackelberg solution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of accounting studies 1 (1996), S. 51-71 
    ISSN: 1573-7136
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper investigates the rationale for the measurement of a firm's periodic performance through the accounting classification of its cash outflows into operating cash flow and investment. We show that when the accounting system does not attempt to measure periodic performance and reports only aggregate cash flow, equilibrium capital market prices are such that there is a perverse informational cost to investment over and above the real cost of investment. This induces distortions in the firms' equilibrium investment. We show that other sources of information, consisting of forecasts of future returns to investment play a vital counterbalancing role when the accounting system is inadequate in this way. An accounting signal that provides noisy information on periodic performance decreases the informational cost to investment and moves the economy closer to first best.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of accounting studies 2 (1998), S. 207-229 
    ISSN: 1573-7136
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Residual income subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. Residual income can be calculated each period from current accounting information, unlike discounted cash flow (DCF), which requires the knowledge of future cash flows. This paper provides a normative justification for residual-income maximization by showing that if investment decisions are made myopically each period to maximize residual income, the resulting path asymptotically maximizes discounted cash flow. Thus, under the assumptions of the model, residual-income maximization is a heuristic that leads to the long-run DCF-optimum.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of accounting studies 2 (1998), S. 231-264 
    ISSN: 1573-7136
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Economic value added, which is the currently popular term for the traditional accounting concept of residual income (RI), subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. This paper provides an activity-based cost system that supports RI maximization. We construct a model of participative budgeting for a multi-activity firm in which the cost system allocates plant and equipment cost to products using a formula that includes the interest charge. The budget system we design enables decision makers to identify RI-improving opportunities for outsourcing and dropping unprofitable products. The budget system also has the “open-architecture” property that additional informal communication among activity managers can only serve to increase RI.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    [s.l.] : Nature Publishing Company
    Nature biotechnology 16 (1998), S. 525-529 
    ISSN: 1546-1696
    Source: Nature Archives 1869 - 2009
    Topics: Biology , Process Engineering, Biotechnology, Nutrition Technology
    Notes: [Auszug] This article, the first in a two-article series, reviews some reliable ways for sophisticated companies to identify investment opportunities. The object of any capital budgeting decision is to maximize the value of the firm through the identification of strategic investment projects that create ...
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of accounting studies 1 (1996), S. 51-71 
    ISSN: 1573-7136
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper investigates the rationale for the measurement of a firm's periodic performance through the accounting classification of its cash outflows into operating cash flow and investment. We show that when the accounting system does not attempt to measure periodic performance and reports only aggregate cash flow, equilibrium capital market prices are such that there is a perverse informational cost to investment over and above the real cost of investment. This induces distortions in the firms' equilibrium investment. We show that other sources of information, consisting of forecasts of future returns to investment.play a vital counterbalancing role when the accounting system is inadequate in this way. An accounting signal that provides noisy information on periodic performance decreases the informational cost to investment and moves the economy closer to first best.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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