Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA
:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Journal of business finance & accounting
24 (1997), S. 0
ISSN:
1468-5957
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
This paper analyzes a game-theoretic model in which a client can potentially avoid a going-concern opinion and its self-fulfilling prophecy by switching auditors. Incumbent auditors are less willing to express a going-concern opinion the more credible the client's threat of dismissal and the stronger the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Similarly, the client is more willing to switch auditors the more likely it is that auditors' reporting judgments will differ and the stronger the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Further, with greater noise in the auditor's forecast of client viability, the auditor tends to express fewer going-concern opinions.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00131
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