ALBERT

Notes: The current safety criteria for a high hazard dam focus on protecting the dam during a large flood. While protecting the dam does help to protect downstream people and property, the two objectives are not the same. Instead, the criteria should focus on lowering property damage (including damage to the dam) and preventing flood deaths.High hazard dams must survive a design flood in the current safety criteria. However, experts don't agree on the size of the peak flow that meets this criteria.Statistical hydrologists have proposed an alternative to using professional judgment to specify the design flood. Unfortunately, peak flow distributions cannot be estimated with confidence for extreme floods given available data.A major safety goal is to prevent deaths from floods. Preventing deaths is a major reason for constructing the spillway to handle extreme floods so that the dam doesn't fail due to overtopping. However, even if the dam doesn't fail, the spilled floods could cause many deaths. A better approach is to warn people to get them out of harm's way if a flood is coming.Retrofitting existing dams that could pass a “probable maximum flood” (PMF) when built is almost never a good use of funds. Instead, funds would be spent better by focusing on preventing damage from small floods, lowering the damage from medium-sized floods, and warning people in the event of a flood that could pose risks to life.

Notes: How should a regulatory agency interpret a risk analysis that concludes there is a small increase in risk? The agency must decide on behalf of society whether the increased risk is large enough to justify banning the risky activity or taking some other step to lessen the risks. In a companion paper (Songer et al.), we conclude that licensing insulin using persons to drive commercial motor vehicles in interstate commerce would result in 42 additional crashes each year. Here we address risk management issues by interpreting the number of additional crashes and the relative risks of the prospective handicapped drivers. Are the number of additional crashes (42) significant? Is the increase in the annual crash risk (from 0.00785 to 0.032 for non-insulin dependent and 0.048 for insulin dependent persons) significant? Are the relative risks significant for all insulin using drivers (4.7)? For drivers with a history of severe hypoglycemic reactions (19.8)? How should society tradeoff risk increases for increases in opportunity for these handicapped persons? We review other social decisions concerning highway safety: Accepting the increasing risks of letting 16 year olds drive, allowing extremely light cars, allowing some unsafe highways, and allowing extremely unsafe driving conditions at some times of day. We conclude that the additional risks from insulin using persons are well within the current accepted range of risks. Currently, 70% of states permit insulin using persons to drive trucks within their state. Nonetheless, the social cost, due to fatalities, injuries, and property damage from allowing a person with a history of severe hypoglycemic reactions to drive is more than $19,700 per year.

Notes: Modern technology, together with an advanced economy, can provide a good or service in myriad ways, giving us choices on what to produce and how to produce it. To make those choices more intelligently, society needs to know not only the market price of each alternative, but the associated health and environmental consequences. A fair comparison requires evaluating the consequences across the whole “life cycle”—from the extraction of raw materials and processing to manufacture/construction, use, and end-of-life—of each alternative. Focusing on only one stage (e.g., manufacture) of the life cycle is often misleading. Unfortunately, analysts and researchers still have only rudimentary tools to quantify the materials and energy inputs and the resulting damage to health and the environment. Life cycle assessment (LCA) provides an overall framework for identifying and evaluating these implications. Since the 1960s, considerable progress has been made in developing methods for LCA, especially in characterizing, qualitatively and quantitatively, environmental discharges. However, few of these analyses have attempted to assess the quantitative impact on the environment and health of material inputs and environmental discharges. Risk analysis and LCA are connected closely. While risk analysis has characterized and quantified the health risks of exposure to a toxicant, the policy implications have not been clear. Inferring that an occupational or public health exposure carries a nontrivial risk is only the first step in formulating a policy response. A broader framework, including LCA, is needed to see which response is likely to lower the risk without creating high risks elsewhere. Even more important, LCA has floundered at the stage of translating an inventory of environmental discharges into estimates of impact on health and the environment. Without the impact analysis, policymakers must revert to some simple rule, such as that all discharges, regardless of which chemical, which medium, and where they are discharged, are equally toxic. Thus, risk analysts should seek LCA guidance in translating a risk analysis into policy conclusions or even advice to those at risk. LCA needs the help of RA to go beyond simplistic assumptions about the implications of a discharge inventory. We demonstrate the need and rationale for LCA, present a brief history of LCA, present examples of the application of this tool, note the limitations of LCA models, and present several methods for incorporating risk assessment into LCA. However, we warn the reader not to expect too much. A comprehensive comparison of the health and environmental implications of alternatives is beyond the state of the art. LCA is currently not able to provide risk analysts with detailed information on the chemical form and location of the environmental discharges that would allow detailed estimation of the risks to individuals due to toxicants. For example, a challenge for risk analysts is to estimate health and other risks where the location and chemical speciation are not characterized precisely. Providing valuable information to decisionmakers requires advances in both LCA and risk analysis. These two disciplines should be closely linked, since each has much to contribute to the other.

Notes: Many risks have the property that large numbers of people are exposed and have little or no individual control over the risks they face. Dams, nuclear power plants, and recombinant DNA research have proven controversial not simply because there is vast uncertainty about the true level of risk associated with each, but because a fundamental issue is that in each case social risks can be lessened by spending more on safety: dams can be designed to withstand larger earthquakes, nuclear plants can have additional safety equipment, and DNA research could be done in yet more carefully isolated laboratories. Since each person will have preferences regarding the proper trade-off between increased cost and increased safety, there is little possibility of consensus. More importantly, we show that a voting process for expressing individual preferences can be manipulated and is seriously flawed in the sense that it does not lead to an “efficient” outcome. In addition, we show that virtually all people are unhappy with the safety decision, in the sense that each would prefer either a safer or a cheaper outcome. Thus, making safety decisions that affect a large group of people who will not be able to control the outcome is even more difficult than has been appreciated. We suggest some ways of handling some of the difficulties.