ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Correcting Trade Distortions in a Small Open Economy (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of international economics 4 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9396
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.1996.tb00105.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “Export Experience” under Borrowing Constraints (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of international economics 12 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9396
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper develops a two-period, two-country, multigood model with endogenous investment. Borrowing is subject to quantitative restrictions. The authors examine the effect of promoting exports in period 1 on the level of exports in period 2. They consider a number of scenarios depending on how the initial values of the policy instruments are determined, and compare the “export-experience” effects under the different scenarios.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2004.00485.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Logic of Aid in an Intertemporal Setting (2004)
    Oxford, UK and Malden, USA : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Review of international economics 12 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9396
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2004.00437.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies (2006)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Topics in theoretical economics 6.2006, 1, art6 
    Details
    ISSN: 1534-598X
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper develops a model of terrorist activity and behavior. A terrorist organization chooses the size and the number of attacks. The defending state chooses the level of security-deterrence measures. The equilibrium sequence is such that the Organization moves first, followed by the State. A defensive policy such as an innovation in security-deterrence technology tends to reduce the size of attacks but increase their number, while an offensive policy, lowering the total "strike" or "output" potential of a terrorist organization, has opposite effects. Both policies reduce the expected damage from terror. An individual's decision to become a terrorist or a financier is also modeled, leading to endogenous supplies of terrorists and funds. The effects of terrorist-flushing measures, provisions to curb the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and income-enhancing policies are evaluated by taking into account their "supply-side" effects.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol6/iss1/art6
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Visa Screening and Collateral Import of Terrorism (2007)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    The @B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 7.2007, 1, art53 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-0494
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A static game-theoretic model is developed to examine the post-9/11 interaction between the higher-education sector and the visa authority. We analyze the determination of the sponsorship of foreign scholars by the former and of visa scrutiny level by the latter, when some of the applicants, unknown to either party, are potential terrorists. When some genuine scholars are denied visa mistakenly, the intensity of visa screening is higher than its efficient level, but the number of students sponsored by the universities may or may not be higher. When delays associated with visa scrutiny cause some genuine scholars to be unable to enter, both the number of foreign scholars sponsored and the intensity of visa scrutiny are higher than their efficient levels. Under the same case, as the proportion of bad applicants (who are potential terrorists) for visas increases, the number of foreign scholars sponsored and the intensity of visa scrutiny increases, while there is a decline in the proportion of visa applicants granted visas. The basic analysis is extended to the case where the pool of applicants is endogenous.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art53
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    European Union Enlargement and Pollution: Why Caution is Necessary (2000)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    The @world economy 23 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9701
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9701.00338
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Export–Oriented Foreign Direct Investment and Local Content Requirement (2003)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Pacific economic review 8 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1468-0106
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a model in which foreign firms locate in a host country and export their produce to another (consuming) country. We consider both exogenous and endogenous numbers of foreign firms. These firms compete with domestic firms in the consuming country under oligopoly. Unemployment exists in both countries. We analyse the conflict of interest between the two countries on the level of local content for the foreign firms. Under free entry of foreign firms, the consuming country may want a less severe restriction on local contents than the host country, but not so when the number of foreign firms is exogenous.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.00179
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Asymmetric oligopoly, international trade, and welfare: a synthesis (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 65 (1997), S. 291-310 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: international oligopoly ; entry-exit policy, welfare ; L1 ; L5 ; H2
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper analyzes the relationship between market shares and welfare under the assumption of Cournot-oligopolistic interdependence in production. The model is general enough to deal with multiple countries, oligopolists with different levels of marginal costs within each country, and any distribution of world demand across countries. It is found that the elimination of a “minor” firm harms the country if the country's total production is “very little.” However, such a policy always benefits the country if it exports the commodity. The welfare effect of production subsidies and the case of foreign ownership of firms are also discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01226847
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies (2006)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2006-06-19
    Description: This paper develops a model of terrorist activity and behavior. A terrorist organization chooses the size and the number of attacks. The defending state chooses the level of security-deterrence measures. The equilibrium sequence is such that the Organization moves first, followed by the State. A defensive policy such as an innovation in security-deterrence technology tends to reduce the size of attacks but increase their number, while an offensive policy, lowering the total "strike" or "output" potential of a terrorist organization, has opposite effects. Both policies reduce the expected damage from terror. An individual's decision to become a terrorist or a financier is also modeled, leading to endogenous supplies of terrorists and funds. The effects of terrorist-flushing measures, provisions to curb the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and income-enhancing policies are evaluated by taking into account their "supply-side" effects.
    Print ISSN: 2194-6124
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1704
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 10
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Visa Screening and Collateral Import of Terrorism (2007)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2007-11-05
    Description: A static game-theoretic model is developed to examine the post-9/11 interaction between the higher-education sector and the visa authority. We analyze the determination of the sponsorship of foreign scholars by the former and of visa scrutiny level by the latter, when some of the applicants, unknown to either party, are potential terrorists. When some genuine scholars are denied visa mistakenly, the intensity of visa screening is higher than its efficient level, but the number of students sponsored by the universities may or may not be higher. When delays associated with visa scrutiny cause some genuine scholars to be unable to enter, both the number of foreign scholars sponsored and the intensity of visa scrutiny are higher than their efficient levels. Under the same case, as the proportion of bad applicants (who are potential terrorists) for visas increases, the number of foreign scholars sponsored and the intensity of visa scrutiny increases, while there is a decline in the proportion of visa applicants granted visas. The basic analysis is extended to the case where the pool of applicants is endogenous.
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1682
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...