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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Identification of stem cells in small intestine and colon by marker gene Lgr5 (2007)
    [s.l.] : Nature Publishing Group
    Nature 449 (2007), S. 1003-1007 
    Details
    ISSN: 1476-4687
    Source: Nature Archives 1869 - 2009
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Notes: [Auszug] The intestinal epithelium is the most rapidly self-renewing tissue in adult mammals. It is currently believed that four to six crypt stem cells reside at the +4 position immediately above the Paneth cells in the small intestine; colon stem cells remain undefined. Lgr5 ...
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature06196
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Computing the nucleolus of some combinatorially-structured games (2000)
    Springer
    Mathematical programming 88 (2000), S. 541-563 
    Details
    ISSN: 1436-4646
    Keywords: Key words: TU-games – (pre)nucleolus – computational complexity
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract. In this paper we introduce the ℬ-prenucleolus for a transferable utility game (N,v), where ℬ⊆2 N . The ℬ-prenucleolus is a straightforward generalization of the ordinary prenucleolus, where only the coalitions in ℬ determine the outcome. We impose a combinatorial structure on the collection ℬ which enables us to compute the ℬ-prenucleolus in ?(n 3|ℬ|) time. The algorithm can be used for computing the nucleolus of several classes of games, among which is the class of minimum cost spanning tree games.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00011385
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the core of information graph games (1993)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 21 (1993), S. 339-350 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper considers a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree games, called information graph games. It is proved that the core of these games can be described by a set of at most 2n — 1 linear constraints, wheren is the number of players. Furthermore, it is proved that each information graph game has an associated concave information graph game, which has the same core as the original game. Consequently, the set of extreme core allocations of an information graph game is characterized as the set of marginal allocation vectors of its associated concave game. Finally, it is proved that all extreme core allocations of an information graph game are marginal allocation vectors of the game itself, though not all marginal allocation vectors need to be core allocations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01240149
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the core of routing games (1997)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 193-205 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. A cooperative cost game, calledrouting game, is associated with this allocation problem, and anO(n 2) algorithm is given which computes a core element of a routing game if the core is non-empty. The non-emptiness of the core depends on the tour which is traversed by the repairman. Several procedures are given to construct tours which guarantee the non-emptiness of the core.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01295848
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the Core of Routing Games (1997)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 193-205 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract:  A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. A cooperative cost game, called routing game, is associated with this allocation problem, and an ?(n 2) algorithm is given which computes a core element of a routing game if the core is non-empty. The non-emptiness of the core depends on the tour which is traversed by the repairman. Several procedures are given to construct tours which guarantee the non-emptiness of the core.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01295848
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimum cost forest games (1997)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 367-377 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes to be connected. We show that the core of such a game may be empty, but that it is always non-empty if there is at least one customer who wants to be connected to all suppliers. Furthermore, the core is always non-empty if there are at most two suppliers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01263278
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimum Cost Forest Games (1997)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 367-377 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract:  In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes to be connected. We show that the core of such a game may be empty, but that it is always non-empty if there is at least one customer who wants to be connected to all suppliers. Furthermore, the core is always non-empty if there are at most two suppliers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01263278
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Note Computing the nucleolus of min-cost spanning tree games is NP-hard (1998)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 443-450 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: Nucleolus ; N-person game ; spanning tree ; NP-hard
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We prove that computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is in general NP-hard. The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050083
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A note on the 5-person traveling salesman game (1993)
    Springer
    Mathematical methods of operations research 38 (1993), S. 131-139 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract LetN=1,2,...,n be a set of customers andG=(N ∪ {0},E) an undirected connected graph with non-negative edge lengths. 0 is the home location of a salesman who visits the customers inN. Each subset $$S \subseteq N$$ can invite the salesman to visit its members only. The costc(S) of coalitionS is the length of a shortest tour that starts in 0, visits each customer inS at least once and returns to 0. The cooperative cost game defined in this way is called a (symmetric) traveling salesman game (TSG). The core of a TSG can be empty when ¦N¦ ≥ 6 and it was proved that it always has a non-empty core when ¦N¦≤ 4. In this note we shall prove that a TSG always has a non-empty core when ¦N¦=5.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01414209
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bin packing games (1998)
    Springer
    Mathematical methods of operations research 47 (1998), S. 499-510 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the subclass of games for which all bins have unit capacity and all items are larger than 1/3. We adopt the taxation model of Faigle and Kern and we prove that for a tax-rate of ɛ = sk7/1 the ɛ-core is always non empty. The bound is sharp, since for every ɛ 〈 sk7/1 there exist instances of the bin packing game within our sublass with an empty ɛ-core.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01198407
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