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  • 1
    Monograph available for loan
    Monograph available for loan
    Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck
    Call number: PIK B 100-09-0127
    Description / Table of Contents: Contents: Teil I - Grundlagen: 1 Einführung ; 2 Probleme der gesellschaftlichen Zielbestimmung ; 3 Staat, Eigentum, Effizienz ; Teil II - Perfekte Steuerbarkeit: 4 Allokationsprobleme ; 5 Private Güter ; 6 Öffentliche Güter ; 7 Zunehmende Skalenerträge in der Produktion ; Teil III - Imperfekte Steuerbarkeit: 8 Abweichung vom Prinzip der vollständigen Internalisierung ; 9 Asymmetrische Information ; 10 Imperfekt durchgesetzte Eigentumsordnungen
    Type of Medium: Monograph available for loan
    Pages: IX, 394 S. : graph. Darst.
    Edition: 2., neu bearb. Aufl.
    ISBN: 3161487966
    Series Statement: Neue ökonomische Grundrisse
    Location: A 18 - must be ordered
    Branch Library: PIK Library
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  • 2
    Call number: PIK B 130-13-0136
    In: Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft
    Description / Table of Contents: Contents: 1 Einleitung ; I Grundlagen ; 2 Historische Entwicklung ; 3 Normative Grundlagen der Untersuchung ; II Intragenerative Umverteilung ; 4 Einleitung ; 5 Mobilität von Personen ; 8 Mobiles Kapital ; 7 Freier Güterhandel ; III Intergenerative Umverteilung ; 8 Einleitung ; 9 Exogene Bevölkerungsentwicklung ; 10 Kleine offene Volkswirtschaft ; 11 2-Länder-Modell ; IV Zusammenfassung, Bewertung und Ausblick ; 12 Zusammenfassung der bisherigen Ergebnisse ; 13 Sozialpolitischer Zentralisierungsbedarf ; V Anhänge
    Type of Medium: Monograph available for loan
    Pages: XV, 262 S. : graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 3161471253
    Series Statement: Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft 7
    Note: Zugl.: Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 1997
    Location: A 18 - must be ordered
    Branch Library: PIK Library
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 88 (1996), S. 381-392 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to “struggle” and when to “subjugate”? Analysing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for “struggle” or “war” have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of population economics 10 (1997), S. 335-356 
    ISSN: 1432-1475
    Keywords: JEL classification: J13 ; H23 ; H55 ; Key words: Endogenous fertility ; pay-as-you-go financed pension systems
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. For pay-as-you-go financed pension systems, claims may be calculated according to individual contributions (income) or the number of children of a family. We analyse the optimal structure of these parameters in a model with endogenous fertility. It is shown that for both structural determinants there exists no interior solution of the problem of intragenerational utility maximisation. Thus, pure systems are always welfare maximizing. Furthermore, children-related pension claims induce a fiscal externality that tends to be positive. The determination of the optimal contribution rate shows that the widely accepted Aaron-condition is in general a misleading indicator for the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go financed pension systems.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a recentcontribution to Constitutional Political Economy, Azariadis andGalasso argued that due to the fact that constitutions allowfor a partial precommitment of the individuals, constitutionalrules are a good means to guarantee an efficient level of redistributionbetween generations. I argue that constitutional rules have noinherent advantage with respect to commitment compared to otherrules. However, the beneficial role of constitutions stems fromtheir ability to create a focal point that helps to solve theequilibrium selection problem.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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