ISSN:
1434-4750
Keywords:
Key words: Incentives, adverse selection, strategy-proofness, reward schemes, labour-managed firms
;
JEL classification: D82, J54, D20
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract. We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply effort inelastically. Thus, we assume away the problem of moral hazard in order to focus on that of adverse selection. We also consider a hierarchical structure of production in which the workers need to be organised in two tiers. We look for reward schemes which specify higher payments to workers who have been assigned to the top-level jobs when the principal detects no lies, distribute the entire output in all circumstances, and induce workers to revel their true abilities. We contemplate two scenarios. In the first one, each individual worker knows only her own type, while in the second scenario each worker also knows the abilities of all other workers. Our general conclusion is that the adverse selection problem can be solved in our context. However, the range of satisfactory reward schemes depends on the informational framework.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580000015
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