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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Ignorance Is Bliss as Trade Policy (1998)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    Review of international economics 6 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9396
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Consider domestic consumers that purchase from foreign firms. A presumption would be that consumers prefer being informed when quality is uncertain and exogenous. However, in a multifirm framework based on previous models, consumers can be worse off if they are informed of the quality. Further, in the Salop-circle model, consumers may prefer not learning even though expected high-quality output is greater with learning. Moreover, the possibility that consumers prefer uncertainty increases with the probability that products are of low quality. Essentially, the benefit of screening quality (better matching) can be less than its cost (higher prices from market segmentation).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00130
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Experimentation with heteroskedastic noise (1994)
    Springer
    Economic theory 4 (1994), S. 275-286 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Conclusion The direction of information with respect to the choice variable can easily change under a general class of distributions. The implication is that, when information is a function of the choice variable, the result of a model may be an outcome of the structure of the uncertainty and not of the existence of uncertainty. Thus, incomplete information does not always have such a clear effect on an agent's decision as previous models have suggested. If such results are key to the conclusions, then the structure of the model should be examined. The model presented here can be used to determine the relationship between information and the choice variable and to derive basic insights into the particular model being examined. It can also be used to eliminate the informational aspect of decisions so as to examine other aspects of a model, e.g., the incentive for information transmission (jamming) and other dynamic aspects (e.g., capital accumulation). Finally, the functional form of the unknown function as well as the error function are inportant in determining the direction of increased information, as the direction of increased noise can be the direction of experimentation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01221204
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
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    A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) (2021)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2021-08-25
    Description: In their seminal paper, Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 assume that it is not profitable for a firm to deviate to the supercompetitive price of Salop, S. C. 1979. “Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 141–56. In this note, it is shown that this assumption is violated if, roughly, each firm reaches less than half of all consumers unless it is a duopoly. This implies that most of the simulations in Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 are not actually equilibria. More importantly, this implies that for their equilibrium to exist nearly all consumers must receive at least one ad. For example, with just four firms in the market, at least 96% of the consumers must receive at least one ad, and this percentage increases with the number of firms in the market.
    Print ISSN: 2194-6124
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1704
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
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