Electronic Resource
350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK .
:
Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Journal of economics & management strategy
13 (2004), S. 0
ISSN:
1530-9134
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00029.x
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