ISSN:
1573-7160
Keywords:
Advertising
;
brand
;
generic
;
collusion
;
spillovers
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This study uses Lancaster's (1966, 1979) characteristics model of consumer theory, combined with imperfect information, to support a firm's advertising choice of a combination of brand and generic advertising. However, as consumers become well educated about a firm's product, spillovers from generic advertising become large. When spillovers are large, firms have a greater incentive to collude on generic advertising. The firm's decision to include advertising collectively with its competitors will follow from its own analysis of the benefits versus the costs of such a union. The success of collective advertising may, however, depend on the control of free-riders.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00163600
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