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  • 11
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    The evolution of eusociality (2010)
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2010-08-27
    Description: Eusociality, in which some individuals reduce their own lifetime reproductive potential to raise the offspring of others, underlies the most advanced forms of social organization and the ecologically dominant role of social insects and humans. For the past four decades kin selection theory, based on the concept of inclusive fitness, has been the major theoretical attempt to explain the evolution of eusociality. Here we show the limitations of this approach. We argue that standard natural selection theory in the context of precise models of population structure represents a simpler and superior approach, allows the evaluation of multiple competing hypotheses, and provides an exact framework for interpreting empirical observations.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279739/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279739/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Nowak, Martin A -- Tarnita, Corina E -- Wilson, Edward O -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-04/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- England -- Nature. 2010 Aug 26;466(7310):1057-62. doi: 10.1038/nature09205.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. martin_nowak@harvard.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20740005" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Animals ; Behavior, Animal/*physiology ; *Biological Evolution ; Female ; Humans ; Insects/physiology ; Male ; Models, Biological ; Selection, Genetic ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Published by Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
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  • 12
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    Winners don't punish (2008)
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
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    Publication Date: 2008-03-21
    Description: A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2292414/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2292414/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Dreber, Anna -- Rand, David G -- Fudenberg, Drew -- Nowak, Martin A -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-02/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- England -- Nature. 2008 Mar 20;452(7185):348-51. doi: 10.1038/nature06723.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18354481" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Adult ; *Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Female ; *Game Theory ; Humans ; Male ; Models, Psychological ; Punishment/*psychology ; Risk Assessment
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 13
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    Generosity: A winner's advice (2008)
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
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    Publication Date: 2008-12-05
    Description: 〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2711890/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2711890/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Nowak, Martin A -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-03/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- England -- Nature. 2008 Dec 4;456(7222):579. doi: 10.1038/456579a.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Harvard University, USA. nowak@fas.harvard.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19052610" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Humans ; Intelligence ; Reproduction ; Selection, Genetic
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Published by Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
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  • 14
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    Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment (2009)
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
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    Publication Date: 2009-01-06
    Description: Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Our behaviour towards other people depends not only on what they have done to us but also on what they have done to others. Indirect reciprocity works through reputation. The standard model of indirect reciprocity offers a binary choice: people can either cooperate or defect. Cooperation implies a cost for the donor and a benefit for the recipient. Defection has no cost and yields no benefit. Currently there is considerable interest in studying the effect of costly (or altruistic) punishment on human behaviour. Punishment implies a cost for the punished person. Costly punishment means that the punisher also pays a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment between individuals can promote cooperation. Here we study the role of costly punishment in an explicit model of indirect reciprocity. We analyse all social norms, which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient. We allow errors in assigning reputation and study gossip as a mechanism for establishing coherence. We characterize all strategies that allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Some of those strategies use costly punishment; others do not. We find that punishment strategies typically reduce the average payoff of the population. Consequently, there is only a small parameter region where costly punishment leads to an efficient equilibrium. In most cases the population does better by not using costly punishment. The efficient strategy for indirect reciprocity is to withhold help for defectors rather than punishing them.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2614697/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2614697/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Ohtsuki, Hisashi -- Iwasa, Yoh -- Nowak, Martin A -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-03/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- England -- Nature. 2009 Jan 1;457(7225):79-82. doi: 10.1038/nature07601.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. ohtsuki.h.aa@m.titech.ac.jp〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19122640" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Altruism ; Biological Evolution ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; *Game Theory ; Humans ; Models, Psychological ; *Punishment/psychology
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 15
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    Distant metastasis occurs late during the genetic evolution of pancreatic cancer (2010)
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
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    Publication Date: 2010-10-29
    Description: Metastasis, the dissemination and growth of neoplastic cells in an organ distinct from that in which they originated, is the most common cause of death in cancer patients. This is particularly true for pancreatic cancers, where most patients are diagnosed with metastatic disease and few show a sustained response to chemotherapy or radiation therapy. Whether the dismal prognosis of patients with pancreatic cancer compared to patients with other types of cancer is a result of late diagnosis or early dissemination of disease to distant organs is not known. Here we rely on data generated by sequencing the genomes of seven pancreatic cancer metastases to evaluate the clonal relationships among primary and metastatic cancers. We find that clonal populations that give rise to distant metastases are represented within the primary carcinoma, but these clones are genetically evolved from the original parental, non-metastatic clone. Thus, genetic heterogeneity of metastases reflects that within the primary carcinoma. A quantitative analysis of the timing of the genetic evolution of pancreatic cancer was performed, indicating at least a decade between the occurrence of the initiating mutation and the birth of the parental, non-metastatic founder cell. At least five more years are required for the acquisition of metastatic ability and patients die an average of two years thereafter. These data provide novel insights into the genetic features underlying pancreatic cancer progression and define a broad time window of opportunity for early detection to prevent deaths from metastatic disease.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148940/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148940/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Yachida, Shinichi -- Jones, Sian -- Bozic, Ivana -- Antal, Tibor -- Leary, Rebecca -- Fu, Baojin -- Kamiyama, Mihoko -- Hruban, Ralph H -- Eshleman, James R -- Nowak, Martin A -- Velculescu, Victor E -- Kinzler, Kenneth W -- Vogelstein, Bert -- Iacobuzio-Donahue, Christine A -- A62924/PHS HHS/ -- CA106610/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- CA121113/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- CA43460/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- CA57345/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- K08 CA106610/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- K08 CA106610-04/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- K08 CA106610-05/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- P50 CA062924/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- P50 CA062924-10/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- P50 CA062924-11/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- P50 CA062924-12/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA057345/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA057345-08/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA057345-09/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA057345-10/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA121113/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA121113-03/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA121113-04/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA121113-05/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 CA140599/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-02/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-03/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-04/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R37 CA043460/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R37 CA043460-24/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R37 CA043460-25/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R37 CA043460-26/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- R37 CA057345/CA/NCI NIH HHS/ -- Howard Hughes Medical Institute/ -- England -- Nature. 2010 Oct 28;467(7319):1114-7. doi: 10.1038/nature09515.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Pathology, The Sol Goldman Pancreatic Cancer Research Center, Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Baltimore, Maryland 21231, USA.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20981102" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Adenocarcinoma/genetics/pathology ; Autopsy ; Cell Lineage/genetics ; Clone Cells/metabolism/pathology ; DNA Mutational Analysis ; *Disease Progression ; Early Detection of Cancer ; *Evolution, Molecular ; Humans ; Liver Neoplasms/genetics/secondary ; Lung Neoplasms/genetics/secondary ; Models, Biological ; Mutation/*genetics ; Neoplasm Metastasis/*genetics/pathology ; Pancreas/metabolism/pathology ; Pancreatic Neoplasms/*genetics/*pathology ; Peritoneal Neoplasms/genetics/secondary ; Time Factors
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 16
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    Antigenic diversity thresholds and the development of AIDS (1991)
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Details
    Publication Date: 1991-11-15
    Description: Longitudinal studies of patients infected with HIV-1 reveal a long and variable incubation period between infection and the development of AIDS. Data from a small number of infected patients show temporal changes in the number of genetically distinct strains of the virus throughout the incubation period, with a slow but steady rise in diversity during the progression to disease. A mathematical model of the dynamic interaction between viral diversity and the human immune system suggests the existence of an antigen diversity threshold, below which the immune system is able to regulate viral population growth but above which the virus population induces the collapse of the CD4+ lymphocyte population. The model suggests that antigenic diversity is the cause, not a consequence, of immunodeficiency disease. The model is compared with available data, and is used to assess how the timing of the application of chemotherapy or immunotherapy influences the rate of progress to disease.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Nowak, M A -- Anderson, R M -- McLean, A R -- Wolfs, T F -- Goudsmit, J -- May, R M -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 1991 Nov 15;254(5034):963-9.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, UK.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1683006" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome/*immunology/prevention & control/therapy ; Base Sequence ; CD4-Positive T-Lymphocytes ; Computer Simulation ; DNA, Viral/genetics ; HIV Antigens/genetics ; HIV Core Protein p24/metabolism ; HIV-1/genetics/*immunology ; Humans ; Immunotherapy ; Leukocyte Count ; Molecular Sequence Data ; Mutation ; Oligonucleotides/chemistry ; Time Factors ; Vaccination
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 17
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    Five rules for the evolution of cooperation (2006)
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
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    Publication Date: 2006-12-13
    Description: Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279745/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279745/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Nowak, Martin A -- 1R01GM078986-01/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-04/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2006 Dec 8;314(5805):1560-3.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, and Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. martin_nowak@harvard.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17158317" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Biological Evolution ; Community Networks ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Family ; Game Theory ; Helping Behavior ; Humans ; Mathematics ; Selection, Genetic
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 18
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    Positive interactions promote public cooperation (2009)
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
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    Publication Date: 2009-09-05
    Description: The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be more effective than reward for maintaining cooperation in public goods games. The typical design of these studies, however, represses future consequences for today's actions. In an experimental setting, we compare public goods games followed by punishment, reward, or both in the setting of truly repeated games, in which player identities persist from round to round. We show that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff. We conclude that reward outperforms punishment in repeated public goods games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others.〈br /〉〈br /〉〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2875121/" target="_blank"〉〈img src="https://static.pubmed.gov/portal/portal3rc.fcgi/4089621/img/3977009" border="0"〉〈/a〉   〈a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2875121/" target="_blank"〉This paper as free author manuscript - peer-reviewed and accepted for publication〈/a〉〈br /〉〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Rand, David G -- Dreber, Anna -- Ellingsen, Tore -- Fudenberg, Drew -- Nowak, Martin A -- R01 GM078986/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- R01 GM078986-03/GM/NIGMS NIH HHS/ -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2009 Sep 4;325(5945):1272-5. doi: 10.1126/science.1177418.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19729661" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Cooperative Behavior ; Games, Experimental ; Humans ; Interpersonal Relations ; Punishment ; *Reward
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 19
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    Dissecting x-ray-emitting gas around the center of our galaxy (2013)
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
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    Publication Date: 2013-08-31
    Description: Most supermassive black holes (SMBHs) are accreting at very low levels and are difficult to distinguish from the galaxy centers where they reside. Our own Galaxy's SMBH provides an instructive exception, and we present a close-up view of its quiescent x-ray emission based on 3 megaseconds of Chandra observations. Although the x-ray emission is elongated and aligns well with a surrounding disk of massive stars, we can rule out a concentration of low-mass coronally active stars as the origin of the emission on the basis of the lack of predicted iron (Fe) Kalpha emission. The extremely weak hydrogen (H)-like Fe Kalpha line further suggests the presence of an outflow from the accretion flow onto the SMBH. These results provide important constraints for models of the prevalent radiatively inefficient accretion state.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Wang, Q D -- Nowak, M A -- Markoff, S B -- Baganoff, F K -- Nayakshin, S -- Yuan, F -- Cuadra, J -- Davis, J -- Dexter, J -- Fabian, A C -- Grosso, N -- Haggard, D -- Houck, J -- Ji, L -- Li, Z -- Neilsen, J -- Porquet, D -- Ripple, F -- Shcherbakov, R V -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2013 Aug 30;341(6149):981-3. doi: 10.1126/science.1240755.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Institute of Astronomy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK. wqd@astro.umass.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23990554" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
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    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 20
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    Cancer. Unwanted evolution (2013)
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2013-11-23
    Description: 〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bozic, Ivana -- Nowak, Martin A -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2013 Nov 22;342(6161):938-9. doi: 10.1126/science.1247887.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24264980" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Animals ; Cell Transformation, Neoplastic/*genetics/*pathology ; *Gene Expression Regulation, Neoplastic ; Intestinal Neoplasms/*genetics/*pathology ; Neoplastic Stem Cells/*pathology
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    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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