ALBERT

Notes: There are conflicting tendencies among recent developments in bargaining and participation at the workplace level in Europe. While there is an emphasis on decentralisation of bargaining structures in many countries, there is considerable variance. Similarly, there is a diversity of approaches to both direct and indirect forms of participation. Despite attempts by the European Community to integrate policies on these matters among member countries, external influences such as the globalisation of economies and technologies are leading to diverse outcomes.

Notes: In many settings, economic efficiency in law enforcement appears to require differential enforcement of the law. For example, as shown in the paper, crime prone populations warrant stronger sanctions than less crime prone populations if costly sanctions are to be meted out in an efficient manner. However, narrow economic analysis of efficient sanctions attributes an efficiency to modern democratic governments which can not be easily justified by analysis or experience. This paper demonstrates that constraining majority coalitions to write laws consistent with the principle of equal protection generally yields more desirable outcomes than obtained when majority coalitions are permitted to discriminate in an arbitrary manner. The efficiency case for equality before the law is based on political considerations rather than economic ones per se.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDas Kriterium der ökonomischen Effizienz bei der Durchsetzung von Recht scheint in vielen Situationen eine differenzierende Durchsetzung des Rechts zu erfordern. Wie in diesem Artikel ge-zeigt werden kann, können beispielsweise für mehr zu Verbrechen neigende Bevölkerungsteile härtere Strafen gerechtfertigt sein, als für weniger zu Verbrechen neigende Bevölkerungsteile, wenn die mit hohen Kosten verbundene Bestrafung von Verbrechen effizient eingesetzt werden soil. Allerdings schreibt die ökonomische Analyse von effzienten Strafen modernen demokratischen Regierungen eine Effizienz zu, die durch Analyse oder Erfahrung nur schwer zu bestätigen ist. Dieses Papier zeigt nämlich, dass wünschenswertere Ergebnisse zu erzielen sind, wenn man Mehrheitskoalitionen dazu zwingt, Gesetze zu schreiben, die mit dem Prinzip der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz übereinstimmen, als wenn man Mehrheitskoalitionen erlaubt, auf willkürliche Weise zu diskriminieren. Im Ergebnis lasst sich daher feststellen, dass die Effizienzargumente im Hinblick auf die Gleichheit bzw. Ungleicheit vor dem Gesetz lediglich auf politischen Überlegungen beruhen, aber nicht auf ökonomischen.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉDans beaucoup de situations, l'éfficience économique de l'application de la loi semble exiger une application différenciée. Par exemple, comme il est expliqué dans l'article, des lois plus restrictives peuvent ětre appliqués pour une partie de la population étant plus incliné a la criminalité que pour des parties moins inclinées, si les coǔts élevés de l'application de la loi doivent ětre utilisés avec éfficience. Pourtant, l'analyse économique sur la punition éfficiente attribue aux gouvernements démocratiques modernes une éfficience qui ne peut pas ětre justifyé aisément par l'analyse et l'expérience. Cet article montre que des résultats meilleures peuvent ětre atteints si des coalitions majoritaires peuvent ětre contraintes à concevoir des lois qui sont consistents avec le principe de la protection égale devant la loi, que si une coalition majoritaire permet de discriminer une partie de la population de manière arbitraire. L'éfficience du principe de l'égalité devant la loi est basé sur des considérations politiques, et non sur des considérations économiques.

Notes: This article replicates the Ross and Staw research on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Facility in a mid-sized, entrepreneurial, family-owned firm. Although many of the Ross and Staw conclusions are applicable for the present research project involving Info Vision, some modification to their research propositions is necessitated due primarily to the entrepreneurial nature of Info Vision'S owners.

Notes: Estate laws can have a significant effect on ownership transfers for family companies, influencing both the ease of the transfer and who receives shares of the company. By comparing the estate laws of various countries, we not only can learn about the culture of a country, but also gain insights into the effects of these laws on family business. A review of four countries’ estate laws (for the United States, Finland, Chile, and Taiwan) demonstrates four philosophies and approaches to intergenerational wealth distribution. The authors discuss some implications of these laws on ownership transfers in family companies.

Notes: Sixty-three family business CEOs were surveyed and interviewed to better understand why some successors are able to grow revenues and profits for their respective family firms, and why some do not. This research uncovers significant elements that differentiate effective from less effective successors.

Notes: Family owned and managed firms exhibit remarkable parallels to pre-industrial chiefdoms because the typical economic environment in which they exist limits them to a size and scale equivalent to that of a chiefdom. Using anthropological research this study inventories all known procedures of accommodating multiple heirs to the paramountcy of pre-industrial chiefdoms. It uses this exhaustive inventory to characterize the succession process in modern family owned and managed firms. The major theoretical concept adopted from anthropology is that of polity, defined as an autonomous system of institutional finance and organizational support (resource control and governance). Using terms such as polity helps us to recognize the universality of succession processes. Succession processes in family firms are less idiosyncratic than we once thought. Thus, we can fruitfully explore structural similarities between pre-industrial organizations and modern family firms using the considerable body of field research literature on chiefdoms (Goody, 1958; Barrett, 1965) which finds that every scheme to accommodate multiple successors falls into one of two categories: (a) personnel strategies and (b) asset strategies. A second critical concept is that while it is possible to inventory all possible outcomes (here, succession strategies) in any dynamic system, no single outcome can be accurately predicted in advance. The purpose of this paper is to provide an exhaustive inventory of possible outcomes of the succession process, rather than trying to predict the strategy chosen in a given case. The anthropological perspective provides a much-needed, empirically based, comprehensive model of succession processes in family firms and permits a more nomothetic approach to family firm research.