ISSN:
1573-8477
Keywords:
Nepotism
;
Tit-For-Tat
;
game theory
;
kin selection
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Biology
Notes:
Summary It is well known that interactions among relatives facilitate the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Game theoretic models show, however, that guarded altruism (such as Tit-For-Tat) can evolve among non-relatives when individuals interact many times and ‘cheating’ behaviours can be punished. Strangely, no one has yet asked whether the guarded altruism that evolves among non-relatives might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altriusm. We present a series of one-locus sexual haploid models in which Tit-For-Tat, unconditional altruists and selfish individuals interact in groups of full siblings. Tit-For-Tat frequently (but not always) replaced unguarded altruism, in which case the strategic ‘rules’ for interacting with kin vs non-kin are identical. Even when Tit-For-Tat is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism for non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an ‘outlaw’ from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02214233
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