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Nepotism vs Tit-For-Tat, or, why should you be nice to your rotten brother?

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Summary

It is well known that interactions among relatives facilitate the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Game theoretic models show, however, that guarded altruism (such as Tit-For-Tat) can evolve among non-relatives when individuals interact many times and ‘cheating’ behaviours can be punished. Strangely, no one has yet asked whether the guarded altruism that evolves among non-relatives might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altriusm. We present a series of one-locus sexual haploid models in which Tit-For-Tat, unconditional altruists and selfish individuals interact in groups of full siblings. Tit-For-Tat frequently (but not always) replaced unguarded altruism, in which case the strategic ‘rules’ for interacting with kin vs non-kin are identical. Even when Tit-For-Tat is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism for non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an ‘outlaw’ from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci.

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  1. Department of Biological Sciences, State University of New York, P. O. Box 6000, 13902-6000, Binghamton, New York, USA

    D. S. Wilson & L. A. Dugatkin

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  1. D. S. Wilson
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  2. L. A. Dugatkin
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Wilson, D.S., Dugatkin, L.A. Nepotism vs Tit-For-Tat, or, why should you be nice to your rotten brother?. Evol Ecol 5, 291–299 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02214233

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